Editing Multiple drafts model (section)

===Unoriginality===
Multiple drafts is also attacked for making a claim to novelty. It may be the case, however, that such attacks mistake which features Dennett is claiming as novel. Korb states that, "I believe that the central thesis will be relatively uncontentious for most cognitive scientists, but that its use as a cleaning solvent for messy puzzles will be viewed less happily in most quarters." {{harv|Korb|1993}} In this way, Dennett uses uncontroversial ideas towards more controversial ends, leaving him open to claims of unoriginality when uncontroversial parts are focused upon.

Even the notion of consciousness as drafts is not unique to Dennett. According to Hankins, Dieter Teichert suggests that [[Paul Ricoeur]]'s theories agree with Dennett's on the notion that "the self is basically a narrative entity, and that any attempt to give it a free-floating independent status is misguided." [Hankins] Others see [[Derrida]]'s (1982) representationalism as consistent with the notion of a mind that has perceptually changing content without a definitive present instant.<ref name="derrida">{{cite book | last=Derrida | first=J. | year=1982 |orig-year=1972 | title=Margins of Philosophy | publisher=University of Chicago Press | isbn=978-0-226-14326-2 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sHYoqEcbgs4C}}</ref>

To those who believe that consciousness entails something more than behaving in all ways conscious, Dennett's view is seen as [[eliminativism|eliminativist]], since it denies the existence of [[qualia]] and the possibility of [[philosophical zombie]]s. However, Dennett is not denying the existence of the mind or of consciousness, only what he considers a naive view of them. The point of contention is whether Dennett's own definitions are indeed more accurate: whether what we think of when we speak of perceptions and consciousness can be understood in terms of nothing more than their effect on behaviour.