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Necessary and Proper Clause
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==Later history== In a related case after the [[American Civil War]], the clause was employed, in combination with other enumerated powers, to give the federal government virtually complete control over currency.<ref>Legal Tender Cases (''[[Juilliard v. Greenman]]''), [http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=110&invol=421 110 U.S. 421, 449 (1884)].</ref> The clause has been paired with the [[Commerce Clause]] to provide the constitutional basis for a wide variety of [[federal law]]s. For instance, various reforms involved in the [[New Deal]] were found to be necessary and proper enactments of the objective of regulating interstate commerce.<ref>{{cite journal | title=Rethinking Constitutional Federalism | last=Gardbaum |first=Steven | year=1996 |journal=Texas Law Review |volume=74 |page=795}}</ref>{{fcn|reason=which issue?|date=November 2024}} The influence of the Necessary and Proper Clause and its broader interpretation under ''[[McCulloch v. Maryland]]'' (1819) in American jurisprudence can be seen in cases generally to be thought to involve simply the Commerce Clause. In ''[[Wickard v. Filburn]]'' (1942), the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute making it a crime for a farmer to produce more wheat than was allowed under price and production controls, even if the excess production was for the farmer's own personal consumption. The Necessary and Proper Clause was used to justify the regulation of production and consumption.<ref>''Wickard v. Filburn'', 317 U.S. 111 (1942)</ref> Also, in addition to both clauses being used to uphold federal laws that affect economic activity, they also were used to justify federal [[criminal law]]s as well.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/560/08-1224/| title=United States v. Comstock 560 U.S. 126 (2010) | publisher=Justia}}</ref> For example, Congress in the [[Federal Kidnapping Act]] (1932) made it a [[federal crime]] to transport a kidnapped person across state lines because the transportation would be an act of [[interstate commerce|interstate activity]] over which the Congress has power. It has also provided justification for a wide range of criminal laws relating to interference with the federal government's rightful operation, including federal laws against assaulting or murdering federal employees.{{Citation needed|date=April 2010}} In ''[[National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius]]'' (2012), the Supreme Court ruled that the [[individual mandate]] of the [[Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act]] cannot be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Chief Justice [[John Roberts]] ruled that the mandate cannot "be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause as an integral part of the Affordable Care Act's other reforms. Each of this Court's prior cases upholding laws under that Clause involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power. ... The individual mandate, by contrast, vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power and draw within its regulatory scope those who would otherwise lie outside it. Even if the individual mandate is 'necessary' to the Affordable Care Act's other reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a 'proper' means for making those reforms effective."<ref>{{cite web|last=Roberts|first=John G. Jr.|title=The Supreme Court Decision on Obama's Health Care Law|url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/29/us/29healthcare-scotus-docs.html|work=The New York Times|access-date=July 1, 2012|date=June 28, 2012}}</ref> According to its proponents, the ruling returns the clause to its original interpretation, outlined by [[John Marshall]] in ''[[McCulloch v. Maryland]]''. According to [[David Kopel]], the clause "simply restates the background principle that Congress can exercise powers which are merely 'incidental' to Congress's enumerated powers".<ref name="Kopel">{{cite web|last=Kopel|first=David|title=Major limits on the Congress's powers, in an opinion worthy of John Marshall|url=http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/major-limits-on-the-congresss-powers-in-an-opinion-worthy-of-john-marshall/|publisher=[[SCOTUSblog]]|access-date=July 1, 2012|date=June 28, 2012}}</ref>
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