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Ned Block
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===Consciousness=== In his more recent work on [[consciousness]], he has made a distinction between [[phenomenal consciousness]] and [[Phenomenal consciousness#Types of consciousness|access consciousness]], where phenomenal consciousness consists of subjective experience and feelings and access consciousness consists of that information globally available in the cognitive system for the purposes of reasoning, speech and high-level action control. He has argued that access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness might not always coincide in human beings. ====Overflow argument==== Ned Block has mounted the overflow argument, which argues against the view that phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness are identical. Instead, Ned Block argues that phenomenal consciousness overflows conscious access, meaning that one can consciously experience something that they do not have conscious access to. Empirically, this means that a subject can have some content included in their conscious experience, but lack the cognitive recognition of the content that is necessary to report that the content was in fact experienced.<ref name="Block 2011 pp. 567β575">{{cite journal | last=Block | first=Ned | title=Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access | journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences | volume=15 | issue=12 | date=2011 | doi=10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.001 | pages=567β575| pmid=22078929 | url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BLOPCO-2 }}</ref>
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