Editing Neutral monism (section)

== History ==
{{Expand section|date=August 2020}}

=== Antecedents ===
Early examples of neutral monism are found in [[Indian philosophy]].<ref name=Silberstein2017>{{cite journal |last=Silberstein |first=Michael |date=2017-11-26 |title=Panentheism, Neutral Monism, and Advaita Vedanta |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321453990_PANENTHEISM_NEUTRAL_MONISM_AND_ADVAITA_VEDANTA |journal=[[Zygon (journal)|Zygon]] |volume=52 |issue=4 |pages=1123-1145 |doi=10.1111/zygo.12367 |access-date=2024-08-13}}</ref><ref name=Cumming2023>{{cite web |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CUMROS |title=The Nondual Mind: Vedānta, Kashmiri Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and Spinoza |last=Cumming |first=James H. |date=2023 |website=[[PhilPapers]] |access-date=2024-08-13}}</ref> [[Baruch Spinoza]] and [[David Hume]] provided accounts of reality that may also be interpreted as neutral monism. Spinoza's metaphysics in ''[[Ethics (Spinoza book)|Ethics]]'' argues for a monistic worldview, as well as a neutral one where body and mind are the same.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Rosencrantz|first1=Gary|last2=Hoffman|first2=Joshua|title=Historical Dictionary of Metaphysics|publisher=ScareCrow Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0810859500|page=287}}</ref> [[H. H. Price]] argues that Hume's [[empiricism]] introduces a "neutral monist theory of sensation" as both "matter and mind are constructed out of sense-data".<ref>{{Cite book|last=Price|first=H. H.|title=Perception|year=1932|location=London|page=105}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Backhaus|first=Wilf K.|title=Is Hume a Neutral Monist?|date=1991|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview19917216|journal=Southwest Philosophy Review|volume=7|issue=2|pages=1–15|doi=10.5840/swphilreview19917216|issn=0897-2346|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

In the late 19th century, physicist [[Ernst Mach]] theorized that physical entities are nothing apart from their perceived mental properties.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Ernst|first=Mach|url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1147811644|title=Analysis of Sensations, and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical|date=2019|publisher=Forgotten Books|isbn=978-0-243-66619-5|oclc=1147811644}}</ref> Mach ultimately surmises that "both object and ego are provisional fictions of the same kind".<ref>{{Citation |last1=Mach |first1=Ernst |title=Knowledge and Error: Sketches on the Psychology of Enquiry |date=1976 |pages=79–91 |chapter=Knowledge and Error |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-1428-1_7 |place=Dordrecht |publisher=Springer Netherlands |doi=10.1007/978-94-010-1428-1_7 |isbn=978-90-277-0282-1 |access-date=2021-10-04 |last2=Hiebert |first2=Erwin N.|author-link2=Erwin N. Hiebert}}</ref>

=== Early 20th century ===
[[William James]] propounded the notion of [[radical empiricism]] to advance neutral monism in his essay "Does Consciousness Exist?" in 1904 (reprinted in ''Essays in [[Radical Empiricism]]'' in 1912).<ref>[[William James|James, William]]. (1912).
[https://archive.org/stream/essaysinradicale00jameuoft#page/n7/mode/2up ''Essays in Radical Empiricism'']. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.</ref> William James was one of the earliest philosophers to fully articulate a complete neutral monist view of the world. He did so largely in reaction to neo-[[Kantianism]], which was prevalent at the time.<ref name=":2">{{Citation|last=Stubenberg|first=Leopold|title=Neutral Monism|date=2018|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/neutral-monism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Fall 2018|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-08-30}}</ref>

A convert of James, [[Bertrand Russell]] advocated for neutral monism, coining the term itself. Russell expressed interest in neutral monism early on his career, and officially endorsed the view from 1919 onward, at least until 1927, when  ''The Analysis of Matter'' appeared. The ontology of neutral monism conformed to the "supreme maxim in scientific philosophising", as Russell put it in "Logical Atomism" in 1924. Russell's conception of neutral monism went through a number of versions through his career.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":1" /> Russell's own brand of neutral monism, at whichever stage, can be referred to as ''Russell's neutral monism'', but [[#Russellian monism|Russellian monism]] tends to refer to Russell's adherence to the causal theory of perception on the one hand, and the data of consciousness on the other, the latter reduced to neurological events. This view is actually materialist, which neutral monism is not. The version of 1919-1927 is however compatible with [[logical atomism]], Russel's earlier ontology. <ref>{{Cite book|last=Russell|first=Bertrand|title=An Outline of Philosophy|publisher=Routledge|year=2009|isbn=978-1-134-02748-4|location=Oxon|pages=xiii}}</ref> His position was contentious among his contemporaries; [[G. E. Moore|G.E Moore]] maintained that Russell's philosophy was flawed due to a misinterpretation of facts (e.g. the concept of acquaintance).<ref>{{Cite book|last=Oaklander|first=L. Nathan|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=S33gDwAAQBAJ&q=neutral+monism+c.d.+broad&pg=PT30|title=C. D. Broad's Philosophy of Time|date=2020-04-29|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-317-67951-6|language=en}}</ref>

Neutral monism about the [[mind–body problem|mind–body relationship]] is described by historian [[C. D. Broad]] in ''The Mind and Its Place in Nature''. Broad's list of possible views about the mind–body problem, which became known simply as "Broad's famous list of 1925" (see chapter XIV of Broad's book)<ref>[[C. D. Broad|Broad, C. D]] (1925) [http://www.ditext.com/broad/mpn.html ''The Mind and Its Place in Nature'']. London: Kegan Paul.</ref> states the basis of what this theory had been and was to become. [[Whately Carington]] in his book ''Matter, Mind, and Meaning'' (1949) advocated a form of neutral monism. He held that mind and matter both consist of the same kind of components known as "cognita" or [[sense data]].<ref>[[C. D. Broad|Broad, C. D]]. (1950). ''Matter, Mind, and Meaning by W. Whately Carington. Philosophy''. Vol. 25, No. 94. pp. 275–277.</ref><ref>Grenell, R. G. (1953). ''Matter, Mind and Meaning by Whately Carington''. The Quarterly Review of Biology. Vol. 28, No. 4. pp. 404–405.</ref><ref>Oakeshott, Michael; O'Sullivan, Luke. (2007). ''The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence: Essays and Reviews 1926–51''. Imprint Academic. p. 286. {{ISBN|978-1845401801}} "The doctrine that Mr Carington comes to favour is a form of Neutral Monism: the common constituents of mind and matter are sense-data or cognita. In themselves these cognita are neither mental nor material."</ref> Russian psychologist [[Boris Sidis]] also appears to have adhered to some form of neutral monism.<ref>Sidis, Boris (1914). [https://www.sidis.net/fnap2.htm Foundations of Normal and Abnormal Psychology], retrieved 02/03/19.</ref>

=== Present ===
[[David Chalmers]]<ref name="Edward Craig 1998 p. 816"/> has been known to express sympathy toward neutral monism. In ''[[The Conscious Mind]]'' (1996) he concludes that facts about consciousness are "further facts about our world" and that there ought to be more to reality than just the physical. He then goes on to engage with a Platonic rendition of neutral monism that holds information as fundamental. Though Chalmers believes neutral monism and panpsychism ought to be taken seriously, he considers the combination problem to be point of concern. He considers Russell's solution of "protophenominal properties" to be ad hoc, and thinks such speculation undercuts the parsimony that made neutral monism initially appealing.

According to [[Stephen Stich]] and Ted Warfield, neutral monism has not been a popular view in philosophy as it is difficult to develop or understand the nature of the neutral elements.<ref>[[Stephen Stich|Stich, Stephen]]; Warfield, Ted. (2003). ''The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind''. Blackwell Publishing. pp. 20-21. {{ISBN|0-631-21774-6}}</ref> Nevertheless, a Machian version of the view has been defended by [[Jonathan Westphal]] in ''The Mind–Body Problem'', 2016.<ref>MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2016.</ref>