Editing Operation Rolling Thunder (section)

==Over the north==

===Strategic persuasion===
Under the doctrine of "gradualism", in which threatening destruction would serve as a more influential signal of American determination than destruction itself, it was thought better to hold important targets "hostage" by bombing trivial ones. From the beginning of Rolling Thunder, Washington dictated which targets would be struck, the day and hour of the attack, the number, and types of aircraft and the tonnages and types of ordnance utilized, and sometimes even the direction of the attack.<ref>Morocco, p. 55.</ref> Airstrikes were strictly forbidden within {{convert|30|nmi|km|-1}} of Hanoi and within {{convert|10|nmi|km|-1}} of the port of [[Haiphong]]. A thirty-mile buffer zone also extended along the length of the Chinese frontier. According to U.S. Air Force historian Earl Tilford:

<blockquote>Targeting bore little resemblance to reality in that the sequence of attacks was uncoordinated and the targets were approved randomly—even illogically. The North's airfields, which, according to any rational targeting policy, should have been hit first in the campaign, were also off-limits.<ref>Tilford, p. 109.</ref></blockquote>

[[File:A-4E attacking train in North Vietnam c1965.jpeg|thumb|A U.S. Navy [[Douglas A-4 Skyhawk]] attacking a train in North Vietnam with a ''Zuni'' rocket]]

Although some of these restrictions were later loosened or rescinded, Johnson (with McNamara's support) kept a tight rein on the campaign, which continuously infuriated the American military commanders, right-wing members of Congress, and even some within the administration itself.<ref>Morocco, p. 57.</ref> One of the primary objectives of the operation, at least to the military, should have been the closure of Haiphong and other ports by aerial mining, thereby slowing or halting the flow of seaborne supplies entering the north. Johnson refused to take such a provocative action, however, and such an operation was not implemented until 1972. There was also little consultation between Johnson and the military chiefs during the target selection process. Even the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General [[Earle Wheeler]], was not present for most of the critical discussions of 1965 and participated only occasionally thereafter.<ref>Thompson, p. 80.</ref>

[[File:Rolling Thunder route packages.jpg|thumb|[[Route Package]] organization]]

The majority of strikes during Rolling Thunder were launched from four air bases in [[Thailand]]: [[Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base|Korat]], [[Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base|Takhli]], [[Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base|Udorn]], and [[Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base|Ubon]].{{efn|Only one South Vietnam-based squadron (based at [[Da Nang Air Base|Da Nang]]) participated in the DRV missions.}} The aircraft refueled from aerial tankers over [[Laos]] before flying on to their targets in the DRV. After attacking their targets (usually by [[dive-bombing]]) the strike forces would either fly directly back to Thailand or exit over the relatively safe waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. It was quickly decided that, in order to limit airspace conflicts between air force and naval strike forces, North Vietnam was divided into six target regions called "[[Route Package|route packages]]", each of which was assigned to either the Air Force or Navy and into which the other was forbidden to intrude.<ref>{{cite journal |url=http://www.airforcemag.com/magazinearchive/pages/1999/november%201999/1199pack.aspx?signon=false |title=Route Pack 6 |first= Walter |last=Boyne |journal=Air Force Magazine |date=November 1999}}</ref>

[[File:A-4E Skyhawks attacking Phuong Dinh bridge Vietnam 1967.jpg|thumb|A-4E Skyhawks attacking Phuong Dinh bridge in 1967]]

Naval strikes were launched from the aircraft carriers of [[Task Force 77 (U.S. Navy)|Task Force 77]], cruising off the North Vietnamese coast at [[Yankee Station]]. Naval aircraft, which had shorter ranges (and carried lighter bomb loads) than their air force counterparts, approached their targets from seaward with the majority of their strikes flown against coastal targets.{{efn|This also helped account for the lower number of aircraft and pilot losses suffered by the Navy. Fighters had only to defend a 90-degree arc in front of the strike force, SAM exposure was more limited, and coastal targets made the shorter distances of search and rescue operations more conducive to success.}}{{cn|date=May 2025}}

On 3 April the Joint Chiefs persuaded McNamara and Johnson to launch a four-week attack on North Vietnam's lines of communication, which would isolate the country from its overland sources of supply in China and the Soviet Union. About one-third of the North's imports came down the [[Hanoi–Lào Cai railway]] from China, while the remaining two-thirds came by sea through Haiphong and other ports.<ref>Thompson, p. 26.</ref> For the first time in the campaign, targets were to be chosen for their military, rather than their psychological, significance.<ref>Morocco, p. 58.</ref> During the four weeks, 26 bridges and seven ferries were destroyed.<ref>Morocco, p. 61.</ref> Other targets included the extensive North Vietnamese radar system, barracks, and ammunition depots.<ref name=Drew>Drew 1986.</ref>

The panhandle of southern North Vietnam remained the primary focus of operations, and total sorties flown there rose from 3,600 in April to 4,000 in May.<ref name="Morocco, p. 63">Morocco, p. 63.</ref> Slowly moving away from the destruction of fixed targets, "armed reconnaissance" missions, in which small formations of aircraft patrolled highways, railroads, and rivers, searching for targets of opportunity, were authorized. These missions increased from two to 200 sorties per week by the end of 1965.<ref name="Morocco, p. 63"/> Eventually, armed reconnaissance missions constituted 75 percent of the total bombing effort, in part because the system through which fixed targets were requested, selected, and authorized was so complicated and unwieldy.<ref>Tilford, p. 108.</ref>

===Changing priorities and POL strikes===
If Rolling Thunder was supposed to "send signals" to Hanoi to desist in its actions, it did not seem to be working. On 8 April, responding to requests for peace negotiations, North Vietnamese premier [[Pham Van Dong]] stated that they could only begin when: the bombing was halted; the U.S. had removed all of its troops from the south; the Saigon government recognized the demands of the VC, and it was agreed that the reunification of Vietnam would be settled by the Vietnamese themselves.<ref>Morocco, p. 62.</ref>

As part of a large attack on the [[Thanh Hóa Bridge]] on 3 April, the VPAF first appeared as two flights of four [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17]]s launched from [[Phúc Yên Air Base|Noi Bai airbase]] and shot down an [[F-8 Crusader]],{{efn|Some sources, including Toperczer, claim two F-8s were shot down on 3 April. But the U.S. accounting of SE Asia losses shows no Crusaders lost that date.}} while losing just one of their own aircraft, written off when it landed on a river bed after running short of fuel. A repeat the next day resulted in a classic [[dogfight]] with [[F-100 Super Sabre]]s and [[Republic F-105 Thunderchief|F-105s]] fighting with more MiG-17s. In total, the USAF lost eleven aircraft to air and ground forces, while the VPAF lost three of their fighters.<ref>Toperczer, p. 88.</ref>

The entire complexion of the American effort was altered on 8 March 1965, when 3,500 [[U.S. Marines]] came ashore at [[Da Nang]], ostensibly to defend [[Da Nang Air Base]] which was committed to prosecuting Rolling Thunder.<ref>Karnow, p. 415.</ref> The mission of the ground forces was expanded to combat operations, and the aerial campaign became a secondary operation, overwhelmed by troop deployments and the escalation of ground operations in South Vietnam.<ref>Sheehan, pp. 442–443; Tilford, p. 115.</ref> Until the third week of April, Rolling Thunder had enjoyed at least equal status with air missions conducted in the south. After that time, strikes that interfered with requirements for the southern battlefield were either cut back or canceled.<ref>Schilght, ''Air War in South Vietnam''. p. 33.</ref>

[[File:F-105 hit by SA-2 over Vietnam.jpg|thumb|An F-105D hit by an [[S-75 Dvina|SA-2]] missile]]

On 5 April 1965, U.S. reconnaissance discovered that the construction of North Vietnamese [[surface-to-air missile]] (SAM) launching sites. Washington refused to allow the Air Force and Navy to attack the sites since most were near the restricted urban areas.<ref>Morocco, p. 107.</ref> Then, on 24 July, an [[McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II]] was shot down by a [[SA-2 Guideline]] missile. Three days later, a one-time strike was authorized against two missile sites. The sites were traps with [[Military dummy|dummies]] defended by anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Six strike aircraft were destroyed, with two pilots killed, one missing, two captured, and one rescued. A U.S. pilot described the action as "looking like the end of the world."<ref name="Morocco, p. 109">Morocco, p. 109.</ref>

On 29 June 1965, airstrikes against the North's petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage areas were authorized by Johnson. The American military had advocated such strikes since the inception of the operation, believing that to deny North Vietnam its POL would cause its military effort to grind to a halt. At first, the strikes appeared highly successful, destroying tank farms near Hanoi and Haiphong and leading the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] to estimate that 70 percent of North Vietnam's oil facilities had been destroyed for the loss of 43 aircraft.<ref>Morocco, p. 130</ref> The loss of the oil storage tank farms and refineries proved to be only a short-term inconvenience for North Vietnam, however, since Hanoi had anticipated just such a campaign and had during that time dispersed the majority of its POL stocks in {{convert|190|L|USgal|adj=on}} drums across the length of the country. The POL attacks were halted on 4 September, after U.S. intelligence admitted that there was "no evidence yet of any shortages of POL in North Vietnam."<ref>Morocco, p. 131.</ref>

By 24 December 1965, 180 U.S. aircraft had been lost during the campaign (85 Air Force, 94 Navy and one Marine Corps). Eight RVNAF aircraft had also been lost.<ref name=Hobson15-166/>{{efn|These losses include not only combat shootdowns, but those due to accidents, mechanical failure and unknown causes.}} Air Force aircrews had flown 25,971 sorties and dropped 32,063 tons of bombs. Naval aviators had flown 28,168 sorties and dropped 11,144 tons. The RVNAF had contributed 682 missions with unknown ordnance tonnages.<ref>Van Staaveren, p. 316.</ref>