Editing Operation Varsity (section)

===German preparation===
By this period of the conflict, the number of German divisions remaining on the Western Front was rapidly declining, both in numbers and quality, a fact in the Allies' favour.<ref>Tugwell, p. 269</ref> By the night of 23 March, Montgomery had the equivalent of more than 30 divisions under his command, while the Germans fielded around 10 divisions, all weakened from constant fighting.<ref>O'Neill, p. 302</ref> The best German formation the Allied airborne troops would face was the [[1st Parachute Army (Germany)|1st Parachute Army]], although even this formation had been weakened from the losses it had sustained in earlier fighting, particularly when it had engaged Allied forces in the [[Battle of the Reichswald|Reichswald Forest]] in February.<ref>O'Neill, pp. 302–303</ref> First Parachute Army had three [[corps]] stationed along the river; the [[II Parachute Corps (Germany)|II Parachute Corps]] to the north, [[LXXXVI Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|LXXXVI Army Corps]] in the centre, and [[LXIII Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|LXIII Army Corps]] in the south.<ref>Otway, p. 298</ref> Of these formations, the II Parachute Corps and LXXXVI Corps had a shared boundary that ran through the proposed landing zones for the Allied airborne divisions, meaning that the leading formation of each corps—these being the [[7th Parachute Division (Germany)|7th Parachute]] and [[84th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|84th Infantry Division]]s—would face the airborne assault.<ref name="Otway 299">Otway, p. 299</ref> After their retreat to the Rhine both divisions were under-strength and did not number more than 4,000 men each, with 84th Infantry Division supported by only 50 or so medium artillery pieces.<ref name="Otway 299"/>

The seven divisions that formed the 1st Parachute Army were short of manpower and munitions, and although farms and villages were well prepared for defensive purposes, there were few mobile reserves, ensuring that the defenders had little way to concentrate their forces against the Allied bridgehead when the assault began.<ref>Fraser, p. 391</ref> The mobile reserves that the Germans did possess consisted of some 150 [[armoured fighting vehicle]]s under the command of 1st Parachute Army, the majority of which belonged to [[XLVII Panzer Corps (Germany)|XLVII Panzer Corps]].<ref name="Tugwell271">Tugwell, p. 271</ref> Allied intelligence believed that of the two divisions that formed XLVII Panzer Corps, the [[116th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|116th Panzer Division]] had up to 70 tanks, and the [[15th Panzergrenadier Division (Wehrmacht)|15th Panzergrenadier Division]] 15 tanks and between 20–30 assault guns. Intelligence also pointed to the possibility of a heavy anti-tank battalion being stationed in the area.<ref name="Otway 299"/> Also, the Germans possessed a great number of [[antiaircraft]] weapons; on 17 March Allied intelligence estimated that the Germans had 103 heavy and 153 light anti-aircraft guns, a number which was drastically revised a week later to 114 heavy and 712 light anti-aircraft guns.<ref name="Tugwell271"/> The situation of the German defenders, and their ability to counter any assault effectively, was worsened when the Allies launched a large-scale air attack one week prior to Operation Varsity. The air attack involved more than 10,000 Allied sorties and concentrated primarily on [[Luftwaffe]] airfields and the German transportation system.<ref name="Otway 299"/> The German defenders were also hampered by the fact that they had no reliable intelligence as to where the actual assault would be launched; although German forces along the Rhine had been alerted as to the general possibility of an Allied airborne attack, it was only when British engineers began to set up smoke generators opposite [[Emmerich am Rhein|Emmerich]] and began laying a {{convert|60|mi|km|adj=on}} long smokescreen that the Germans knew where the assault would come.<ref name="Devlin615">Devlin, p. 615</ref>