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Phoenix Program
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== Operations == The chief aspect of the Phoenix Program was the collection of intelligence information. VC members would then be captured, converted, or killed. Emphasis for the enforcement of the operation was placed on local government militia and police forces, rather than the military, as the main operational arm of the program.{{sfn|Andradé|Willbanks|2006}} According to journalist Douglas Valentine, "Central to Phoenix is the fact that it targeted civilians, not soldiers".{{sfn|Valentine|2014}} The Phoenix Program took place under special laws that allowed the arrest and prosecution of suspected [[communism|communists]]. To avoid abuses such as phony accusations for personal reasons, or to rein in overzealous officials who might not be diligent enough in pursuing evidence before making arrests, the laws required three separate sources of evidence to convict an individual targeted for neutralization. If a suspected VC member was found guilty, they could be held in prison for two years, with renewable two-year sentences totaling up to six years.{{sfn|Andradé|Willbanks|2006}} According to [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam|MACV]] Directive 381-41, the intent of Phoenix was to attack the VC with a "rifle shot rather than a shotgun approach to target key political leaders, command/control elements and activists in the VCI [Viet Cong Infrastructure]." The VCI was known by the communists as the [[Revolutionary Infrastructure]].<ref>Morris, Virginia and Hills, Clive. {{Citation|title=Ho Chi Minh's Blueprint for Revolution, In the Words of Vietnamese Strategists and Operatives}}, McFarland & Co Inc, 2018, p. 73.</ref> Heavy-handed operations—such as random cordons and searches, large-scale and lengthy detentions of innocent civilians, and excessive use of firepower—had a negative effect on the civilian population. Intelligence derived from interrogations was often used to carry out "[[search and destroy]]" missions aimed at finding and killing VC members.<ref>[[Donn A. Starry|Starry, Donn A.]] Gen. ''Mounted Combat In Vietnam''; Vietnam Studies. Department of the Army, 1978.</ref> 87% of those killed during the Phoenix Program were killed in conventional military operations.{{sfn|Andradé|1990|p=17-21}} Many of those killed were only identified as members of the VCI following military engagements, which were often started by the VC. Between January 1970 and March 1971, 94% of those killed as a result of the program were killed during military operations (9,827 out of 10,443 VCI killed).<ref name="Lewy"/> === Torture === According to Valentine, methods of torture that were utilized at the interrogation centers included:<blockquote>Rape, gang rape, rape using eels, snakes, or hard objects, and rape followed by murder; electrical shock ("the Bell Telephone Hour") rendered by attaching wires to the genitals or other sensitive parts of the body, like the tongue; "the water treatment"; "the airplane," in which a prisoner's arms were tied behind the back and the rope looped over a hook on the ceiling, suspending the prisoner in midair, after which he or she was beaten; beatings with rubber hoses and whips; and the use of police dogs to maul prisoners.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Valentine|first=Douglas|title=The Phoenix Program: America's Use of Terror in Vietnam|publisher=[[William Morrow & Company]]|year=1990|isbn=978-0-688-09130-9|page=85}}</ref></blockquote>Military intelligence officer K. Barton Osborn reports that he witnessed "the use of the insertion of the 6-inch [[dowel]] into the canal of one of my detainee's ears, and the tapping through the brain until dead. The starvation to death (in a cage), of a Vietnamese woman who was suspected of being part of the local political education cadre in one of the local villages ... The use of electronic gear such as sealed telephones attached to ... both the women's vaginas and men's testicles [to] shock them into submission."<ref>{{cite book |author=[[Joe Allen (writer)|Allen, Joe]] |author2=[[John Pilger|Pilger, John]] |title=Vietnam: the (last) war the U.S. lost|publisher=[[Haymarket Books]]|year=2008|isbn=978-1-931859-49-3 |page=164|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EE1Rs6kBWssC&pg=PA164}}</ref> Osborn's claims have been refuted by author Gary Kulik, who states that Osborn made exaggerated, contradictory and false claims and that his colleagues stated that he liked making "fantastic statements" and that he "frequently made exaggerated remarks in order to attract attention to himself."<ref name="Kulik">{{cite book|last=Kulik|first=Gary|title=War Stories False atrocity tales, Swift Boaters and Winter Soldiers – what really happened in Vietnam|publisher=Potomac Books|year=2009|isbn=978-1-59797-304-5}}</ref>{{rp|134–138}} Osborn served with the [[United States Marine Corps]] in [[I Corps (South Vietnam)|I Corps]] in 1967–1968 before the Phoenix Program was implemented.<ref>{{cite book|last=Woodruff|first=Mark|title=Unheralded Victory|publisher=Harper Collins|year=2000|isbn=0-00-472540-9|page=283}}</ref> Torture was carried out by South Vietnamese forces with the CIA and special forces playing a supervisory role.<ref name="Harbury, Jennifer 2005 97">{{cite book|author=Harbury, Jennifer|title=Truth, torture, and the American way: the history and consequences of U.S. involvement in torture|publisher=[[Beacon Press]]|year=2005|isbn=978-0-8070-0307-7|page=[https://archive.org/details/truthtortureamer0000harb/page/97 97]|url=https://archive.org/details/truthtortureamer0000harb|url-access=registration|author-link=Jennifer Harbury}}</ref> === Targeted killings === Phoenix operations often aimed to assassinate targets or kill them through other means. PRU units often anticipated resistance in disputed areas, and often operated on a shoot-first basis.<ref>Neil Sheehan (1988). ''A Bright Shining Lie'', p. 732.</ref> [[Lieutenant]] [[Vincent Okamoto]], an intelligence-liaison officer for the Phoenix Program for two months in 1968 and a recipient of the [[Distinguished Service Cross (United States)|Distinguished Service Cross]] said the following:<ref>''Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides'' by [[Christian G. Appy]], [[Penguin Books]], 2003, p. 361. [https://www.amazon.com/dp/0142004499]</ref> {{blockquote|The problem was, how do you find the people on the [[blacklist]]? It's not like you had their address and telephone number. The normal procedure would be to go into a village and just grab someone and say, "Where's Nguyen so-and-so?" Half the time the people were so afraid they would not say anything. Then a Phoenix team would take the [[informant]], put a sandbag over his head, poke out two holes so he could see, put [[commo wire]] around his neck like a long leash, and walk him through the village and say, "When we go by Nguyen's house scratch your head." Then that night Phoenix would come back, knock on the door, and say, "[[April Fools' Day|April Fool]], [[motherfucker]]." Whoever answered the door would get wasted. As far as they were concerned whoever answered was a Communist, including family members. Sometimes they'd come back to camp with ears to prove that they killed people.}} [[William Colby]] denied that the program was an assassination program stating: "To call it a program of murder is nonsense ... They were of more value to us alive than dead, and therefore, the object was to get them alive." His instructions to field officers stated "Our training emphasizes the desirability of obtaining these target individuals alive and of using intelligent and lawful methods of interrogation to obtain the truth of what they know about other aspects of the VCI ... [U.S. personnel] are specifically not authorized to engage in assassinations or other violations of the rules of land warfare."<ref>{{cite book|last1=Lipsman|first1=Samuel|last2=Doyle|first2=Edward|title=Fighting for Time (The Vietnam Experience)|publisher=Boston Publishing Company|year=1984|isbn=978-0-939526-07-9|page=80}}</ref><ref name=ksil241 /><ref>''Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report''. A-8.</ref>{{sfn|Andradé|1990|p=53}}
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