Editing Proconsul (section)

==In leadership theory==
Although "proconsul" is an official title only with respect to [[magistrates of ancient Rome]], the word has also been applied to various British, U.S., and French officials. In the modern context, it is rarely a compliment. The terms ''[[satrap]]'' (from Persian) and ''[[viceroy]]'' (from French) are both used in a similar way.{{sfn|Lord|2012a|p=2}}<ref>{{Cite OED|viceroy}}</ref>

Despite the gulf between ancient and modern proconsuls, writer Carnes Lord has proposed a single definition to allow the phenomenon to be analyzed in the context of leadership theory: "delegated political-military leadership that rises in the best case to statesmanship."<ref>{{cite web |last=Lord |first=Carnes |url=http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Proconsuls-Delegated-Political-Military-Leadership-from-Rome-to-America-Today.php |title=On Proconsular Leadership |work=The Montréal Review |date=September 2012}}</ref> [[South Africa]]n historian John Benyon defines a proconsul as a leader with "semi-independent and extraordinary capacity to shape the periphery" of an empire.{{sfn|Lord|2012a|p=15}}

Modern writing on leadership tends to stress the distinction between "administration" on the one hand and "policy" on the other. This emphasis can be traced to an essay by [[Woodrow Wilson]] written in the late 19th century. In earlier epochs, it was common for leaders to combine the two roles. Since this is no longer the case, specific terminology is required to describe such officials.{{sfn|Lord|2012a|p=2}}

In his classic study, [[Max Weber]] distinguished among three modes of legitimate governance: traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic. In the form of bureaucracy, the rational-legal mode is dominant in the modern world. But a modern proconsul may also resort to aristocratic, or charismatic, leadership.{{sfn|Lord|2012a|pp=3-4}}

In the [[Roman Republic]], a proconsul was typically a former consul and thus an experienced commander-in-chief. Having held the Republic's highest office, he was a statesman as well as an administrator. Rome's [[patrician (ancient Rome)|patrician class]] was prepared to exercise aristocratic leadership, both civil and military.

Several factors are said to limit the scope of proconsular authority in modern times. Democracies put the military under civilian authority and tend to avoid policymaking by military leaders. Modern government emphasizes bureaucracy and rulemaking, while the Romans were aristocratic. Finally, modern communications allows for greater central control.{{sfn|Lord|2012a|p=3}}

Although transoceanic telegraph lines were laid by the mid-19th century, Lord describes the late 19th century as the heyday of British proconsular authority. [[George Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston|Lord Curzon]] in India, [[Frederick Lugard, 1st Baron Lugard|Frederick Lugard]] in Nigeria, [[Cecil Rhodes]] in South Africa, and [[Evelyn Baring, 1st Earl of Cromer|Lord Cromer]] in Egypt all took imperial initiatives that London approved only reluctantly.{{sfn|Lord|2012a|p=14}} As ruler of Japan and Korea after [[World War II]], U.S. General [[Douglas MacArthur]] consciously modeled himself on a Roman aristocrat.{{sfn|Lord|2012a|pp=3-4}}
The role of U.S. General [[David Petraeus]] and others in Iraq suggests a continued need for proconsular leadership, according to Lord.{{sfn|Lord|2012a|p=21}} Modern technology makes communication easier than ever. But as email and [[PowerPoint]] presentations proliferate, clarity and intellectual discipline is lost.{{sfn|Lord|2012|pp=4–6}} Another factor is that civilian policymakers, whether on the spot or in the metropole, may lack the skills needed to manage military forces.{{sfn|Lord|2012a|p=21}} Yet proconsuls are at best an ''ad hoc'' solution to a reoccurring problem. Managing a large territory in occupation or conflict requires a range of skills and the ability to deal with various organizations. No one is trained as a proconsul and the available administrators have experience in at most one relevant agency or service. During the [[Vietnam War]], the U.S. attempted to deal with this issue by creating an integrated civilian-military command structure called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).{{sfn|Lord|2012a|p=236}}