Editing Reagan Doctrine (section)

==Origin and advocates==
With the arrival of the Reagan administration, [[The Heritage Foundation]] and other conservative foreign policy think tanks saw a political opportunity to significantly expand Carter's Afghanistan policy into a more global "doctrine", including U.S. support to anti-communist resistance movements in Soviet-allied nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. According to political analysts Thomas Bodenheimer and Robert Gould, "it was the Heritage Foundation that translated theory into concrete policy. Heritage targeted nine nations for [[rollback|regime change]]: Afghanistan, [[Angola]], [[People's Republic of Kampuchea|Cambodia]], [[Derg|Ethiopia]], [[Iran]], [[Laos]], [[History of Libya under Muammar Gaddafi|Libya]], [[Nicaragua]], and [[Vietnam]]".<ref>{{cite book|title=Rollback!: Right-wing Power in U.S. Foreign Policy|date=1 July 1999|publisher=South End Press|isbn=0896083454|page=[https://archive.org/details/rollbackrightwin00bode/page/82 82]|url=https://archive.org/details/rollbackrightwin00bode/page/82}}</ref>

Throughout the 1980s, The Heritage Foundation's foreign policy expert on the [[Third World]], [[Michael Johns (policy analyst)|Michael Johns]], the foundation's principal Reagan Doctrine advocate, visited with resistance movements in Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and other Soviet-supported nations and urged the Reagan administration to initiate or expand military and political support to them. Heritage Foundation foreign policy experts also endorsed the Reagan Doctrine in two of their ''[[Mandate for Leadership]]'' books, which provided comprehensive policy advice to Reagan administration officials.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://thedailycougar.com/2008/08/22/think-tank-fosters-bloodshed-terrorism/|title=Think tank fosters bloodshed, terrorism|work=The Daily Cougar|access-date=2012-03-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110716232636/http://thedailycougar.com/2008/08/22/think-tank-fosters-bloodshed-terrorism/|archive-date=2011-07-16|url-status=live|date=2008-08-22}}</ref>

In fact, the doctrine only applied to Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Nicaragua, and [[People's Republic of Mozambique|Mozambique]],<ref>{{cite book |last=Fischer |first=Beth A. |date=2020 |title=The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan's Cold War Legacy |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Q5K3DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA159 |publisher=The University Press of Kentucky |isbn=978-0-8131-7817-2 |page=159}}</ref> while Afghanistan was the centerpiece of the doctrine.<ref>{{cite book |last=Brands |first=Hal |author-link=Hal Brands |date=2016 |title=Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bKA9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA80 |publisher=Cornell University Press |doi=10.7591/9781501703430 |isbn=978-1-5017-0272-3 |page=80}}</ref>

The result was that, unlike in Afghanistan, the Reagan Doctrine was rather quickly applied in Angola and Nicaragua, with the United States providing military support to the [[UNITA]] movement in Angola and the "[[Contras]]" in Nicaragua, but without a declaration of war against either country. Addressing The Heritage Foundation in October 1989, UNITA leader [[Jonas Savimbi]] called the efforts "a source of great support. No Angolan will forget your efforts. You have come to [[Jamba, Cuando Cubango|Jamba]], and you have taken our message to Congress and the Administration".<ref name="heritage.org">{{unfit|1=[http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20061122165840/http://www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/HL217.cfm "The Coming Winds of Democracy in Angola," by Jonas Savimbi, Heritage Foundation Lecture #217, October 5, 1989.]}}</ref> U.S. aid to UNITA began to flow overtly after [[United States Congress|Congress]] repealed the [[Clark Amendment]], a long-standing legislative prohibition on military aid to UNITA.<ref name="heritage.org"/>

Following these victories, Johns and The Heritage Foundation urged further expanding the Reagan Doctrine to Ethiopia, where they argued that the [[1983–1985 famine in Ethiopia|Ethiopian famine]] was a product of the military and [[agriculture|agricultural]] policies of Ethiopia's Soviet-supported government under [[Mengistu Haile Mariam]]. Johns and Heritage also argued that Mengistu's decision to permit Soviet naval and air presence on the [[Red Sea]] ports of [[Eritrea]] represented a strategic challenge to U.S. security interests in the [[Middle East]] and [[North Africa]].<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.heritage.org/research/MiddleEast/bg692.cfm |title="A U.S. Strategy to Foster Human Rights in Ethiopia", by Michael Johns, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #692, February 23, 1989. |access-date=August 24, 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060823192853/http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg692.cfm |archive-date=August 23, 2006 |url-status=unfit }}</ref>

The Heritage Foundation and the Reagan administration also sought to apply the Reagan Doctrine in Cambodia. The largest resistance movement fighting Cambodia's communist government was largely made up of members of the former [[Khmer Rouge]] regime, whose human rights record was among the worst of the 20th century. Therefore, Reagan authorized the provision of aid to a smaller Cambodian resistance movement, a coalition called the [[Khmer People's National Liberation Front]], known as the KPNLF and then run by [[Son Sann]]; in an effort to force an end to the Vietnamese occupation.<ref>{{Cite journal|author-link=Nate Thayer|last=Thayer|first=Nate|year=1991|title=Cambodia: Misperceptions and Peace|journal=The Washington Quarterly|volume=14|issue=2|pages=179–191|doi=10.1080/01636609109477687}}</ref>

While the Reagan Doctrine enjoyed strong support from The Heritage Foundation and the [[American Enterprise Institute]], the libertarian-oriented [[Cato Institute]] opposed the Reagan Doctrine, arguing in 1986 that "most Third World struggles take place in arenas and involve issues far removed from legitimate American security needs. U.S. involvement in such conflicts expands the republic's already overextended commitments without achieving any significant prospective gains. Instead of draining Soviet military and financial resources, we end up dissipating our own."<ref>{{cite web|title=Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 74: U.S. Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The "Reagan Doctrine" and Its Pitfalls|url=http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa074.pdf|website=Cato Institute|access-date=2014-07-02|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714235232/http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa074.pdf|archive-date=2014-07-14|url-status=live}}</ref>

Even Cato, however, conceded that the Reagan Doctrine had "fired the enthusiasm of the conservative movement in the United States as no foreign policy issue has done in decades". While opposing the Reagan Doctrine as an official governmental policy, Cato instead urged Congress to remove the legal barriers prohibiting private organizations and citizens from supporting these resistance movements.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa074.html|title=U.S. Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The "Reagan Doctrine" and Its Pitfalls|date=24 June 1986|work=cato.org|access-date=24 August 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120716183631/http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa074.html|archive-date=16 July 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Advocates within the Reagan administration===
Within the Reagan administration, the doctrine was quickly embraced by nearly all of Reagan's top national security and foreign policy officials, including [[United States Secretary of Defense|Defense Secretary]] [[Caspar Weinberger]], [[List of ambassadors of the United States to the United Nations|UN Ambassador]] [[Jeane Kirkpatrick]], and a series of National Security Advisors appointed by Reagan including [[John Poindexter]], [[Frank Carlucci]], and [[Colin Powell]].<ref>{{cite journal | last = Chang | first = Felix | title = Reagan Turns One Hundred: Foreign Policy Lessons | journal = The National Interest | date = February 11, 2011 | url = http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ronnie-turns-one-hundred-4829 | access-date = January 12, 2012 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20120128111431/http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ronnie-turns-one-hundred-4829 | archive-date = January 28, 2012 | url-status = live }}</ref>

Reagan himself was a vocal proponent of the policy. Seeking to expand congressional support for the doctrine in his 1985 State of the Union Address in February 1985, Reagan said: "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives ... on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua ... to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense".

As part of his effort to gain congressional support for the Nicaraguan Contras, Reagan labeled the Contras "the moral equivalent of our [[Founding Fathers of the United States|founding fathers]]", which was controversial because the Contras had shown disregard for [[human rights]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.jewishworldreview.com/jeff/jacoby111403.asp|title=Jeff Jacoby|work=jewishworldreview.com|access-date=2006-08-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930155820/http://www.jewishworldreview.com/jeff/jacoby111403.asp|archive-date=2007-09-30|url-status=live}}</ref> There also were allegations that some members of the Contra leadership were involved in [[cocaine]] trafficking.<ref>[http://prorev.com/blum.htm "The Contras and Cocaine"] {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120722140043/http://prorev.com/blum.htm |date=2012-07-22 }}, ''Progressive Review,'' testimony to U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing on the Allegations of CIA Ties to Nicaraguan Contra Rebels and Crack Cocaine in American Cities, October 23, 1996.</ref>

Reagan and other conservative advocates of the Reagan Doctrine advocates also argued that the doctrine served U.S. foreign policy and strategic objectives and was a moral imperative against the Soviet Union, which Reagan, his advisers, and supporters labeled an "[[Evil Empire speech|evil empire]]".

===Other advocates===
Other early conservative advocates for the Reagan Doctrine included influential activist [[Grover Norquist]], who ultimately became a registered UNITA lobbyist and an economic adviser to Savimbi's UNITA movement in Angola,<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20150924013135/http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb1367/is_199803/ai_n6384825 "Savimbi's Shell Game," ''Bnet.com'', March 1998]</ref> and former Reagan speechwriter and former U.S. congressman [[Dana Rohrabacher]], who made several secret visits with the ''mujahideen'' in Afghanistan and returned with glowing reports of their bravery against the Soviet occupation.<ref>[http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?id=1521846767-2190 "Profile: Dana Rohrabacher," ''Cooperative History Research Commons'', September 17, 2001.] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060418144639/http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?id=1521846767-2190 |date=April 18, 2006 }}</ref> Rohrabacher was led to Afghanistan by his contact with the ''mujahideen'', Jack Wheeler.<ref>Gregory L. Schneider, ''The Conservative Century: From Reaction to Revolution'' (NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 165-66. {{ISBN|9780742542846}}</ref>

===Origin of the phrase===
In 1985, as U.S. support was flowing to the ''mujahideen'', Savimbi's UNITA, and the Nicaraguan Contras, columnist [[Charles Krauthammer]], in an essay for ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine, labeled the policy the "Reagan Doctrine," and the name stuck.<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Krauthammer |first=Charles |author-link=Charles Krauthammer |date=1 April 1985 |title=The Reagan Doctrine |url=https://time.com/archive/6709711/essay-the-reagan-doctrine/ |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |access-date=26 August 2024}}</ref>

Krauthammer has said of his writing in support of the Reagan Doctrine,

{{quote|I basically came to the conclusion ... the Soviets had overextended their empire, and they were getting what the West had gotten with its overextended empire decades before a reaction, they got a rebellion, they got resistance. And the Soviets were now beginning to feel it, and the genius of Reagan, although I don't think they had a plan in doing this is he instinctively realized that one of the ways to go after the Soviets was indirect, and that is you go after their proxies, you go after their allies, you go after their clients, or even in Afghanistan you go after them directly. So that's what I called the Reagan Doctrine, it was sort of the opposite of the [[Brezhnev Doctrine]], which was whatever we control we keep. And Reagan was saying, no you don't.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://conversationswithbillkristol.org/video/charles-krauthammer/ |title=Charles Krauthammer: Reflections on a Distinguished Career |access-date=2016-03-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160324153201/http://conversationswithbillkristol.org/video/charles-krauthammer/ |archive-date=2016-03-24 |url-status=live }}</ref>}}

==="Rollback" replaces "containment" and "détente"===
[[File:Johnas Savimbi, leader of Unita, the Angolan Rebels (larger picture) (cropped).png|thumb|U.S.-supported [[UNITA]] leader [[Jonas Savimbi]]]]
The Reagan Doctrine was especially significant because it represented a substantial shift in the post–World War II foreign policy of the United States. Prior to the Reagan Doctrine, U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War was rooted in "[[containment]]", as originally defined by [[George F. Kennan]], [[John Foster Dulles]], and other post–World War II U.S. foreign policy experts. In January 1977, four years prior to becoming president, Reagan bluntly stated, in a conversation with National Security Advisor [[Richard V. Allen]], his basic expectation in relation to the Cold War. "My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and some would say simplistic," he said. "It is this: We win and they lose. What do you think of that?"<ref>{{cite web|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110501052925/http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7398 |archive-date=1 May 2011 |url=http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7398 |website=hoover.org |title=The Man Who Won the Cold War |first=Richard V. |last=Allen |author-link=Richard V. Allen }}</ref>

Although a similar policy of "rollback" had been considered on a few occasions during the Cold War, the U.S., fearing an escalation of the Cold War and possible [[nuclear warfare|nuclear conflict]], chose not to confront the Soviet Union directly. With the Reagan Doctrine, those fears were set aside and the United States began to openly confront Soviet-supported governments through support of rebel movements in the doctrine's targeted countries.

One perceived benefit of the Reagan Doctrine was the relatively low cost of supporting guerrilla forces compared to the Soviet Union's expenses in propping up client states. Another benefit was the lack of direct involvement of American troops, which allowed the United States to confront Soviet allies without sustaining casualties. Especially since the [[September 11 attacks]], some Reagan Doctrine critics have argued that, by facilitating the transfer of large amounts of weapons to various areas of the world and by training military leaders in these regions, the Reagan Doctrine actually contributed to "[[Blowback (intelligence)|blowback]]" by strengthening some political and military movements that ultimately developed hostility toward the U.S., such as [[al-Qaeda]] in [[Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001)|Afghanistan]].<ref>[https://archive.today/20090209220235/http://media.www.thedailycougar.com/media/storage/paper1206/news/2008/08/25/Opinion/Think.Tank.Fosters.Bloodshed.Terrorism-3401834.shtml "Think Tank Fosters Bloodshed, Terrorism," ''The Cougar'', August 25, 2008.]</ref> However, no direct U.S. aid to [[Osama bin Laden]] or any of his affiliates has ever been established.<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Peter Bergen|last=Bergen|first=Peter|title=The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader|publisher=[[Simon and Schuster]]|year=2006|isbn=9780743295925|pages=60–61}}</ref>

===Controversy over Nicaragua===
{{Further|United States and state-sponsored terrorism#The Contras|Contras}}
Historian Greg Grandin described a disjuncture between official ideals preached by the United States and actual U.S. support for terrorism. "Nicaragua, where the United States backed not a counter insurgent state but anti-communist [[mercenaries]], likewise represented a disjuncture between the idealism used to justify U.S. policy and its support for political terrorism. ... The corollary to the idealism embraced by the Republicans in the realm of diplomatic public policy debate was thus political terror. In the dirtiest of Latin America's dirty wars, their faith in America's mission justified atrocities in the name of liberty".<ref>Grandin, Greg. ''Empire's Workshop: Latin America, The United States and the Rise of the New Imperialism'', Henry Holt & Company 2007, p. 89</ref> Grandin examined the behaviour of the U.S.-backed Contras and found evidence that it was particularly inhumane and vicious: "In Nicaragua, the U.S.-backed Contras decapitated, castrated, and otherwise mutilated civilians and foreign aid workers. Some earned a reputation for using spoons to gouge their victims' eyes out. In one raid, Contras cut the breasts of a civilian defender to pieces and ripped the flesh off the bones of another."<ref>Grandin, Greg. Empire's Workshop: Latin America, ''The United States and the Rise of the New Imperialism'', Henry Holt & Company 2007, p. 90</ref>

Professor Frederick H. Gareau has written that the Contras "attacked bridges, electric generators, but also state-owned agricultural cooperatives, rural health clinics, villages, and [[non-combatant]]s". U.S. agents were directly involved in the fighting. "CIA commandos launched a series of sabotage raids on Nicaraguan port facilities. They mined the country's major ports and set fire to its largest oil storage facilities." In 1984, Congress ordered this intervention to be stopped; however, it was later shown that the Reagan administration illegally continued (see [[Iran–Contra affair]]). Gareau has characterized these acts as "wholesale terrorism" by the United States.<ref name="Gareau">{{cite book |last=Gareau |first=Frederick H. |title=State Terrorism and the United States |year=2004 |publisher=Zed Books |location=London |isbn=1-84277-535-9 |pages=16 & 166}}</ref>

A CIA manual for training the Contras in [[Psychological warfare|psychological operations]], leaked to the media in 1984, entitled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla War".<ref name="KillingHope">{{cite book |last=Blum |first=William |author-link=William Blum |title=Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II |url=https://archive.org/details/pdfy-q0ULBH2DJICRS3Vg |year=2003 |publisher=Zed Books |location=Noida, India |isbn=1-84277-369-0 |page=290 |access-date=2019-11-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170204124507/https://archive.org/details/pdfy-q0ULBH2DJICRS3Vg |archive-date=2017-02-04 |url-status=live }}</ref> recommended "selective use of violence for propagandistic effects" and to "neutralize" government officials. Contras were taught to lead:

{{quote|... selective use of armed force for PSYOP psychological operations effect. ... Carefully selected, planned targets&nbsp;– judges, police officials, tax collectors, etc.&nbsp;– may be removed for PSYOP effect in a UWOA unconventional warfare operations area, but extensive precautions must insure that the people "concur" in such an act by thorough explanatory canvassing among the affected populace before and after conduct of the mission.|James Bovard|Freedom Daily<ref name="FFF">{{cite web |title=Terrorism Debacles in the Reagan Administration |work=The Future of Freedom Foundation |url=http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0406c.asp |access-date=2006-07-30 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060821215232/http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0406c.asp |archive-date=2006-08-21 }}</ref>}}

Similarly, former diplomat Clara Nieto, in her book ''Masters of War'', charged that "the CIA launched a series of terrorist actions from the "mothership" off Nicaragua's coast. In September 1983, she charged the agency attacked [[Puerto Sandino]], Nicaragua's largest port, with rockets. The following month, [[Frogman|frogmen]] blew up the underwater oil pipeline in the same port – the only one in the country. In October there was an attack on Puerto Corinto with mortars, rockets, and grenades blowing up five large oil and gasoline storage tanks. More than a hundred people were wounded, and the fierce fire, which could not be brought under control for two days, forced the evacuation of 23,000 people."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Nieto |first=Clara |title=Masters of War: Latin America and United States Aggression from the Cuban Revolution Through the Clinton Years |location=New York |publisher=Seven Stories Press |year=2003 |pages=343–45 |isbn=1-58322-545-5}}</ref>

The [[International Court of Justice]], when judging the case of ''[[Nicaragua v. United States]]'' in 1984, found that the United States was obligated to pay reparations to Nicaragua, because it had violated international law by actively supporting the Contras in their rebellion and by mining the Naval waters of Nicaragua.<ref>{{cite web|title=Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), International Court of Justice, Order of 26 september 1991|url=http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6483.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924063157/http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6483.pdf|archive-date=24 September 2015}}</ref> The U.S. refused to participate in the proceedings after the Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The U.S. later blocked the enforcement of the judgment by exercising its veto power in the [[United Nations Security Council]] and so prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation.<ref name="law">{{cite journal|author=Morrison, Fred L. |title=Legal Issues in The Nicaragua Opinion |journal=American Journal of International Law |date=January 1987 |volume=81 |issue=1 |pages=160–66 |url=http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/55750.html |doi=10.2307/2202146 |jstor=2202146 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205163909/http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/55750.html |archive-date=2012-02-05 |url-access=subscription }} "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision. Nicaragua vs United States (Merits)"</ref>

===Covert implementation===
As the Reagan administration set about implementing The Heritage Foundation's plan in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, it first attempted to do so covertly, not as part of official policy. "The Reagan government's initial implementation of the Heritage plan was done covertly", according to the book ''Rollback'', "following the longstanding custom that containment can be overt but rollback should be covert". Ultimately, however, the administration supported the policy more openly.

===Congressional support===
While the doctrine benefited from strong support from the Reagan administration, The Heritage Foundation and several influential members of Congress, many votes on critical funding for resistance movements, especially the Nicaraguan Contras, were extremely close, making the Reagan Doctrine one of the more contentious American political issues of the 1980s.<ref>''A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977–1990'', [[Robert Kagan]], Simon & Schuster, 1996.</ref>

===End of the Cold War===
As arms flowed to the contras, Savimbi's UNITA and the ''mujahideen'', advocates of the Reagan Doctrine argued that the doctrine was yielding constructive results for U.S. interests and global democracy.

In Nicaragua, pressure from the Contras led the [[Sandinista National Liberation Front|Sandinstas]] to end the State of Emergency, and they subsequently lost the [[1990 Nicaraguan general election|1990 elections]]. In Afghanistan, the ''mujahideen'' bled the Soviet Union's military and paved the way for Soviet military defeat. In Angola, Savimbi's resistance ultimately led to a decision by the Soviet Union and [[Cuba]] to bring their troops and military advisors home from Angola as part of a negotiated settlement.

All of these developments were Reagan Doctrine victories, the doctrine's advocates argue, laying the ground for the ultimate [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]].<ref>"It Was Reagan Who Tore Down That Wall," [[Dinesh D'Souza]], ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'', November 7, 2004.</ref> Johns later argued that "the Reagan-led effort to support freedom fighters resisting Soviet oppression led successfully to the first major military defeat of the Soviet Union ... Sending the Red Army packing from Afghanistan proved one of the single most important contributing factors in one of history's most profoundly positive and important developments".<ref>[http://michaeljohnsonfreedomandprosperity.blogspot.com/2008/01/charlie-wilsons-war-was-really-americas.html "Charlie Wilson's War Was Really America's War," by Michael Johns] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110708053536/http://michaeljohnsonfreedomandprosperity.blogspot.com/2008/01/charlie-wilsons-war-was-really-americas.html |date=2011-07-08 }}, January 19, 2008.</ref>

===Margaret Thatcher's view===
Among others, [[Margaret Thatcher]], [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom]] from 1979 to 1990, credited the Reagan Doctrine with aiding the end of the Cold War. In December 1997, Thatcher said that the Reagan Doctrine "proclaimed that the truce with communism was over. The West would henceforth regard no area of the world as destined to forego its liberty simply because the Soviets claimed it to be within their sphere of influence. We would fight a battle of ideas against communism, and we would give material support to those who fought to recover their nations from tyranny".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=108376|title=Lecture to The Heritage Foundation ("The Principles of Conservatism")|work=margaretthatcher.org|access-date=2006-08-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060825160956/http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=108376|archive-date=2006-08-25|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Iran–Contra affair===
U.S. funding for the Contras, who opposed the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, was obtained from covert sources. Congress did not authorize sufficient funds for the Contras' efforts, and the [[Boland Amendment]] barred further funding. In 1986, in an episode that became known as the [[Iran–Contra affair]], the Reagan administration illegally facilitated the sale of arms to Iran, the subject of an arms embargo, in the hope that the arms sales would secure the release of hostages and allow U.S. intelligence agencies to fund the Contras.