Editing Recognition heuristic (section)

== Controversies ==
Research on the recognition heuristic has sparked a number of controversies.

=== Trade-offs ===

The recognition heuristic is a model that relies on recognition only. This leads to the testable prediction that people who rely on it will ignore strong, contradicting cues (i.e., do not make trade-offs; so-called noncompensatory inferences). In an experiment by [[Daniel M. Oppenheimer]] participants were presented with pairs of cities, which included actual cities and fictional cities.  Although the recognition heuristic predicts that participants would judge the actual (recognizable) cities to be larger, participants judged the fictional (unrecognizable) cities to be larger, showing that more than recognition can play a role in such inferences.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Oppenheimer | first1 = D. M. | year = 2003 | title = Not so Fast! (and not so Frugal!): Rethinking the Recognition Heuristic | url = https://escholarship.org/content/qt90b4f50x/qt90b4f50x.pdf?t=op2mse | journal = Cognition | volume = 90 | issue = 1 | pages = B1–B9 | doi = 10.1016/s0010-0277(03)00141-0 | pmid = 14597272 | s2cid = 16927640 | access-date = 2023-02-27 | archive-date =  | archive-url =  | url-status =  }}</ref>

Newell & Fernandez<ref name="Newell 2006" /> performed two experiments to try to test the claims that the recognition heuristic is distinguished from [[Availability heuristic|availability]] and [[Fluency heuristic|fluency]] through binary treatment of information and inconsequentiality of further knowledge. The results of their experiments did not support these claims. Newell & Fernandez  and Richter & Späth tested the non-compensatory prediction of the recognition heuristic and stated that "recognition information is not used in an all-or-none fashion but is integrated with other types of knowledge in judgment and decision making."<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Richter | first1 = T. | last2 = Späth | first2 = P. | year = 2006 | title = Recognition is used as one cue among others in judgment and decision making | url = https://www.uni-kassel.de/fb01/fileadmin/groups/w_270518/pub_richter/Richter_Spaeth_in_press.pdf | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition | volume = 32 | issue = 1 | pages = 150–162 | doi = 10.1037/0278-7393.32.1.150 | pmid = 16478347 | access-date = 2023-02-27 | archive-date = 2016-08-04 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160804055138/https://www.uni-kassel.de/fb01/fileadmin/groups/w_270518/pub_richter/Richter_Spaeth_in_press.pdf | url-status = dead }}</ref>

A reanalysis of these studies at an individual level, however, showed that typically about half of the participants consistently followed the recognition heuristic in every single trial, even in the presence of up to three contradicting cues.<ref>{{Cite journal|vauthors=Pachur T, Bröder A, Marewski JN|year=2008|title=The recognition heuristic in memory-based inference: Is recognition a noncompensatory cue?|journal=J. Behav. Decis. Mak.|volume=21|issue=2|pages=183–210|doi=10.1002/bdm.581|hdl=11858/00-001M-0000-0024-FB80-1|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Furthermore, in response to those criticisms, Marewski et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|vauthors=Marewski JN, Gaissmaier W, Schooler LJ, Goldstein DG, Gigerenzer G|year=2010|title=From recognition to decisions: extending and testing recognition-based models for multi-alternative inference|journal=Psychon. Bull. Rev.|volume=17|issue=3|pages=287–309|doi=10.3758/PBR.17.3.287|pmid=20551350|s2cid=1936179|url=http://www.dangoldstein.com/papers/Marewski_Recognition_PBR2010.PDF|doi-access=free|access-date=2023-02-27|archive-date=2023-01-30|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230130124232/http://www.dangoldstein.com/papers/Marewski_Recognition_PBR2010.PDF|url-status=live}}</ref> pointed out that none of the studies above formulated and tested a compensatory strategy against the recognition heuristic, leaving the strategies that participants relied on unknown. They tested five compensatory models and found that none could predict judgments better than the simple model of the recognition heuristic.

=== Measurement ===
One major criticism of studies on the recognition heuristic that was raised was that mere accordance with the recognition heuristic is not a good measure of its use. As an alternative, Hilbig et al. proposed to test the recognition heuristic more precisely devised a multinomial processing tree model for the recognition heuristic. A multinomial processing tree model is a simple statistical model often used in cognitive psychology for [[categorical variable|categorical data]].<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Batchelder | first1 = W. H. | last2 = Riefer | first2 = D. M. | year = 1999 | title = Theoretical and empirical review of multinomial process tree modeling | journal = Psychonomic Bulletin & Review | volume = 6 | issue = 1| pages = 57–86 | doi = 10.3758/BF03210812 | pmid = 12199315 | doi-access = free }}</ref> Hilbig et al. claimed that a new model of recognition heuristic use was needed due to the confound between recognition and further knowledge. The multinomial processing tree model was shown to be effective and Hilbig et al. claimed that it provided an unbiased measure of the recognition heuristic.<ref name=Hilbig />

Pachur<ref name="Pachur 2011">{{cite journal|last=Pachur|first=T.|title=The limited value of precise tests of the recognition heuristic|journal=Judgment and Decision Making|date=2011 |volume=6|issue=5|pages=413–422|doi=10.1017/S1930297500001376 |url=http://journal.sjdm.org/11/rh21/rh21.html|access-date=2023-02-27|archive-date=2022-06-18|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220618075206/http://journal.sjdm.org/11/rh21/rh21.html|url-status=live|hdl=21.11116/0000-0002-1AA5-7|hdl-access=free}}</ref> stated that it is an imperfect model but currently it is still the best model to predict people’s recognition-based inferences. He believes that precise tests have a limited value basically because certain aspects of the recognition heuristic are often ignored and so the results could be inconsequential or misleading.

=== Intuitive strategy ===

Hilbig et al.<ref name=Hilbig>{{cite journal|last=Hilbig|first=Benjamin E.|author2=Erdfelder, Edgar |author3=Pohl, Rüdiger F. |title=One-reason decision making unveiled: A measurement model of the recognition heuristic.|journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition|date=1 January 2010|volume=36|issue=1|pages=123–134|doi=10.1037/a0017518|pmid=20053049}}</ref> state that heuristics are meant to reduce effort and that the recognition heuristic reduces effort in making judgments by relying on one single cue and ignoring other information. In their study, they found that the recognition heuristic is more useful in deliberate thought than in intuitive thought. This means it is more useful when thoughts are intentional and not impulsive as opposed to intuitive thought, which is based more on impulse rather than conscious reasoning.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Hilbig | first1 = B. E. | last2 = Scholl | first2 = S. G. | last3 = Pohl | first3 = R. F. | year = 2010 | title = Think or blink—Is the recognition heuristic an "intuitive" strategy? | journal = Judgment and Decision Making | volume = 5 | issue = 4| pages = 300–309 | doi = 10.1017/S1930297500003533 | doi-access = free }}</ref> 
In contrast, a study by Pachur and Hertwig<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Pachur T, Hertwig R|year=2006|title=On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use|journal=J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn.|volume=32|issue=5|pages=983–11002|url=http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/tp/TP_On_2006.pdf|doi=10.1037/0278-7393.32.5.983|pmid=16938041|hdl=11858/00-001M-0000-0024-FF00-5|hdl-access=free|access-date=2023-02-27|archive-date=2021-11-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211128025127/http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/tp/TP_On_2006.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> found that it is actually the faster responses that are more in line with the recognition heuristic. Also, judgments accorded more strongly with the recognition heuristic under time pressure. In line with these findings, neural evidence suggests that the recognition heuristic may be relied upon by default.<ref name="Volz" />