Editing Regiment (section)

=== Advantages and disadvantages ===
{{more citations needed section|date=July 2019}}
The regimental system is generally admired for the ''[[esprit de corps]]'' it engenders in its units' members, but efforts to implement it in countries with a previously existing continental system usually do not succeed. The system presents difficulties for military planners, who must deal with the problems of trying to keep soldiers of a regiment together throughout their careers and of administering separate garrisons, training and mess facilities. The regimental community of serving and retired members often makes it very difficult for planners to restructure forces by moving, merging or re-purposing units.

In those armies where the continental system exists, the regimental system is criticised as parochial and as creating unnecessary rivalry between different regiments. The question is also raised as to whether it is healthy to develop soldiers more loyal to their regiment than to the military in general. Regiments recruited from areas of political ferment (such as Scotland, Wales, Ireland, [[Quebec]], India, etc.), tend to perform particularly well because of the loyalty their members exhibit to the regiments. Generally, the regimental system is found to function best in countries with small-to medium-sized military forces where the problems of administering vast numbers of personnel are not as prevalent. The regimental system works particularly well in an environment in which the prime role of the army consists of small-scale police actions and counterinsurgency operations, requiring prolonged deployment away from home. In such a situation, co-ordination between regiments is rarely necessary, and the esprit de corps of the regiment provides an emotional substitute for the sense of public approval that an army receives at home. This is particularly relevant to British experience during the days of the [[British Empire|empire]], where the army was virtually continuously engaged in low-intensity conflict with insurgents, and full-scale warfare was the exception rather than the rule.

A regimental system, since it is decentralized and the regiments are independent from each other, prevents the army from staging a [[coup d'état]]. This is best exemplified by the British Army: since the formation of the United Kingdom, there have been no military takeovers.<ref>Cannon, John. The Oxford Companion to British History. 2009. [[Oxford University Press]].</ref><ref>Chandler, David G., The Oxford History of the British Army. 2003. Oxford University Press.</ref>

A regimental system can also foster close links between the regiment and the community from which it is recruited. This sense of community 'ownership' over local regiments can be seen in the public outcry over recent regimental amalgamations in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, recruitment from a single community can lead to a concentrated and potentially devastating local impact if the regiment takes heavy casualties.

Further, the regimental system offers the advantage of grouping like units together for centralized administrative, training, and logistical purposes, thereby creating an "[[economies of scale]]" effect and its ensuing increased efficiency.

An illustrative example of this is the modular integration employed by the [[USMC|United States Marine Corps]], which can take elements from its regimentally grouped forces and specifically tailor [[combined arms]] [[task forces]] for a particular mission or the deployed [[Marine Expeditionary Unit]]s (MEU). This is achievable partially because of the [[marine (military)|Marines]] mission adaptability, flexibility, philosophy, shared culture, history and overall esprit de corps, which allows for near seamless interoperability.<ref name=Operating-concept>{{cite journal|last=Flynn|first=G.J.|title=Lt. General|journal=Marine Corps Operating Concepts|date=June 2010|issue=Third Edition|page=24|url=http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/strategic/usmc_oc.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110522131340/http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/strategic/usmc_oc.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=May 22, 2011|access-date=May 4, 2013}}</ref>