Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Laos: "secret war"===
[[File:T-28D.jpg|thumb|[[Royal Lao Air Force|RLAF]] [[T-28 Trojan|T-28D]], at [[Long Tieng]], Laos, 1972<ref>{{cite web|title=Air America: Fairchild C-123 Providers |url=http://www.utdallas.edu/library/uniquecoll/speccoll/Leeker/123b.pdf |publisher=The University of Texas at Dallas |access-date=2009-01-18 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512181920/http://www.utdallas.edu/library/uniquecoll/speccoll/Leeker/123b.pdf |archive-date=May 12, 2008 }}</ref>]]

The [[International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos|"second Geneva Convention" of 1962]] settled ''de jure'' the [[Neutrality (international relations)|neutrality]] of the Kingdom of [[History of Laos since 1945|Laos]], obtaining commitments from both the Soviets and the Americans. Nonetheless, such a neutral ''status quo'' in Laos soon became threatened ''de facto'', e.g., by North Vietnamese (NVN) armed support for the communist [[Pathet Lao]]. The CIA in 1963 was tasked to mount an armed defense of the "neutrality" of the Kingdom. Helms then served as DDP and thus directed the overall effort. It was a ''secret war'' because both NVN and CIA were in violation of Geneva's 1962 terms.<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 193, 194–195 (why CIA tasked to wage a ''secret'' war).</ref><ref>Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) at 29 (ch.2): Use of armed forces in Laos was "justified partly because the North Vietnamese were also violating the Geneva Accords".</ref>

Thereafter during the 1960s the CIA accomplished this mission largely by training and arming native tribal forces, primarily those called the [[Hmong people|Hmong]].<ref>Ranelagh (1978) at p. 425 note. "The CIA referred to the hill tribes as 'Meos' although they were, in fact, several different tribes."</ref> Helms called it "the war we won". At most several hundred CIA personnel were involved, at a small fraction of the cost of the Vietnam War. Despite prior criticism of the CIA's abilities due to the 1961 [[Bay of Pigs]] disaster in Cuba, here the CIA for years successfully managed a large-scale [[paramilitary]] operation. At the height of the Vietnam War, much of royal Laos remained functionally neutral, although over its southeast borderlands ran the contested [[Ho Chi Minh trail]]. The CIA operation fielded as many as 30,000 Hmong soldiers under their leader [[Vang Pao]], while also supporting 250,000 mostly Hmong people in the hills. Consequently, more than 80,000 NVN troops were "tied down" in Laos.<ref>Helms (2003) 250–263 (Chapter: "The war we won"), at 251–253 (second Geneva), at 255, 260–261 (NVN troops). Additional forces in Laos were Thai army instructors and 20,000 "Thai volunteers", and U.S. Army special forces (at 258, 259).</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 191–201, at 191–195 (Geneva); at 200 (large-scale paramilitary); at 198 (at most 200 to 300 CIA, at much reduced cost than Vietnam).</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 419, 425.</ref><ref>Also, American planes carried out an extensive "secret bombing" of Laos. Joseph Buttinger, ''Vietnam. The unforgettable tragedy'' (1977) pp. 94.</ref>

At the time of Nixon's [[Vietnamization]] policy, CIA concern arose over sustaining the ''covert'' nature of the secret war. In 1970 Helms decided "to transfer the budgetary allocations for operations in Laos from the CIA to the [[United States Department of Defense|Defense Department]]."<ref>Karalekas (1976) p. 69.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 543.</ref> [[William Colby]], then a key American figure in Southeast Asia and later DCI, comments that "a large-scale paramilitary operation does not fit the secret budget and policy procedures of CIA."<ref>Colby (1978) p. 202 (quote); also at 301 (CIA budget taken over by Defense).</ref>

About Laos, however, Helms wrote that "I will always call it the war we won."<ref>Helms (2003) at 262 (quote).</ref> In 1966, the CIA had termed it "an exemplary success story".<ref>1966 CIA memo to [[303 Committee]], cited by Weiner (2007) pp. 257, 610.</ref> Colby concurred.<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 198, 200.</ref> Senator [[Stuart Symington]], after a 1967 visit to the CIA [[Station chief|chief of station]] in [[Vientiane]], the Laotian capital, reportedly called it "a sensible way to fight a war."<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 204–205.</ref> Yet others disagreed, and the 'secret war' would later draw frequent political attacks.<ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) p. 425 and note.</ref><ref>E.g., Colby (1978) pp. 202, 348.</ref> Author Weiner criticizes the imperious insertion of American power, and the ultimate abandonment of America's Hmong allies in 1975.<ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 252–256, and 343–345 on the fate of the Hmong, abandoned in 1975. But see below regarding Hmong refugees coming to the US.</ref><ref>Richard L. Holm, "No Drums, No Bugles. Recollections of a Case Officer in Laos, 1962–1965" in ''Studies in Intelligence'' 47/1 (CIA/CSI 2003), is cited by Weiner (2007) pp. 213, 345. The CIA's Holm later rued "the arrogance of Americans" who "had only a minimal understanding of the history, culture, and politics of the people" onto whom America's "strategic interests were superimposed". About the Hmong, Holm summarizes: "Their way of life has been destroyed. They can never return to Laos."</ref> Other problems arose because of the Hmong's practice of harvesting poppies.<ref>Leftist writer Mark Zepezauer, ''The CIA's Greatest Hits'' (Odonian Press 1994, 1998) pp. 48–49, 90–91, claims that the CIA got involved in heroin trafficking through its ''Armée Clandistine'' in Laos, which later led the CIA to similar crimes in Central America and Afghanistan.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 425 note, states that in the mid-1970s the Senate's Church Committee "found no evidence" of such CIA activity in Laos.</ref><ref>Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) write (pp. 214–215) of unofficial drug dealing by CIA agents, including in Laos, ancillary to fighting the Cold War. The authors also relate (pp. 312–313) the CIA's failed attempt to stop the publication of Alfred McCoy's book ''The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia'' (Harper and Row 1972).</ref>

[[File:USA - HMONG Memorial.jpg|thumb|Hmong memorial at Fresno County Court House, in California]]
Due to political developments, the war ultimately ended badly. Helms acknowledges that after President Nixon, through his agent Kissinger, negotiated in [[Paris Peace Accords|Paris to end the Vietnam war]] in 1973, America failed to continue supporting its allies and "abdicated its role in Southeast Asia." Laos was given up and the Hmong were left in a desperate situation. Helms references that eventually 450,000 Laotians including 200,000 Hmong emigrated to the United States.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 261–262, at 262 (quote).</ref><ref>Spencer C. Tucker, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (2000) p. 173.</ref><ref>War critic David Harris, ''Our War'' (1996), p. 169, writes, "our evacuation of those we did take was likely the noblest act we performed" during the conflict. Yet he describes the sad plight of Hmong in Fresno, California (pp. 270–271).</ref>

While this Laotian struggle continued on the borderlands of the Vietnam War, DCI Helms was blindsided when several senators began to complain that they had been kept in the dark about the "CIA's secret war" in Laos. Helms recalls that three presidents, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, had each approved the covert operation, the "secret war", and that 50 senators had been briefed on its progress, e.g., Senator Symington had twice visited Laos.<ref>Helms (2007) p. 255 (three Presidents), at 261 (50 senators briefed on CIA in Laos, at 415 (Symington's visits).</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 201–202. Colby writes, one "Senator publicly attacked CIA's 'secret war' when he had been fully briefed on it and had actually visited the area."</ref> Helms elaborates on the turnabout:

<blockquote>In 1970, it came as a jolt when, with a group of senators, Senator [[Stuart Symington]] publicly expressed his "surprise, shock and anger" at what he and the others claimed was their "recent discovery" of "CIA's secret war" in Laos. At the time I could not understand the reason for this about-face. Nor have I since been able to fathom it.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 415 (quote).</ref><ref>Symington's "shock" in 1973 was "viewed with undisguised scorn in the agency." Ranelagh (1978) p. 425 note. Often such "congressional huffing and puffing was for public consumption only" with the CIA being "privately congratulated" later for its efforts in Laos. Ranelagh at 610 note.</ref></blockquote>