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Russian Ground Forces
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=== Crime and corruption in the ground forces === The new Russian Ground Forces inherited an increasing crime problem from their Soviet predecessors. As draft resistance grew in the last years of the Soviet Union, the authorities tried to compensate by enlisting men with criminal records and who spoke little or no Russian. Crime rates soared, with the military procurator in Moscow in September 1990 reporting a 40-percent increase in crime over the previous six months, including a 41-percent rise in serious bodily injuries.{{sfn|Odom|1998|page=302}} Disappearances of weapons rose to rampant levels, especially in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.{{sfn|Odom|1998|page=302}} Generals directing the withdrawals from Eastern Europe diverted arms, equipment, and foreign monies intended to build housing in Russia for the withdrawn troops. Several years later, the former commander in Germany, General [[Matvey Burlakov]], and the Defence Minister, [[Pavel Grachev]], had their involvement exposed. They were also accused of ordering the murder of reporter [[Dmitry Kholodov]], who had been investigating the scandals.{{sfn|Odom|1998|page=302}} In December 1996, Defence Minister [[Igor Rodionov]] ordered the dismissal of the Commander of the Ground Forces, General [[Vladimir Magomedovich Semyonov|Vladimir Semyonov]], for activities incompatible with his position — reportedly his wife's business activities.<ref name="nupi">{{cite report| url = http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?314| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070319042913/http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?314| archive-date = 19 March 2007| title = Chronology of events—Rodionov dismisses commander of ground forces and then cancels visit to United States| publisher = Norwegian Institute of International Affairs | date = 4 December 1996| access-date = 27 September 2008}}</ref> A 1995 study by the U.S. [[Foreign Military Studies Office]]<ref>{{cite web|last=Turbiville |first=Graham H. |url=http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/mafia.htm |archive-url=https://archive.today/20070801170345/http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/mafia.htm |archive-date=1 August 2007 |title=Mafia in Uniform: The criminalization of the Russian Armed Forces }}</ref> went as far as to say that the Armed Forces were "an institution increasingly defined by the high levels of military criminality and corruption embedded within it at every level." The FMSO noted that crime levels had always grown with social turbulence, such as the trauma Russia was passing through. The author identified four major types among the raft of criminality prevalent within the forces—weapons trafficking and the arms trade; business and commercial ventures; military crime beyond Russia's borders; and contract murder. Weapons disappearances began during the dissolution of the Union and has continued. Within units "rations are sold while soldiers grow hungry ... [while] fuel, spare parts, and equipment can be bought."{{sfn|Orr|2003|page=10}} Meanwhile, ''voyemkomats'' take bribes to arrange avoidance of service, or a more comfortable posting. Beyond the Russian frontier, drugs were smuggled across the [[Tajikistan|Tajik]] border—supposedly being patrolled by Russian guards—by military aircraft, and a Russian senior officer, General Major Alexander Perelyakin, had been dismissed from his post with the United Nations peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Hercegovina ([[UNPROFOR]]), following continued complaints of smuggling, profiteering, and corruption. In terms of contract killings, beyond the Kholodov case, there have been widespread rumours that GRU [[Spetsnaz]] personnel have been moonlighting as ''mafiya'' hitmen.<ref>{{Cite journal| last = Galeotti | page = 52| first = Mark | title = Moscow's Armed Forces: a city's balance of power| journal = Jane's Intelligence Review | issn = 1350-6226}}</ref> Reports such as these continued. Some of the more egregious examples have included a constant-readiness motor rifle regiment's tanks running out of fuel on the firing ranges, due to the diversion of their fuel supplies to local businesses.{{sfn|Orr|2003|page=10}} Visiting the 20th Army in April 2002, [[Sergei Ivanov|Sergey Ivanov]] said the volume of theft was "simply impermissible".{{sfn|Orr|2003|page=10}} Ivanov said that 20,000 servicemen were wounded or injured in 2002 as a result of accidents or criminal activity across the entire armed forces - so the ground forces figure would be less.<ref>Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 December 2003, p.27.</ref> Abuse of personnel, sending soldiers to work outside units—a long-standing tradition which could see conscripts doing things ranging from being large scale manpower supply for commercial businesses to being officers' families' servants—is now banned by Sergei Ivanov's Order 428 of October 2005. What is more, the order is being enforced, with several prosecutions recorded.<ref name="keir-07"/> President Putin also demanded a halt to dishonest use of military property in November 2005: "We must completely eliminate the use of the Armed Forces' material base for any commercial objectives." The spectrum of dishonest activity has included, in the past, exporting aircraft as scrap metal; but the point at which officers are prosecuted has shifted, and investigations over trading in travel warrants and junior officers' routine thieving of soldiers' meals are beginning to be reported.<ref name="keir-07"/> However, British military analysts comment that "there should be little doubt that the overall impact of theft and fraud is much greater than that which is actually detected".<ref name="keir-07"/> Chief Military Prosecutor Sergey Fridinskiy said in March 2007 that there was "no systematic work in the Armed Forces to prevent embezzlement".<ref name="keir-07"/> In March 2011, Military Prosecutor General Sergei Fridinsky reported that crimes had been increasing steadily in the Russian ground forces for the past 18 months, with 500 crimes reported in the period of January to March 2011 alone. Twenty servicemen were crippled and two killed in the same period as a result. Crime in the ground forces was up 16% in 2010 as compared to 2009, with crimes against other servicemen constituting one in every four cases reported.<ref name="pravda">[http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/25-03-2011/117335-army_hazing-0/ "No solution to hideous army hazing in Russia"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141213124012/http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/25-03-2011/117335-army_hazing-0/ |date=13 December 2014 }}, [[Pravda]] (25 March 2011)</ref> Compounding this problem was also a rise in "extremist" crimes in the ground forces, with "''servicemen from different ethnic groups or regions trying to enforce their own rules and order in their units''", according to the Prosecutor General. Fridinsky also lambasted the military investigations department for their alleged lack of efficiency in investigative matters, with only one in six criminal cases being revealed. Military commanders were also accused of concealing crimes committed against servicemen from military officials.<ref name="rferl">[http://www.rferl.org/content/violent_crimes_in_russian_army_increase/3538265.html "Violent Crimes In Russian Army Increase"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141213043702/http://www.rferl.org/content/violent_crimes_in_russian_army_increase/3538265.html |date=13 December 2014 }}, [[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty]] (27 March 2011)</ref> A major corruption scandal also occurred at the elite [[Lipetsk Air Base|Lipetsk pilot training center]], where the deputy commander, the chief of staff and other officers allegedly extorted 3 million roubles of premium pay from other officers since the beginning of 2010. The Tambov military garrison prosecutor confirmed that charges have been lodged against those involved. The affair came to light after a junior officer wrote about the extortion in his personal blog. Sergey Fridinskiy, the Main Military Prosecutor acknowledged that extortion in the distribution of supplementary pay in army units is common, and that "criminal cases on the facts of extortion are being investigated in practically every district and fleet."<ref>{{cite web|url = http://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/07/26/latest-on-sulim-and-premium-pay-extortion/|title = Latest on Sulim and Premium Pay Extortion {{!}} Russian Defense Policy|date = 26 July 2011|access-date = 14 August 2011|archive-date = 15 August 2011|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110815032504/https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/07/26/latest-on-sulim-and-premium-pay-extortion/|url-status = live}}</ref> In August 2012, Prosecutor General Fridinsky again reported a rise in crime, with murders rising more than half, bribery cases doubling, and drug trafficking rising by 25% in the first six months of 2012 as compared to the same period in the previous year. Following the release of these statistics, the [[Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia]] denounced the conditions in the Armed Forces as a "crime against humanity".<ref name="dw">[http://www.dw.de/crime-reportedly-flourishes-in-russian-army/a-16175665 "Crime reportedly flourishes in Russian army"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403014352/http://www.dw.de/crime-reportedly-flourishes-in-russian-army/a-16175665 |date=3 April 2015 }}, [[Deutsche Welle]] (18 August 2012)</ref> In July 2013, the [[Prosecutor General of Russia]]'s office revealed that corruption in the same year had grown 5.5 times as compared to the previous year, costing the Russian government 4.4 billion rubles (US$130 million). It was also revealed that total number of registered crimes in the Russian armed forces had declined in the same period, although one in five crimes registered were corruption-related.<ref>{{cite web |title=Ущерб государству от коррупции в армии в 2013 году превысил 4,4 млрд рублей |url=https://www.interfax.ru/russia/317810 |date=11 July 2013 |access-date=24 February 2023 |archive-date=24 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230224085202/https://www.interfax.ru/russia/317810 |url-status=live }}</ref> "In 2019, Chief Military Prosecutor Valery Petrov reported that some $110 million had been lost due to corruption in the military departments and the number was on the uptick."<ref>'В 2018 Году Ущерб от Коррупции Военнослужащих в России Вырос до 7 Млрд Рублей', TASS, 21 March 2019, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/6242472 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230222223810/https://tass.ru/obschestvo/6242472 |date=22 February 2023 }} via Coffey 2022 on the evolution of dedovschina.</ref>
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