Editing Sea Dart (section)

===CF.299===
The new design was returned in 1962, and was so promising that the [[Ministry of Aviation]] assigned it the name CF.299 and detailed design began.{{sfn|Gibson|Buttler|2007|p=63}}

A 1966 report estimated that CF.299 would have a two-shot [[Probability of kill|kill probability]] (Pk) against an [[K-10S|AS-2 Kipper]] missile of 0.8–0.9, whereas Seaslug II would manage only 0.35–0.55. Against a supersonic [[Tupolev Tu-22|"Blinder"]] bomber, Pk was 0.5–0.8, compared to 0.3–0.5 for Seaslug. Additionally, because it flew faster than Seaslug, the total engagement time was shorter, and this meant the battery could salvo more rapidly. Finally, its ability to [[deflection (ballistics)|lead the target]], compared to Seaslug's [[beam riding]] [[pursuit course]], allowed it to attack targets with much higher crossing speeds. A 1968 study suggested Sea Dart would have the same capability as eight [[F-4 Phantom]]s on patrol.{{sfn|Friedman|2012|p=257}}

By this time, many European navies had chosen the US [[RIM-24 Tartar]] surface-to-air missiles, but the [[Dutch Navy]] was interested in the British missile for a new class of advanced anti-air ships they were designing. The design mounted an advanced radar system, and an agreement was arranged where the Dutch would use the British missile and the RN ships would use the Dutch radar under the name Type 988 "Broomstick". This was a 3D radar with multiple antennas that provided both fast continual scanning as well as multiple independent targeting radars. Both the radar and missiles would be controlled by a new combat direction system being developed by both navies.{{sfn|Friedman|2012|p=258}}

Ultimately, the Dutch also chose Tartar for their missile component, leaving the Royal Navy as the Sea Dart's only initial user.{{sfn|Friedman|2012|p=258}} The Navy dropped its interest in Broomstick and continued development using simpler radars like the [[Type 965 radar]] that was already in service. This had the disadvantage of not being able to pick out targets against a background landform or high waves, significantly limiting its capabilities against low-flying strike aircraft.{{sfn|Friedman|2012|p=162}}