Editing Selby rail crash (section)

===Health and Safety Executive report===
The HSE released their final report into the accident on 4 December 2002.<ref>{{cite news |last=Wainwright |first=Martin |date=5 December 2002 |title=Rail crash inquiry calls for monitors |url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/dec/05/selby.railtravel |access-date=24 August 2024 |work=The Guardian |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> It stated that no defects were found with any of the railway infrastructure that could have contributed to the outcome of the crash, and that the motorway complied with the standards at the time.{{sfn|HSE|2002|p=7}}

At the time of the impact with the car, the InterCity 225 was estimated to have been travelling at a speed of {{convert|120|mph|abbr=on}} to {{convert|125|mph|abbr=on}}. After the initial collision, the train then slowed to an estimated speed of {{convert|88|mph|abbr=on}} prior to the impact with the freight train, which was estimated to have been travelling at {{convert|54|mph|abbr=on}}. With an estimated closing speed of {{convert|142|mph|abbr=on}}, the collision between the trains is the highest-speed railway incident that has occurred in the UK.{{sfn|HSE|2002|pp=10, 34}}

The HSE report considered the [[crashworthiness]] of the trains. The InterCity 225 had 99 occupants at the time, out of a total seating capacity of 544. The DVT suffered major damage, which included the cab being separated from the underframe. This was due to it being more lightweight, and having a lower ride height than the freight locomotive it collided with.{{sfn|HSE|2002|p=22}} 45 of the 52 seriously injured passengers, and all eight fatalities, were travelling in the first five coaches. These coaches were noted for having the most damage, with their survival space reduced due to several impacts. Overall, the report noted that the coaches performed well in the crash, considering the high speeds involved.{{sfn|HSE|2002|p=24}}

The front and right side of the freight locomotive suffered heavy damage as a result of the impact with the DVT. Though the locomotive's body had a robust construction, which meant it only suffered relatively minor structural damage compared to the other vehicles involved in the accident, its design meant that it did not have any energy absorbing features. The report added "Its design does not appear to complement the crashworthy considerations that guide the construction of passenger vehicles that use the same rail network." Some freight wagons impacted the passenger train's coaches, causing extensive damage. This was partially due to the angular design of the wagons, which was also noted in the [[Southall rail crash]] investigation.{{sfn|HSE|2002|pp=28–29}}

Overall, the HSE report recommended that further research be conducted on how derailments occur and how the vehicles behave during them. This research should consider several factors, such as vehicle construction and safety features such as obstacle deflectors and bogie retention. It raised concerns relating to the design of freight trains as a whole, and mentioned that future designs should include features such as energy absorption functionality and bogie retention. It also stated that freight vehicles should avoid aggressive corners at possible interfaces with passenger trains in the event of a crash. [[Tripwires]] similar to those already used close to airport runways were mentioned as potentially warranting further research. These could detect the incursion of a road vehicle onto railway property, and interface with different train control systems. Although this may not help when a train is already close to the incident, it could provide an early warning to the incursion in other cases.{{sfn|HSE|2002|pp=37–38}}