Editing Six Days' Campaign (section)

==Analysis==
Ralph Ashby wrote in ''Napoleon Against Great Odds'' (2010):
{{quote|Blücher’s Army of Silesia had been very roughly handled between February 10 and 14. The ebullient Prussian Field Marshal was temporarily chastened. Napoleon had beaten a larger force with a smaller one and had suffered only a fraction of the casualties he inflicted on the Russo-Prussian forces. Even given the massive Allied superiority in numbers, they had taken losses proportionately greater than the French. The Army of Silesia had lost about a third of its strength, and the remainder was whipped and demoralized. To add to Allied woes, French partisan warfare was beginning to take shape...{{sfn|Ashby|2010|p=102}} }}

David Zabecki wrote in ''Germany at War'' (2014):
{{quote|Later commentators noted that in this campaign Napoleon achieved unexpected and extraordinary results, including the elimination of approximately 20,000 enemy troops, which nearly halved the forces he then faced. Napoleon's troops had been greatly outnumbered, and he therefore fought by means of careful tactical manoeuvring, rather than using the sort of brute force characteristic of earlier French victories.

But the campaign rallied the Allies and helped end their internal bickering.{{sfn|Zabecki|2014|p=1206}}
}}
 
Michael Leggiere  in  ''Blücher: Scourge of Napoleon'' (2014) quotes [[Johann Nepomuk von Nostitz-Rieneck|Johann von Nostitz]] that the campaign displayed Napoleon's "talents as a field commander to the highest degree in defeating five enemy corps in sequence", but in failing to totally destroy Blücher's army and driving the remnants back into Germany, Napoleon missed his only opportunity of forcing the Coalition Powers to agree to anything other than peace on their terms.{{sfn|Leggiere|2014|p=439}}