Editing Skepticism (section)

===Philosophy===
{{Pyrrhonism sidebar}}{{Main|Philosophical skepticism}}
As a philosophical school or movement, skepticism arose both in ancient Greece and India. In India the [[Ajñana]] school of philosophy espoused skepticism. It was a major early rival of [[Buddhism]] and [[Jainism]], and possibly a major influence on Buddhism. Two of the foremost disciples of the [[Buddha]], [[Sariputta]] and [[Maudgalyayana|Moggallāna]], were initially students of the Ajñana philosopher [[Sanjaya Belatthiputta]]. A strong element of skepticism is found in [[Early Buddhist schools|Early Buddhism]], most particularly in the [[Atthakavagga and Parayanavagga|Aṭṭhakavagga]] sutra. However, the total effect these philosophies had on each other is difficult to discern. Since skepticism is a philosophical attitude and a style of philosophizing rather than a position, the Ajñanins may have influenced other skeptical thinkers of India such as [[Nagarjuna]], [[Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa]], and [[Shriharsha]].{{sfn|Matilal|2004|pp=52–75}}{{full citation needed|date=August 2023}}

In Greece, philosophers as early as [[Xenophanes]] ({{BCE|{{circa|570}}–{{circa|475}}}}) expressed skeptical views, as did [[Democritus]]<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite book|author=[[Diogenes Laërtius]]|title=Lives of the Eminent Philosophers|at=[https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/diogenes-laertius/the-lives-and-opinions-of-eminent-philosophers/c-d-yonge/text/book-9#part-9-7 Book IX]}}
|2= [[#Fr|Bakalis]] (2005, p. 86){{full citation needed|date=August 2023}} }}</ref>
and a number of [[Sophists]]. [[Gorgias]], for example, reputedly argued that nothing exists, that even if there were something we could not know it, and that even if we could know it we could not communicate it.<ref>{{cite book|first=W. T.|last=Jones|title=A History of Western Philosophy|location=New York|publisher=Harcourt, Brace|year=1952|at=p. 60 n. 45}}</ref> The [[Heraclitus|Heraclitean]] philosopher [[Cratylus]] refused to discuss anything and would merely wriggle his finger, claiming that communication is impossible since meanings are constantly changing.<ref name=PopkinSkepticism>{{cite book|first=Richard H.|last=Popkin|chapter=Skepticism|editor-first=Paul|editor-last=Edwards|title=The Encyclopedia of Philosophy|volume=7|location=New York|publisher=Macmillan|year=1967}}</ref>{{rp|449}} [[Socrates]] also had skeptical tendencies, claiming to know nothing worthwhile.<ref>{{cite book|last=Hazlett|first=Allan|author-link=Allan Hazlett|title=[[A Critical Introduction to Skepticism]]|location=London|publisher=Bloomsbury|year=2014|pages=4–5}}</ref>

[[File:Philosopher,_marble_head,_Roman_copy,_AM_Corfu,_Krfm22.jpg|thumb|[[Pyrrho of Elis]] was the founder of the school of skepticism known as [[Pyrrhonism]].]]
There were two major schools of skepticism in the ancient Greek and Roman world. The first was [[Pyrrhonism]], founded by [[Pyrrho of Elis]] ({{circa|{{BCE|360–270}}}}). The second was [[Academic Skepticism]], so-called because its two leading defenders, [[Arcesilaus]] ({{circa|{{BCE|315–240}}}}) who initiated the philosophy, and [[Carneades]] ({{circa|{{BCE|217–128}}}}), the philosophy's most famous proponent, were heads of Plato's [[Academy]]. Pyrrhonism's aims are psychological. It urges suspension of judgment ({{transliteration|grc|[[epoche]]}}) to achieve mental tranquility ({{transliteration|grc|[[ataraxia]]}}). The Academic Skeptics denied that knowledge is possible ({{transliteration|grc|[[acatalepsy]]}}). The Academic Skeptics claimed that some beliefs are more reasonable or probable than others, whereas Pyrrhonian skeptics argue that equally compelling arguments can be given for or against any disputed view.{{r|PopkinSkepticism|page=450}} Nearly all the writings of the ancient skeptics are now lost. Most of what we know about ancient skepticism is from [[Sextus Empiricus]], a Pyrrhonian skeptic who lived in {{CE|the second or third century}}. His works contain a lucid summary of stock skeptical arguments.

Ancient skepticism faded out during the late Roman Empire, particularly after [[Augustine]] ({{CE|354–430}}) attacked the skeptics in his work ''Against the Academics'' ({{CE|386}}). There was little knowledge of, or interest in, ancient skepticism in Christian Europe during the Middle Ages. Interest revived during the Renaissance and Reformation, particularly after the complete writings of Sextus Empiricus were translated into Latin in 1569 and after [[Martin Luther]]'s skepticism of holy orders.<ref name="Daughtrity 2017 p. 358">{{cite book | last=Daughtrity | first=Dyron B. | title=Martin Luther: A Biography for the People | publisher=Abilene Christian University Press | year=2017 | isbn=978-0-89112-468-9 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TEGHDwAAQBAJ | url-access=subscription | access-date=2023-02-11 | page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEGHDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT358 358]}}</ref> A number of Catholic writers, including [[Francisco Sanches]] ({{circa|1550–1623}}), [[Michel de Montaigne]] (1533–1592), [[Pierre Gassendi]] (1592–1655), and [[Marin Mersenne]] (1588–1648) deployed ancient skeptical arguments to defend moderate forms of skepticism and to argue that faith, rather than reason, must be the primary guide to truth. Similar arguments were offered later (perhaps ironically) by the Protestant thinker [[Pierre Bayle]] in his influential Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697–1702).<ref name=PopkinHistory>{{cite book|first=Richard H.|last=Popkin|title=The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza|edition=revised|location=Berkeley|publisher=University of California Press|year=1979}}</ref>{{rp|chaps. 1 & 2}}

The growing popularity of skeptical views created an intellectual crisis in seventeenth-century Europe. An influential response was offered by the French philosopher and mathematician [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650). In his classic work, ''Meditations of First Philosophy'' (1641), Descartes sought to refute skepticism, but only after he had formulated the case for skepticism as powerfully as possible. Descartes argued that no matter what radical skeptical possibilities we imagine there are certain truths (e.g., that thinking is occurring, or that I exist) that are absolutely certain. Thus, the ancient skeptics were wrong to claim that knowledge is impossible. Descartes also attempted to refute skeptical doubts about the reliability of our senses, our memory, and other cognitive faculties. To do this, Descartes tried to prove that God exists and that God would not allow us to be systematically deceived about the nature of reality. Many contemporary philosophers question whether this second stage of Descartes's critique of skepticism is successful.{{r|PopkinHistory|page=210}}

In the eighteenth century a new case for skepticism was offered by the Scottish philosopher [[David Hume]] (1711–1776). Hume was an empiricist, claiming that all genuine ideas can be traced back to original impressions of sensation or introspective consciousness. Hume argued that on empiricist grounds there are no sound reasons for belief in God, an enduring self or soul, an external world, causal necessity, objective morality, or inductive reasoning. In fact, he argued that "Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not Nature too strong for it."{{r|PopkinSkepticism|page=456}} As Hume saw it, the real basis of human belief is not reason, but custom or habit. We are hard-wired by nature to trust, say, our memories or inductive reasoning, and no skeptical arguments, however powerful, can dislodge those beliefs. In this way, Hume embraced what he called a "mitigated" skepticism, while rejecting an "excessive" Pyrrhonian skepticism that he saw as both impractical and psychologically impossible.

Hume's skepticism provoked a number of important responses. Hume's Scottish contemporary, [[Thomas Reid]] (1710–1796), challenged Hume's strict empiricism and argued that it is rational to accept "common-sense" beliefs such as the basic reliability of our senses, our reason, our memories, and inductive reasoning, even though none of these things can be proved. In Reid's view, such common-sense beliefs are foundational and require no proof in order to be rationally justified.{{r|PopkinSkepticism|page=456}} Not long after Hume's death, the German philosopher [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804) argued that human empirical experience has possibility conditions which could not have been realized unless Hume's skeptical conclusions about causal synthetic ''a priori'' judgements were false.

Today, skepticism continues to be a topic of lively debate among philosophers.{{r|Greco2009}} British philosopher [[Julian Baggini]] posits that reason is perceived as "an enemy of mystery and ambiguity," but, if used properly, can be an effective tool for solving many larger societal issues.<ref name="Radford and Frazier (2017)">{{cite journal |author-link1=Benjamin Radford|last1=Radford|first1=Benjamin|author-link2=Kendrick Frazier|last2=Frazier|first2=Kendrick |title=The Edge of Reason: A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World |journal=Skeptical Inquirer |date=January 2017 |volume=41 |issue=1 |page=60}}</ref>