Editing Splendid isolation (section)

==Abandonment==
In 1898, the [[Secretary of State for the Colonies|Colonial Secretary]] [[Joseph Chamberlain]] tried to negotiate an alliance with Germany. He spoke publicly of Britain's diplomatic predicament, saying "We have had no allies. I am afraid we have had no friends&nbsp;... We stand alone."{{sfn|Massie|1997|pp=245–247}} While unsuccessful, it reflected a growing realisation that Britain's diplomatic isolation during the 1899–1902 [[Second Boer War]] left it dangerously exposed.{{sfn|Cohen|1997|pp=122–134}}
[[File:Germany GB France.gif|thumb|right|upright=0.8|The [[Entente Cordiale]]; [[John Bull]] (Britain) walks off with [[Marianne]] (France), while the Kaiser pretends not to care.]]

According to  G.W. Monger's summary of the Cabinet debates in 1900 to 1902:<blockquote>Chamberlain advocated ending Britain's isolation by concluding an alliance with Germany; [[Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury|Salisbury]] resisted change. With the new crisis in China caused by the Boxer rising and [[Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne|Lansdowne]]'s appointment to the Foreign Office in 1900, those who advocated a change won the upper hand. Lansdowne in turn attempted to reach an agreement with Germany and a settlement with Russia but failed. In the end Britain concluded an alliance with Japan. The decision of 1901 was momentous; British policy had been guided by events, but Lansdowne had no real understanding of these events. The change of policy had been forced on him and was a confession of Britain's weakness.<ref> G. W. Monger, "The End of Isolation: Britain, Germany and Japan, 1900-1902" ''Transactions of the Royal Historical Society'' vol. 13, 1963, pp. 103–21 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678731 online]</ref></blockquote> 

In 1902, Britain and Japan signed the [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance]]; if either were attacked by a third party, the other would remain neutral and if attacked by two or more opponents, the other would come to its aid. This meant Japan could rely on British support in a war with Russia, if either France or Germany, which also had interests in China, decided to join them.{{sfn|Cavendish |2002}} With Britain still engaged in the Boer War, this was arguably a defensive move rather than an end to isolation, a view supported by T. G. Otte, who sees it as reinforcing Britain's aloofness from the Continent and the European alliance systems.{{sfn|Otte|2007|p=306}} 

The peaceful resolution of the Venezuela issue in 1897 led to the 1901 [[Hay–Pauncefote Treaty]], but it dealt with the [[Panama Canal]], Britain tacitly accepted US supremacy and responsibility for the Americas. Just as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance allowed the Royal Navy to reduce its presence in the [[Far East]], that in the [[Caribbean]] was also significantly reduced as a result.{{sfn|Humphries|1967|p=163}} 

Primarily for domestic British consumption, the 1904 [[Entente Cordiale]] with France and the 1907 [[Anglo-Russian Convention]] were not formal alliances, and both focused on colonial boundaries in Asia and Africa. However, they cleared the way for co-operation in other areas, making British entry into any future conflict involving France or Russia a strong possibility; these interlocking bilateral agreements became known as the [[Triple Entente]].{{sfn|Willmott|2003|p=15}}

In the 1911 [[Agadir Crisis]], Britain backed France against Germany. By 1914, the British army and navy were committed to support France in the event of war with Germany, but even in the government, few were aware of the true extent of these undertakings.{{sfn|Asquith|2014|pp=17–18}}