Editing Strategic Hamlet Program (section)

==Implementation==

In late 1961, President Kennedy sent [[Roger Hilsman]], then director of the State Department's [[Bureau of Intelligence and Research]], to assess the situation in Vietnam. There Hilsman met [[Robert Grainger Ker Thompson|Sir Robert Thompson]], head of the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam (BRIAM). Thompson was a veteran of the [[Malayan Emergency#British response|Malayan counter-insurgency]] effort and a [[counter-insurgency]] advisor to the Diem government.<ref name="Tucker, p. 1070" /> Thompson shared his revised system of resettlement and population security, a system he had proposed to Diem that would eventually become the Strategic Hamlet Program. Thompson's proposal, adopted by Diem, advocated a priority on winning control of the South Vietnamese rural population rather than killing insurgents.  The police and local security forces would play an important role coupled with anti-insurgent sweeps by the [[Army of the Republic of Vietnam|South Vietnamese army]] (ARVN).<ref>Krepinevich, Jr., Andrew F. (1986), ''The Army and Vietnam'', Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 67–68 {{ISBN?}}</ref>

After his meetings with Thompson, on 2 February 1962 Hilsman described his concepts of a Strategic Hamlet Program in a policy document entitled "A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam", which President Kennedy read and endorsed.<ref>Hilsman, Roger, ''To Move a Nation'', New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967, pp. 427–438; [http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent1.html ''The Pentagon Papers: Senator Gravel Edition''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180818075800/http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent1.html |date=2018-08-18 }}, 5 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971, 2:139ff; Thompson, Robert, ''No Exit From Vietnam'', London: Chatto & Windus, 1969.</ref>  Hilsman proposed heavily fortified strategic hamlets. "Each strategic village will be protected by a ditch and a fence of barbed wire.  It will include one or more observation towers...the area immediately around the village will be cleared for fields of fire and the area approaching the clearing, including the ditch, will be strewn with booby-traps...and other personal obstacles.<ref>Latham, Michael L. (2006) "Redirecting the Revolution?  The USA and the Failure of Nation Building in South Vietnam", ''Third World Quarterly'', Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 35. {{jstor|}}</ref> The Strategic Hamlet Program "aimed to condense South Vietnam’s roughly 16 000 hamlets (each estimated to have a population of slightly less than 1000) into about 12000 strategic hamlets”.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Latham|first=Michael|date=2006|title=Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the Failure of Nation Building in South Vietnam|journal=Third World Quarterly|volume=27|issue=1|pages=34|doi=10.1080/01436590500368743|s2cid=154956991}}</ref>

Hilsman proposed that each strategic hamlet be protected by a self-defense group of 75 to 100 armed men. The self-defense group would, in addition to defending the hamlet, be responsible for "enforcing curfews, checking identity cards, and ferreting out hard-core Communists." The objective was to separate, physically and politically, the Viet Cong guerrillas and supporters from the rural population.<ref name="Latham, p. 35">Latham, p. 35</ref>

The first step in the establishment of a strategic hamlet would be a census carried out by the South Vietnamese government. Next, villagers would be required to build fortifications and the members of the self-defense force identified and trained. The villagers would be registered and be given identity cards, and their movements would be monitored. Outside the fortifications would be a [[free-fire zone]].<ref name="Latham, p. 35" />

The South Vietnamese government on its part would provide assistance to the strategic hamlet and build an "essential socio-political base" that would break old habits and orient the residents toward identification with the country of South Vietnam.<ref>Latham, pp. 35–36</ref>

President Diem in an April 1962 speech outlined his hopes for the Program:
<blockquote>... strategic hamlets represented the basic elements in the war undertaken by our people against our three enemies: communism, discord, and underdevelopment. In this concept they also represent foundation of the Vietnamese society where values are reassessed according to the personalist revolution where social, cultural, and economic reform will improve the living conditions of the large working class down to the remotest village.<ref>Osborne, Milton E. ''Strategic Hamlets in South Viet-nam: A Survey and Comparison''. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1965, p. 28.</ref></blockquote>

The U.S. military commander in Vietnam, General [[Lionel C. McGarr]], was initially skeptical of the Strategic Hamlet Program, especially because it emphasized police and local security forces rather than military action against insurgents. The U.S. military also objected to the proposed focus of the program on the most populated areas of South Vietnam; the U.S. wished to focus on areas where communist influence was greatest. After compromises were made to secure U.S. agreement, the Strategic Hamlet Program began implementation in March 1962.<ref>Krepinevich, Jr., p. 67</ref>