Editing Ten Major Relationships (section)

== Content ==
Mao Zedong summarized the issues related to socialist construction and transformation into ten major relationships. To avoid the mistakes that the Soviet Union had made, Mao urged to mobilize the "positive elements" of the country, which were the peasants and workers, and turned the "negative elements" of reactionaries as far as possible into positive. Internationally "forces that can be united" were positive whilst reactionary forces were negative. The following are the synopses of the ten relationships, many of which were Mao's urge for balanced development and open criticism of the situations in the Soviet Union and [[Eastern Bloc|Eastern European countries]].

=== Relationship between heavy industry on one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other ===
Mao was concerned about the speed of [[capital accumulation]] and the production of the [[means of production]]. He was of the opinion that China was on the right course of balancing heavy industry on one hand, and light industry and agriculture on the other. Unlike in the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries, where the disequilibrium resulted in "a shortage of goods on the market and an unstable currency",<ref name=":2" /> the supply of grain, raw materials, and daily necessities were stable in China. He urged to increase the investment in agriculture and light industry so that the accumulation of capital could be enhanced for the development of heavy industry.

=== Relationship between industry in the coastal regions and industry in the interior ===
The focus of this part is the balance between the development in the [[Coastline of China|coastal regions]] and interior regions, which Mao considered free from major mistakes. Yet he urged to give greater attention to development in coastal regions, because the military threat posed by the United States had subsided and it would be unwise to abandon the coastal regions. He also mentioned in the interior regions industry should be gradually built.

=== Relationship between economic construction and defense construction ===
Similar to last part, Mao suggested that the threat posed by the United States since the Korean War had subsided and the Chinese armed forces had grown. Though China did not yet have the atom bomb, they would be able to possess it soon. Hence he urged lowering military and administrative expenses in favor of economic construction, which would eventually lead to investment in defense construction.

=== Relationship between the state, the units of production, and the producers ===
As for the relationship between the state and society, Mao urged for more openness and delegation of powers to the individual units of production and producers. Workers should be given improved working conditions and welfare, and increased and more equal wages as a reward for their political consciousness and over-fulfillment of production quotas. Factories should also been given more autonomy in operation. Unlike in the Soviet Union where peasants were exploited heavily by the state, China had a good relation with the peasants, though the Chinese Communist Party made a huge purchase of grain despite the floods in 1954 which made the peasants disgruntled. The policies of low agricultural tax, purchasing agricultural productions at standard prices, and subsidizing the grain sale to grain-deficient areas prevented China from making the mistakes the Soviet Union had made.

=== Relationship between the central and the local authorities ===
Mao stated that because of the complex situation of China's large population and vast scale, it was better to have both strong central and strong local governments than only a strong central government (as Mao described the Soviet Union).<ref name=":62">{{Cite book |last=Lan |first=Xiaohuan |title=How China Works: An Introduction to China's State-led Economic Development |publisher=[[Palgrave MacMillan]] |year=2024 |isbn=978-981-97-0079-0 |translator-last=Topp |translator-first=Gary}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=|page=36}} Mao stated that China should not be like the USSR, which Mao described as having a central government that was not flexible enough for local governments to operate.<ref name=":62" />{{Rp|page=36}} Though the incidents of [[Gao Gang]] and [[Rao Shushi]] in 1953 reminded the danger of local leaders having too much power, "provided that the policies of the central authorities are not violated, the local authorities may work out rules, regulations and measures in the light of their specific conditions and the needs of their work, and this is in no way prohibited by the [[Constitution of China|Constitution]]."<ref name=":2" />

=== Relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities ===
Mao said that the party had been able to oppose [[Han chauvinism]] and foster a harmonious relation with ethnic minorities. The situation in China was that Han population was the majority, but they occupied relatively a lower portion of land and the ethnic minorities occupied the majority of the land. The party hence needed to keep reviewing their own policy to eliminate the influences of the old time and devise systems of economic management and finance for the minority nationalities.

=== Relationship between Party and non-Party ===
This part is the most liberal of the ten major relationships, as Mao opined that the existence of [[United Front (People's Republic of China)|other political parties]] could serve the party well by providing supervision. Though democratic parties were composed of the national bourgeoisies and intellectuals, they offered "well-intentioned criticisms." Even if the criticism was abusive, the party could refute by rational responses. Mao then envisioned the disappearance of the party, as the Marxist theory suggested the coming of a [[stateless society]] when communism is achieved, and even though a coercive party was needed to suppress counter-revolutionaries, he proposed to streamline the party and the bureaucracy.

=== Relationship between revolution and counter-revolution ===
Though counter-revolutionaries were negative factor, thanks to the policy of the party, some of them had stopped opposing the revolution. Whilst affirming the necessity of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries campaign in the early 1950s, Mao distanced himself from the [[Great Purge]] of Stalin and insisted that counter-revolutionaries like [[Hu Feng]] still existed and hence execution was needed in some cases to safeguard socialism and the [[dictatorship of the proletariat]].

=== Relationship between right and wrong ===
In this section Mao focused on those who made mistakes in the past, which include "dogmatists headed by [[Wang Ming]]" who led the party "picking up the bad aspect of Stalin's style of work".<ref name=":2" /> Mao used [[Lu Xun]]'s "[[The True Story of Ah Q]]" to illustrate it was "bad either to bar people outside the Party from the revolution or to prohibit erring comrades inside the Party from making amends."<ref name=":2" /> He suggested to observe those Communists who had erred but not those "who cling to their mistakes and fail to mend their ways after repeated admonition".<ref name=":2" />

=== Relationship between China and other countries ===
In the tenth point, Mao emphasized the importance of "learning the strengths of all peoples and all countries."<ref name=":Minami">{{Cite book |last=Minami |first=Kazushi |title=People's Diplomacy: How Americans and Chinese Transformed US-China Relations during the Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |isbn=9781501774157 |location=Ithaca, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=15}}

Mao viewed the policy of learning from the other countries (implying the Soviet Union) had been right so far. Yet since that every nation had its weak points, China "mustn't copy everything indiscriminately and transplant mechanically" and "pick up their shortcomings and weak points."<ref name=":2" /> The Chinese Communists must be able to discern what were the strong or bad points from other countries to pick up. He used the example of the setting of a [[Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China|Ministry of Culture]] and a Bureau of Cinematography, instead of a Ministry of Cinematography and a Bureau of Culture like the case of the Soviet Union, to illustrate the importance of making a decision that best fitted the situations of China.

Regarding to the denouncement of the cult of personality of Stalin in the Soviet Union, Mao said that the "assessment of 30 per cent for mistakes and 70 per cent for achievements" for Stalin was "just about right."<ref name=":2" /> He then recounted the history of Wang Ming's "left adventurism" and "right opportunism" in the early history of the Chinese Communist Party which could be traced back to Stalin. In terms of socialist construction, Mao warned against the dogmatic following of Marxism–Leninism and applied their doctrines creatively.

Lastly, Mao summed up the two weaknesses of China, one being the lack of confidence among the people due to its colonial and semi-colonial past and the imperialist encroachment, and another being the delay of revolution which came only in 1949, four decades after the [[Xinhai Revolution|bourgeois revolution in 1911]].