Editing Tet Offensive (section)

== North Vietnam ==

=== Party politics ===
Planning in [[Hanoi]] for a winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the ''general offensive and uprising'', even decades after the event.<ref>Elliot, p. 1055.</ref> In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S.<ref>Nguyen, p. 4.; Duiker, William J. (2002) "Foreword," in ''Military History Institute of Vietnam'' Victory in Vietnam: A History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, p. xiv.</ref> The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated.

The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that the economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist [[Trường Chinh]] and Minister of Defense [[Võ Nguyên Giáp]]. The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of the [[People's Republic of China]] and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and [[Lê Đức Thọ]]  (no relation).  From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam.<ref>Nguyen, pp. 15–16.</ref> General [[Nguyễn Chí Thanh]], the head of [[Central Office for South Vietnam]] (COSVN), headquarters for the South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by [[Mao Zedong]].<ref name="Nguyen20">Nguyen, p. 20. See also Wirtz, pp. 30–50.</ref>

By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. [[strategic bombing|aerial bombing]], there was a dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South.<ref>Wirtz, p. 20.</ref> As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that the policy of rejecting negotiations was in error.<ref>Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, p. 55.</ref> The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy.<ref name="Nguyen22">Nguyen, p. 22.</ref>

During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President [[Hồ Chí Minh]], Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister [[Nguyễn Duy Trinh]], who called for negotiations.<ref>Contrary to Western belief, Hồ Chí Minh had been sidelined politically since 1963 and took little part in the day-to-day policy decisions of the Politburo or Secretariat. Nguyen, p. 30.</ref> From October 1966 through April 1967, a very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp.<ref>Wirtz, pp. 36–40, 47–49.</ref> Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam.<ref name="HoangLung" />{{rp|15–16}}<ref>See also Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, p. 56.</ref> Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the [[First Indochina War]] and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating the past."<ref name="HoangLung" />{{rp|16}}

The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that a conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the [[Korean War]]. They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas."<ref>Nguyen, pp. 18–20.</ref>

To "break the will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the [[Revisionist Anti-Party Affair]].<ref name="Nguyen24">Nguyen, p. 24.</ref> All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive.<ref name="Nguyen27">Nguyen, p. 27.</ref> This move cemented the position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December.

=== General offensive and uprising ===
[[File:T4 Vietcong Tet Offensive.jpg|thumb|VC prior to departing for [[Saigon]]-[[Gia Định Province|Gia Định]]]]

The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi the following month. Thanh was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo.<ref>''Victory in Vietnam'', p. 371.</ref> On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in a U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia.<ref>''Victory in Vietnam'', p. 380. Nguyen, fn. 147</ref>

After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of the population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the [[Buddhist crisis|Buddhist crises of 1963]] and [[Buddhist Uprising|1966]]; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of the Thiệu government in the southern press.<ref name="HoangLung" />{{rp|24}} Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced."<ref name="Nguyen24" />

[[File:Viet Cong Sworn In.jpg|thumb|left|VC special forces are sworn into the forces before the Tet Offensive.]]

In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at the 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968.<ref>Ang, p. 352.</ref> The resultant ''Resolution 14'' was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible."<ref>Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, p. 56.</ref>

Contrary to Western belief, Giáp did not plan or command the offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, [[Phạm Hùng]], and then modified by Giáp.<ref>Nguyen, p. 34. Duiker, p. 288. Also see Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, p. 56.</ref> The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress", he may have found the task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a ''fait accompli''.<ref>Marc J. Gilbert & James Wells ''Hau Nghia Part 3'', 2005. http://grunt.space.swri.edu/gilbert3.htm {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051027174556/http://grunt.space.swri.edu/gilbert3.htm |date=2005-10-27 }}</ref> Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for the Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory".<ref>Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, pp. 58–59.</ref>

[[File:Tet Offensive Preparation.jpg|thumb|VC special forces study maps of District 7, Saigon, prior to the Tet offensive]]

The PAVN official history states that the objectives of the Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on the basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification.<ref>William, Thomas Allison. The Tet Offensive: a brief history with documents. pp. 25.</ref>

The operation would involve a preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The ''general offensive and uprising'' would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against the U.S. [[Khe Sanh Combat Base]]. The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention.<ref name="Duiker299">Duiker, p. 299.</ref> Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt.<ref name="HoangLung" />{{rp|26}} The offensive, therefore, was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the [[1968 United States presidential election|November presidential election]] in the U.S.<ref>Hoang offered opposing viewpoints (pp. 22–23) while William Duiker (p. 289) and Clark Clifford (p. 475) believed that it was so intended. Stanley Karnow did not (p. 537), while William Westmoreland never even mentioned the prospect in his memoir. A study of North Vietnamese documentation by James Wirtz led him to conclude that Giáp believed that the American people would have to endure two more years of military stalemate (post-offensive) before turning decisively against the war. Wirtz, p. 61.</ref>

[[File:NLF Main Force troops.jpg|thumb|left|VC troops pose with new AK-47 assault rifles and American field radios.]]

According to General [[Trần Văn Trà]], the new military head of COSVN (B2 Front), the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be a countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down the enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August.<ref>Trần Văn Trà, ''Tet'', p. 40.</ref>

Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the [[Ho Chi Minh trail]].<ref>''Victory in Vietnam,'', p. 208. See also Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, ''The North'', p. 46.</ref> This logistical effort also involved re-arming the VC with new [[AK-47]] assault rifles and [[RPG-2|B-40]] rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi ''would'' rather than ''could'' open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended [[Operation Rolling Thunder]], the bombing campaign against North Vietnam.<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|10}} This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year.

South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six [[sapper]] battalions.<ref name="HoangLung" />{{rp|10}}