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Thing-in-itself
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===G. E. Schulze=== The anonymously published work ''[[Aenesidemus (book)|Aenesidemus]]'' was one of the most successful attacks against the project of Kant. According to Kant's teaching, things-in-themselves cannot cause appearances, since the [[Category (Kant)|category]] of [[causality]] can only find application to objects of experience. Kant, therefore, does not have the right to claim the existence of things-in-themselves. This contradiction was subsequently generally accepted as being the main problem of the thing-in-itself. The attack on the thing-in-itself, and the skeptical work in general, had a big impact on [[Fichte]], and [[Schopenhauer]] called [[Gottlob Ernst Schulze|G. E. Schulze]], who was revealed to be the author, “the acutest" of Kant's opponents.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|volume=1 Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy|quote=Kant’s greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing in itself … This defect, as is known, is the introduction of the thing in itself in the way chosen by him, the inadmissibleness of which was exposed at length by G. E. Schulze in "Aenesidemus " and was soon recognised as the untenable point of his system. … It is most remarkable that one of Kant’s opponents, and indeed the acutest of them, G. E. Schulze …}}</ref>
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