Editing Timor-Leste Defence Force (section)

=== Formation of the F-FDTL ===

[[File:FALINTIL veterans USAID photo.jpg|thumb|upright|FALINTIL veterans]]
An Office for Defence Force Development staffed mainly by foreign military officers was established to oversee the process of forming Timor-Leste's armed forces and demobilising the former guerrillas. The Office delegated responsibility for recruiting personnel to FALINTIL's leaders.{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|p=132}}

FALINTIL officially became F-FDTL on 1 February 2001. The first 650 members of the F-FDTL were selected from 1,736 former FALINTIL applicants and began training on 29 March. The FDTL's 1st Battalion was established on 29 June 2001 and reached full strength on 1 December. Most members of the battalion were from Timor-Leste's eastern provinces.<ref>Ball (2002), p. 180</ref> The 2nd Battalion was established in 2002 from a [[En cadre|cadre]] of the 1st Battalion and was composed mainly of new personnel under the age of 21 who had not participated in the independence struggle.<ref>Rees (2004), p. 31</ref> Due to the force's prestige and relatively high pay, there were 7,000 applications for the first 267 positions in the battalion.<ref>{{cite news |first=Hamish |last=McDonald |title=East Timor's Tiny Army Aims High |url=http://www.etan.org/et2002b/april/14-20/20ettiny.htm |work=Reproduced on the East Timor Action Network's website |publisher=[[The Sydney Morning Herald]] |date=20 April 2002 |access-date=3 February 2008 |archive-date=1 October 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061001215006/http://www.etan.org/et2002b/april/14-20/20ettiny.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> The F-FDTL's small naval component was established in December 2001.<ref name="Ref-1">''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment&nbsp;– Southeast Asia.'' Issue 20&nbsp;– 2007, p. 148</ref> The Australian UNTAET contingent provided most of the F-FDTL's training, and the United States equipped the force.<ref name="Dobbins_et_al_2013_139">Dobbins et al. (2013), p. 139</ref>

Some of the problems that have affected the F-FDTL throughout its existence were caused by the process used to establish the force. A key flaw in this process was that FALINTIL's high command was allowed to select candidates for the military from members of FALINTIL without external oversight. As a result, the selection was conducted, to a large degree, on the basis of applicants' political allegiance. This led to many FALINTIL veterans feeling that they had been unfairly excluded from the military and reduced the force's public standing.<ref>Rees (2004), pp. 47–49</ref> The decision to recruit young people who had not served in FALINTIL in the subsequent rounds of recruitment led to further tensions within the F-FDTL due to the often large age gap between the veterans and the new recruits and the fact that while the senior officers tended to be from the east of the country most of the junior officers and [[infantry]] were from the west.{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|pp=133–134}} Furthermore, UNTAET failed to establish adequate foundations for the East Timorese security sector by developing legislative and planning documents, administrative support arrangements and mechanisms for the democratic control of the military. These omissions remained uncorrected after Timor-Leste achieved independence on 20 May 2002.<ref name=icg5>International Crisis Group (2008), p. 5</ref>

[[File:F-FDTL soldiers standing in formation.JPG|thumb|F-FDTL soldiers standing in formation]]
The F-FDTL gradually assumed responsibility for Timor-Leste's security from the UN peacekeeping force. The [[Lautém District]] was the first area to pass to the F-FDTL in July 2002. After further training the F-FDTL took over responsibility for the entire country's external security on 20 May 2004, although some foreign peacekeepers remained in Timor-Leste until mid-2005.<ref name="Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment 2007, p. 116">''Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment&nbsp;– Southeast Asia''. Issue 20&nbsp;– 2007, p. 116</ref> The F-FDTL conducted its first operation in January 2003 when an army unit was called in to quell criminal activity caused by west Timorese militia gangs in the [[Ermera district]]. While the F-FDTL operated in a "relatively disciplined and orderly fashion" during this operation, it illegally arrested nearly 100 people who were released 10&nbsp;days later without being charged.{{sfn|Rees|2004|pp=20–21}}

The F-FDTL has suffered from serious morale and disciplinary problems since its establishment.<ref>Horta (2006)</ref> These problems have been driven by uncertainty over the F-FDTL's role, poor conditions of service due to limited resources, tensions arising from FALINTIL's transition from a guerrilla organisation to a regular military and political and regional rivalries. The F-FDTL's morale and disciplinary problems have resulted in large numbers of soldiers being disciplined or dismissed.{{sfn|Rees|2004|pp=32–33}} The East Timorese Government was aware of these problems before the 2006 crisis but did not rectify the factors that were contributing to low morale.<ref name=icg2>International Crisis Group (2008), p. 2</ref>

Tensions between the F-FDTL and PNTL have also reduced the effectiveness of Timor-Leste's security services. In 2003, the East Timorese Government established three new paramilitary police forces equipped with modern military-grade weapons. The formation of these units led to dissatisfaction with the Government among some members of the F-FDTL.<ref name=Robinson_1011 />{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|p=133}} During 2003 and 2004, members of the police and F-FDTL clashed on a number of occasions, and groups of soldiers attacked police stations in September 2003 and December 2004.<ref name=icg2/> These tensions were caused by the overlapping roles of the two security services, differences of opinion between members of Timor-Leste's leadership and the fact that many members of the PNTL had served with the [[Indonesian National Police]] prior to Timor-Leste's independence while the F-FDTL was based around FALINTIL.<ref name="Robinson_1011">Robinson (2011), p. 1011</ref>