Editing Trolley problem (section)

=== Criticism ===
In a 2014 paper published in the ''Social and Personality Psychology Compass'',<ref name="Bauman2014">{{cite journal|last1=Bauman|first1=Christopher W.|last2=McGraw|first2=A. Peter|last3=Bartels|first3=Daniel M.|last4=Warren|first4=Caleb|title=Revisiting External Validity: Concerns about Trolley Problems and Other Sacrificial Dilemmas in Moral Psychology|date=September 4, 2014|journal=Social and Personality Psychology Compass|volume = 8|issue=9|pages=536–554|doi=10.1111/spc3.12131|s2cid=11170070 |url=http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5j0215cr}}</ref> researchers criticized the use of the trolley problem, arguing, among other things, that the scenario it presents is too extreme and unconnected to real-life moral situations to be useful or educational.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/07/what-if-one-of-the-most-popular-experiments-in-psychology-is-worthless/374931/|title=Is One of the Most Popular Psychology Experiments Worthless?|last=Khazan|first=Olga|date=July 24, 2014|work=[[The Atlantic]]}}</ref>

In her 2017 paper, Nassim JafariNaimi<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Our Bodies in the Trolley's Path, or Why Self-driving Cars Must *Not* Be Programmed to Kill|journal = Science, Technology, & Human Values|volume = 43|issue = 2|pages = 302–323|last=JafariNaimi|first=Nassim|doi=10.1177/0162243917718942|year = 2018|s2cid = 148793137}}</ref> lays out the reductive nature of the trolley problem in framing ethical problems that serves to uphold an impoverished version of utilitarianism. She argues that the popular argument that the trolley problem can serve as a template for algorithmic morality is based on fundamentally flawed premises that serve the most powerful with potentially dire consequences on the future of cities.<ref>{{cite news |title=Why Self-Driving Cars Must Be Programmed to Kill |url=https://www.technologyreview.com/s/542626/why-self-driving-cars-must-be-programmed-to-kill/ |work=MIT Technology Review |date=October 22, 2015 |language=en}}</ref>

In 2017, in his book ''On Human Nature'', [[Roger Scruton]] criticises the usage of ethical dilemmas such as the trolley problem and their usage by philosophers such as [[Derek Parfit]] and [[Peter Singer]] as ways of illustrating their ethical views. Scruton writes, "These 'dilemmas' have the useful character of eliminating from the situation just about every morally relevant relationship and reducing the problem to one of arithmetic alone." Scruton believes that just because one would choose to change the track so that the train hits the one person instead of the five does not mean that they are necessarily a [[consequentialist]]. As a way of showing the flaws in consequentialist responses to ethical problems, Scruton points out paradoxical elements of belief in utilitarianism and similar beliefs. He believes that [[Robert Nozick|Nozick's]] [[experience machine]] thought experiment definitively disproves [[hedonism]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Scruton |first=Roger |author-link=Roger Scruton |title=On Human Nature |publisher=Princeton |edition=1st |date=2017 |pages=79–112 |isbn=978-0-691-18303-9}}</ref> In his 2017 article ''The Trolley Problem and the Dropping of Atomic Bombs,'' Masahiro Morioka considers the dropping of atomic bombs as an example of the trolley problem and points out that there are five "problems of the trolley problem", namely, 1) rarity, 2) inevitability, 3) safety zone, 4) possibility of becoming a victim, and 5) the lack of perspective of the dead victims who were deprived of freedom of choice.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200804-can-nuclear-war-ever-be-morally-justified|title=Can nuclear war be morally justified?|first=Richard|last=Fisher|website=www.bbc.com|accessdate=19 April 2023}}; {{Cite journal|title=The Trolley Problem and the Dropping of Atomic Bombs |journal=Journal of Philosophy of Life |date=2017 |volume=7 |issue=2 |pages=316–337 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/MORTTP-7 |last1=Morioka |first1=Masahiro }}</ref>

In a 2018 article published in ''Psychological Review'', researchers pointed out that, as measures of utilitarian decisions, sacrificial dilemmas such as the trolley problem measure only one facet of proto-utilitarian tendencies, namely permissive attitudes toward instrumental harm, while ignoring impartial concern for the greater good. As such, the authors argued that the trolley problem provides only a partial measure of utilitarianism.<ref name="Kahane2018">{{cite journal |last1=Kahane |first1=Guy |last2=Everett |first2=Jim A. C. |last3=Earp |first3=Brian D. |last4=Caviola |first4=Lucius |last5=Faber |first5=Nadira S. |last6=Crockett |first6=Molly J. |last7=Savulescu |first7=Julian |title=Beyond sacrificial harm: A two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology. |journal=Psychological Review |date=March 2018 |volume=125 |issue=2 |pages=131–164 |doi=10.1037/rev0000093|pmid=29265854 |pmc=5900580 }}</ref>