Editing Truth (section)

====Correspondence====
{{Main|Correspondence theory of truth}}
Correspondence theories emphasize that true beliefs and true statements correspond to the actual state of affairs.<ref name=":2">[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth.: [[Arthur N. Prior]], p. 223 (Macmillan, 1969). Prior uses [[Bertrand Russell]]'s wording in defining correspondence theory. According to Prior, Russell was substantially responsible for helping to make correspondence theory widely known under this name.</ref> This type of theory stresses a relationship between thoughts or statements on one hand, and things or objects on the other. It is a traditional model tracing its origins to [[ancient Greece|ancient Greek]] philosophers such as [[Socrates]], [[Plato]], and [[Aristotle]].<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth.: Arthur N. Prior, pp. 223–224 (Macmillan, 1969).</ref> This class of theories holds that the truth or the falsity of a representation is determined in principle entirely by how it relates to "things" according to whether it accurately describes those "things". A classic example of correspondence theory is the statement by the thirteenth century philosopher and theologian [[Thomas Aquinas]]: "''[[Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus]]''" ("Truth is the adequation of things and [[intellect]]"), which Aquinas attributed to the ninth century [[Neoplatonist]] [[Isaac Israeli ben Solomon|Isaac Israeli]].<ref name=":3">[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol. 2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth.: Arthur N. Prior, Macmillan, 1969, p. 224.</ref><ref>[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence "Correspondence Theory of Truth", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191031140950/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/ |date=2019-10-31 }}.</ref><ref name=":4">Thomas Aquinas, ''[[Summa Theologiae]]'', I. Q.16, A.2 arg. 2.</ref> Aquinas also restated the theory as: "A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality".<ref name=":5">[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence "Correspondence Theory of Truth", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191031140950/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/ |date=2019-10-31 }} (citing ''De Veritate'' Q.1, A.1–3 and ''[[Summa Theologiae]]'', I. Q.16).</ref>

Correspondence theory centres around the assumption that truth is a matter of accurately copying what is known as "[[objective reality]]" and then representing it in thoughts, words, and other symbols.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' Bradley, F.H., "On Truth and Copying", in Blackburn, ''et al.'' (eds., 1999),''Truth'', 31–45.</ref> Many modern theorists have stated that this ideal cannot be achieved without analysing additional factors.<ref name=EPT/><ref name=":6">[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth: Arthur N. Prior, pp. 223 ''ff''. Macmillan, 1969. See especially, section on "Moore's Correspondence Theory", 225–226, "Russell's Correspondence Theory", 226–227, "Remsey and Later Wittgenstein", 228–229, "Tarski's Semantic Theory", 230–231.</ref> For example, language plays a role in that all languages have words to represent concepts that are virtually undefined in other languages. The [[German language|German]] word ''[[Zeitgeist]]'' is one such example: one who speaks or understands the language may "know" what it means, but any translation of the word apparently fails to accurately capture its full meaning (this is a problem with many abstract words, especially those derived in [[agglutinative languages]]). Thus, some words add an additional parameter to the construction of an accurate [[truth predicate]]. Among the philosophers who grappled with this problem is [[Alfred Tarski]], whose [[semantic theory of truth|semantic theory]] is summarized further on.<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth: Arthur N. Prior, pp. 223 ''ff''. Macmillan, 1969. See the section on "Tarski's Semantic Theory", 230–231.</ref>