Editing Twenty-One Demands (section)

== Consequences ==
{{Further|Shandong Problem}}
The results of the revised final (Thirteen Demands) version of the Twenty-One Demands were far more negative for Japan than positive. Without "Group 5", the new treaty gave Japan little more than it already had in China.{{cn|date=January 2021}}

On the other hand, the United States expressed strongly negative reactions to Japan's rejection of the [[Open Door Policy]]. In the Bryan Note issued by Secretary of State [[William Jennings Bryan]] on 13 March 1915, the U.S., while affirming Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria, Mongolia and Shandong, expressed concern over further encroachments to Chinese sovereignty.<ref>Walter LaFeber, ''The Clash: US-Japanese Relations Throughout History'' (1998) pp 106–116</ref>

Great Britain, [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance|Japan's closest ally]], expressed concern over what was perceived as Japan's overbearing, bullying approach to diplomacy, and the British Foreign Office in particular was unhappy with Japanese attempts to establish what would effectively be a Japanese [[protectorate]] over all of China.<ref>Robert Joseph Gowen, "Great Britain and the Twenty-One Demands of 1915: Cooperation versus Effacement" ''Journal of Modern History'' (1971) 43#1 pp 76–106.</ref>

Afterwards, Japan and the United States looked for a compromise; as a result, the [[Lansing–Ishii Agreement]] was concluded in 1917. It was approved by the [[Paris Peace Conference, 1919|Paris Peace Conference]] in 1919.<ref>https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-japan-and-twenty-one-demands</ref>

Japan continued to push for outright control over Shandong Province and won European diplomatic recognition for their claim at the [[Treaty of Versailles]] (despite the refusal of the Chinese delegation to sign the treaty). This, in turn, provoked ill-will from the United States government, as well as widespread hostility within China; a large-scale boycott against Japanese goods was just one effect. In 1922, the U.S. brokered a solution: China was awarded nominal sovereignty over all of Shandong, while in practice Japan's economic dominance continued.<ref>A. Whitney Griswold, ''The Far Eastern Policy of the United States'' (1938)  pp 326–328</ref>

In China, the overall political impact of Japan's actions was highly negative, creating a considerable amount of public [[Anti-Japanese sentiment|ill-will towards Japan]], contributing to the [[May Fourth Movement]], and a significant upsurge in [[Chinese nationalism|nationalism]].<ref>Zhitian Luo, "National humiliation and national assertion-The Chinese response to the twenty-one demands", ''Modern Asian Studies'' (1993) 27#2 pp 297–319.</ref><ref>https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-japan-and-twenty-one-demands</ref>