Editing Value theory (section)

=== Types ===

==== Intrinsic and instrumental ====
{{main|Instrumental and intrinsic value}}
[[File:Intrinsic and instrumental values.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram with a box labelled "instrumental value" and an arrow pointing to a circle labelled "intrinsic value"|An entity has intrinsic value if it is good in itself. An entity has instrumental value if it leads to other good things.<ref name="auto15">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006a|pp=719–720}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.1 Intrinsic Value}} | {{harvnb|Rønnow-Rasmussen|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA29 29–30]}} | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|Bradley|2019|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>]]
[[File:Chain of instrumental values.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram with several boxes and arrows labelled "chain of instrumental values", and a circle labelled "intrinsic value"|Instrumental values can form chains with intrinsic values as their endpoints.<ref name="auto14">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006a|pp=719–720}} | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|Bradley|2019|loc=§ 6. What Is Extrinsic Value?}} }}</ref>]]
A thing has intrinsic or final value if it is good in itself or good for its own sake, independent of external factors or outcomes. A thing has extrinsic or instrumental value if it is useful or leads to other good things, serving as a means to bring about a desirable end. For example, tools like microwaves or money have instrumental value due to the useful functions they perform.<ref name="auto15"/> In some cases, the thing produced this way has itself instrumental value, like when using money to buy a microwave. This can result in a chain of instrumentally valuable things in which each link gets its value by causing the following link. Intrinsically valuable things stand at the endpoint of these chains and ground the value of all the preceding links.<ref name="auto14"/> 

One suggestion to distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental value, proposed by [[G. E. Moore]], relies on a [[thought experiment]] that imagines the valuable thing in isolation from everything else. In such a situation, purely instrumentally valuable things lose their value since they serve no purpose while purely intrinsically valuable things remain valuable.<ref name="auto1">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|Bradley|2019|loc=§ 2. What Is Intrinsic Value?}} | {{harvnb|Rønnow-Rasmussen|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA30 30–31]}} }}</ref>{{efn|Critics of this thought experiment argue that it depends on controversial assumptions about the nature of intrinsic value and is not applicable to all cases.<ref>{{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA31 31–32]}}</ref>}} According to a common view, [[pleasure]] is one of the sources of intrinsic value. Other suggested sources include [[desire]] satisfaction, [[virtue]], [[life]], [[health]], [[beauty]], [[freedom]], and [[knowledge]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|Bradley|2019|loc=§ 1. What Has Intrinsic Value?}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.1 Intrinsic Value}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref>

[[File:Intrinsic and instrumental values2.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram with a circle inside a box labelled "intrinsic and instrumental value", an arrow, and another circle labelled "intrinsic value"|A thing can have both intrinsic and instrumental value if it is good in itself and leads to other good things.<ref name="auto16">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schellekens|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LB4SBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA38 38]}} | {{harvnb|Vilkka|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2WxPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA32 32]}} }}</ref>]]
[[File:Positive and negative value.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram with a box labelled "instrumental value", two arrows, and two circles labelled "positive intrinsic value" and "negative intrinsic value"|A thing can have both positive and negative consequences. Its total instrumental value is the value balance of all its consequences.<ref name="auto11">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|Bradley|2019|loc=§ 6. What Is Extrinsic Value?}} | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9pqECJM08rkC&pg=PA253 253]}} }}</ref>]]

Intrinsic and instrumental value are not exclusive categories. As a result, a thing can have both intrinsic and instrumental value if it is both good in itself while also leading to other good things.<ref name="auto16"/> In a similar sense, a thing can have different instrumental values at the same time, both positive and negative ones. This is the case if some of its consequences are good while others are bad. The total instrumental value of a thing is the value balance of all its consequences.<ref name="auto11"/>

Because instrumental value depends on other values, it is an open question whether it should be understood as a value in a strict sense. For example, the overall value of a chain of causes leading to an intrinsically valuable thing remains the same if instrumentally valuable links are added or removed without affecting the intrinsically valuable thing. The observation that the overall value does not change is sometimes used as an argument that the things added or removed do not have value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|Bradley|2019|loc=§ 6. What Is Extrinsic Value?}} | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9pqECJM08rkC&pg=PA252 252]}} }}</ref>

Traditionally, value theorists have used the terms ''intrinsic value'' and ''final value'' interchangeably, just like the terms ''extrinsic value'' and ''instrumental value''. This practice has been questioned in the 20th century based on the idea that they are similar but not identical concepts. According to this view, a thing has intrinsic value if the source of its value is an [[intrinsic property]], meaning that the value does not depend on how the thing is related to other objects. Extrinsic value, by contrast, depends on [[Relation (philosophy)#Internal and external|external relations]]. This view sees instrumental value as one type of extrinsic value based on external [[Causality|causal relations]]. At the same time, it allows that there are other types of non-instrumental extrinsic value that result from external non-causal relations. Final value is understood as what is valued for its own sake, independent of whether intrinsic or extrinsic properties are responsible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.1 Intrinsic Value}} | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|Bradley|2019|loc=§ 3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?, § 6. What Is Extrinsic Value?}} | {{harvnb|Rønnow-Rasmussen|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA29 29–30]}} }}</ref>{{efn|In the [[social sciences]], some works rely on the concept of relational value to understand the value of the relationship between humans and nature. According to this view, relational value is a unique type of value that is neither intrinsic nor instrumental.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chan|Gould|Pascual|2018|pp=A1–A2}} | {{harvnb|Jax|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=j57WEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT38 59–60]}} | {{harvnb|Gupta|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=U9EEEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11]}} }}</ref>}}

==== Absolute and relative ====
Another distinction relies on the contrast between absolute and relative value. Absolute value, also called ''value {{lang|la|simpliciter}}'', is a form of unconditional value. A thing has relative value if its value is relative to other things or limited to certain considerations or viewpoints.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA45 45–46]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 1. Basic Questions}} }}</ref>

One form of relative value is restricted to the type of an entity, expressed in sentences like "That is a good knife" or "Jack is a good thief". This form is known as ''[[Attributive expression|attributive]] goodness'' since the word "good" modifies the meaning of another term. To be attributively good as a certain type means to possess qualities characteristic of that type. For instance, a good knife is sharp and a good thief has the skill of stealing without getting caught. Attributive goodness contrasts with [[Predicative expression|predicative]] goodness. The sentence "Pleasure is good" is an example since the word ''good'' is used as a predicate to talk about the unqualified value of pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3–4]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 1. Basic Questions}} | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|2015|pp=13–14}} }}</ref> Attributive and predicative goodness can accompany each other, but this is not always the case. For instance, being a good thief is not necessarily a good thing.<ref>{{harvnb|Silverstein|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=96qkDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA227 227]}}</ref>

Another type of relative value restricts goodness to a specific person. Known as ''personal value'',{{efn|[[Prudential value]] is a closely related concept signifying what is good for a person.<ref>{{harvnb|Tiberius|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA158 158]}}</ref>}} it expresses what benefits a particular person, promotes their [[welfare spending|welfare]], or is in their interest. For example, a poem written by a child may have personal value for the parents even if the poem lacks value for others. Impersonal value, by contrast, is good in general without restriction to any specific person or viewpoint.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA63 63–64]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 1. Basic Questions}} | {{harvnb|Rønnow-Rasmussen|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=b_O3l9_QgNgC&pg=PA1 1–2]}} }}</ref> Some philosophers, like Moore, reject the existence of personal values, holding that all values are impersonal. Others have proposed theories about the relation between personal and impersonal value. The agglomerative theory says that impersonal value is nothing but the sum of all personal values. Another view understands impersonal value as a specific type of personal value taken from the perspective of the universe as a whole.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 1.1.1 Good Simpliciter and Good For}} | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA63 63–65]}} }}</ref>

Agent-relative value is sometimes contrasted with personal value as another person-specific limitation of the evaluative outlook. Agent-relative values affect moral considerations about what a person is responsible for or guilty of. For example, if Mei promises to pick Pedro up from the airport then an agent-relative value obligates Mei to drive to the airport. This obligation is in place even if it does not benefit Mei, in which case there is an agent-relative value without a personal value. In [[consequentialism]],{{efn|Consequentialism is a theory in [[normative ethics]]. It says that whether an act is right depends on its consequences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sinnott-Armstrong|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Haines|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Hooker|2023|loc=§ 1. Utilitarianism}} }}</ref>}} agent-relative values are often discussed in relation to [[ethical dilemmas]]. One dilemma revolves around the question of whether an individual should murder an innocent person if this prevents the murder of two innocent people by a different perpetrator. The agent-neutral perspective tends to affirm this idea since one murder is preferable to two. The agent-relative perspective tends to reject this conclusion, arguing that the initial murder should be avoided since it negatively impacts the agent-relative value of the individual committing it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA73 73–74]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 3.3 Agent-Relative Value?}} | {{harvnb|Cullity|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA96 96–97]}} }}</ref>

Traditionally, most value theorists see absolute value as the main topic of value theory and focus their attention on this type. Nonetheless, some philosophers, like [[Peter Geach]] and [[Philippa Foot]], have argued that the concept of absolute value by itself is meaningless and should be understood as one form of relative value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA45 45–46, 61]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 1.1.2 Attributive Good}} }}</ref>

==== Other distinctions ====
Other classifications of values have been proposed without a widely accepted main classification.<ref>{{harvnb|Rescher|1969|pp=13–14}}</ref> Some focus on the types of entities that have value. They include distinct categories for entities like things, the environment, individuals, groups, and society. Another subdivision pays attention to the type of benefit involved and encompasses material, economic, moral, social, political, aesthetic, and religious values. Classifications by the beneficiary of the value distinguish between self- and other-oriented values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rescher|1969|pp=15–16, 18}} | {{harvnb|Pradhan|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=m4wWEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142]}} | {{harvnb|Hartman|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1UX7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA306 306]}} }}</ref>

A historically influential approach identifies three spheres of value: [[truth]], goodness, and beauty.{{efn|In [[scholastic philosophy]], they are known as ''[[transcendentals]]'' and considered fundamental aspects of being.<ref>{{harvnb|De Haan|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=a5EHEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA302 302]}}</ref>}} For example, the [[neo-Kantian]] philosopher [[Wilhelm Windelband]] characterizes them as the highest goals of [[consciousness]], with [[thought]] aiming at truth, [[Will (philosophy)|will]] aiming at goodness, and [[emotion]] aiming at beauty. A similar view, proposed by the [[Chinese philosophy|Chinese philosopher]] Zhang Dainian, says that the value of truth belongs to knowledge, the value of goodness belongs to behavior, and the value of beauty belongs to art.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Li|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=W2a4BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA80 80–81]}} | {{harvnb|Ollig|1998|loc=[https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/neo-kantianism/v-1 Lead section]}} | {{harvnb|Martin|2016|pp=3–5, 42–43}} }}</ref> This three-fold distinction also plays a central role in the philosophies of [[Franz Brentano]] and [[Jürgen Habermas]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Martin|2016|pp=4–5}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2018|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3e9IDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA96 96–97, 149, 253, 288]}} }}</ref> Other suggested types of values include objective, subjective, potential, actual, contingent, necessary, inherent, and constitutive values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA44 44]}} | {{harvnb|Bahm|1993|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jqSRrmtQ_WoC&pg=PA60 60–63]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.1.1 What is Intrinsic Value?}} | {{harvnb|Rønnow-Rasmussen|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA39 39–40]}} }}</ref>