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Walter Short
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===Hawaii=== {{Expand section|date=December 2021}} General [[George C. Marshall]], the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|U.S. Army Chief of Staff]], appointed Short to command the Army's [[Hawaiian Department]] on February 8, 1941 and promoted him to the temporary rank of lieutenant general.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/wcshort.htm | title=Walter Campbell Short - Lieutenant General, United States Army | date=9 April 2023 }}</ref> He earned the Distinguished Service Medal, and was considered to have had a successful career at that time, especially in light of his promotions during peacetime.<ref name="usmil"/> ====Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor==== [[File:Walter Short.jpg|left|thumb|Short as a lieutenant general]] On December 17, 1941, Short was removed from command of the Hawaiian Department as a result of the [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor]], and was ordered back to Washington, D.C. by General Marshall. He reverted to his permanent rank of major general, as his temporary rank of lieutenant general had been contingent on his command. On February 28, 1942, he retired from the Army, later heading the traffic department at a [[Ford Motor Company]] plant in [[Dallas, Texas]]. He briefly returned to active duty from October 3, 1945 to February 28, 1946. He retired for the final time in 1946, and died in 1949 in Dallas of a chronic heart ailment.<ref name="obit"/> =====Roberts Commission===== The [[Roberts Commissions#First Roberts Commission|Roberts Commission]], headed by U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice [[Owen J. Roberts]], was formed soon after the Japanese attack on the Hawaiian Islands. General Short, along with [[United States Navy|Navy]] [[Commander in Chief]], U.S. Fleet and [[United States Pacific Fleet|Pacific Fleet]], Admiral [[Husband E. Kimmel]], were accused of being unprepared and charged with [[dereliction of duty]]. The report charged that Short and Kimmel did not take seriously enough an earlier war warning and did not prepare for an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In a letter dated January 24, 1941, Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] advised the Secretary of War, [[Henry L. Stimson]], that the increased gravity of the foreign policy situation with Japan had prompted a re-study of the problem of the security of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor. Knox wrote: "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor." The letter proceeded: "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack (2) Air torpedo plane attack, (3) Sabotage, (4) Submarine attack, (5) Mining, (6) Bombardment by gunfire."<ref name="roberts">[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/roberts/roberts.html Attack Upon Pearl Harbor by Japanese Armed Forces] β 77th Congress, Senate Document No. 159.</ref> Knox's letter stated the defenses against all but the first two were satisfactory, described the probable character of an air attack, and urged the Army to prepare for such an attack. It concluded with recommendations for the revision of joint defense plans with special emphasis on the coordination of Army and Navy operations against surprise aircraft raids. It also urged the conduct of joint exercises to train the forces to meet such raids.<ref name="roberts"/> Stimson replied on February 7, 1941, that a copy of the letter was being forwarded to Short, with directions to him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making the suggested measures effective. Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of these letters at about the time they assumed their commands.<ref name="roberts"/> The report found that, had the orders been complied with: *the aircraft warning system of the Army should have been operating; *the distant reconnaissance of the inshore air patrol of the Army should have been maintained; *the antiaircraft batteries of the Army should have been manned and supplied with ammunition; and *a high state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. In fact, none of these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained, for the reason that the responsible commanders had failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary actions based upon the warnings and adopt measures enjoined by the orders given to them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.<ref name="roberts"/> The Roberts Commission was not a court-martial proceeding nor a judicial tribunal. Rather, the investigations were for fact-finding. There is generally no right to "due process", in the sense of a right to counsel and to cross-examine witnesses at a fact-finding investigation.<ref>Edwin Dorn [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/dorn/dorn_0.html Advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short on the Retired List] III. The Pearl Harbor Investigations</ref> Admiral [[William Harrison Standley]], who served as a member of the Roberts Commission, later disavowed the report, maintaining that "these two officers were martyred" and "if they had been brought to trial, both would have been cleared of the charge."<ref>[https://archive.today/20120722104654/http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:S.J.RES.55.IS: Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet ]</ref> =====Short's defense===== In 1946 Short testified on his own behalf before Congress about the 1941 attack.<ref name="usmil"/> Unlike some of his predecessors in Hawaii, Short was more concerned with sabotage from Japanese-Americans on Oahu. This led to Army planes being parked outside of their hangars so they could be more easily guarded. However, this made them easy targets for aerial attack, and many were subsequently destroyed on the morning of the attack.<ref name="usmil"/><ref name="roberts"/> In explaining his reasons for his instituting an alert against sabotage only (local "Alert One" level),<ref name="afs">Arakaki, Leatrice R. and Kuborn, John R. (1991). [http://newpreview.afnews.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100917-040.pdf ''7 December 1941: The Air Force Story'']{{dead link|date=March 2025|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}, Pacific Air Forces Office of History. {{ISBN|0-912799-73-0}}, p. 19 (p. 5 in text)</ref> General Short stated: * that the war warning message he received on November 27 contained nothing directing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii ("Alert Two" and "Three");<ref name="afs"/> * that he received other messages after the November 27 dispatch emphasizing measures against sabotage and subversive activities; * that the dispatch was a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as an overt act; * that he was looking to the Navy to provide him adequate warning of the approach of a hostile force, particularly through distant reconnaissance which was a Navy responsibility; and * that instituting higher level alerts would have seriously interfered with the training mission of the Hawaiian Department.<ref>CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_0.html INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK: REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK ] 79TH Congress SENATE DOCUMENT No. 244.</ref> He also declared that he did not receive adequate warning and suffered from a lack of resources. He and his family attempted to get the Army to restore his rank of lieutenant general on the retired list, on the basis that warnings from the War Department prior to the attack were vague and in conflict.<ref name="day"/> He requested, but did not receive, a formal court-martial.<ref name="day"/>
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