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Game theory
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===Ultimatum game=== {{main|Ultimatum game}} The ultimatum game is a game that has become a popular instrument of [[experimental economics|economic experiments]]. An early description is by Nobel laureate [[John Harsanyi]] in 1961.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Harsanyi |first1=John C. |title=On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=June 1961 |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=179β196 |doi=10.1177/002200276100500205 }}</ref> One player, the proposer, is endowed with a sum of money. The proposer is tasked with splitting it with another player, the responder (who knows what the total sum is). Once the proposer communicates his decision, the responder may accept it or reject it. If the responder accepts, the money is split per the proposal; if the responder rejects, both players receive nothing. Both players know in advance the consequences of the responder accepting or rejecting the offer. The game demonstrates how social acceptance, fairness, and generosity influence the players decisions.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Aoki |first1=Ryuta |last2=Yomogida |first2=Yukihito |last3=Matsumoto |first3=Kenji |title=The neural bases for valuing social equality |journal=Neuroscience Research |date=January 2015 |volume=90 |pages=33β40 |doi=10.1016/j.neures.2014.10.020 |pmid=25452125 }}</ref> Ultimatum game has a variant, that is the dictator game. They are mostly identical, except in dictator game the responder has no power to reject the proposer's offer.
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