Editing Ulster Defence Regiment (section)

===The 1973 "Subversion in the UDR" report===
A draft document, entitled ''Subversion in the UDR'', was amongst many released in 2005 and discovered in the [[Public Record Office]]. Some content appeared in ''[[The Irish News]]'' on 2 and 3 May 2006. Believed to have been prepared by British military intelligence in August 1973, it examines the issue of overlapping membership between the UDR and subversive organisations in the first three years of recruiting.<ref name=subversion /> ''[[Subversion]]'' was considered to be a "strong support for, or membership of, organisations whose aims are incompatible with those of the UDR" and attempts by soldiers to use their "knowledge, skills, or equipment to further the aims of such organisations." It speculated that "perhaps" 5–15% of UDR soldiers were, or had been, full members of "Protestant extremist groups". That the "best single source of weapons, and the only significant source of modern weapons, for these groups was the UDR" and that the British government knew UDR weapons were being used by loyalist paramilitaries, including the killing of a Catholic civilian and other attacks.<ref>2 May 2006 edition of the Irish News available [http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/irish_news/arts2006/may2_subversion_colluson_UDR.php here.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070310213754/http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/irish_news/arts2006/may2_subversion_colluson_UDR.php |date=10 March 2007 }}</ref> The report admitted that there existed scarce intelligence on the full extent of infiltration of the UDR by loyalist paramilitaries:

{{Blockquote|We know comparatively little, from an intelligence point of view, of subversion in the UDR. Often what intelligence there is, is of a 'post facto' character. But despite our limited sources and the limited evidence available to us a fair number of UDR soldiers have been discovered to hold positions in the UDA/UVF. A number have been involved in overt terrorist acts. It is most unlikely that our intelligence coverage presents anything like the whole picture of infiltration of the UDR by the UDA and other groups, and there is no immediate prospect of it doing so.}}

The report illustrated how over 200 UDR weapons were lost or stolen by the end of 1972, although the rate of loss had decreased to 56 by 1973 when the report was written.  This was suggested to be partially due to increased security and also that "the reduced credibility of Protestant extremist groups in the eyes of the majority community, has made the subversion of UDR members more difficult."<ref name="cain.ulst" /> During 1973 the most successful loyalist extremist arms raids took place at the Department of Industrial and Forensic Science, and at firearms dealers in Belfast, Newtownards and Armagh, rather than on UDR locations.<ref name="cain.ulst" /> The report suggested there was no substantial threat of subversion from republican extremists in the regiment as the number of Catholics had decreased to under 4%.<ref name=subversion /> There were isolated incidents where Catholic UDR soldiers 'lost' weapons in suspicious circumstances, but "neither the number of weapons nor the threat is thought to be great".<ref name="cain.ulst" />

The report concluded that except in limited circumstances subversion in the UDR has not compromised its ability to carry out its duties. This was caveated with the caution that there were "predictable political circumstances" in which the UDR might not only experience a much "higher level" of subversion than at the time of the report, but in which "elements" of the UDR might "cease to be reliable."<ref name="cain.ulst" /> One such scenario considered was after the failure of political initiatives, unionist politicians might attempt to declare a [[unilateral declaration of independence]] for Northern Ireland to return power to the unionist community.<ref name="cain.ulst" />