Editing Anti-Comintern Pact (section)

=== Attempts to develop the pact into a military alliance ===
After the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact and especially after Italy's entry, Ribbentrop continued his efforts to form it into a full military alliance.<ref name="Macmillan-1985" />{{Rp|268}} This mirrored the thoughts of Ribbentrop, Raumer, Ōshima and Hitler during the treaty's creation, as the original draft that Hitler signed off on in Bayreuth had likely included military terms that were explicitly both defensive as well as offensive. This was prevented by the intervention of Japanese diplomats around Shigenori Tōgō.<ref name="Boyd-1977" />{{Rp|66–67}}

After the pact's conclusion, Ribbentrop's efforts to transform it into a military alliance continued, although his agenda was driven by the concern with war against the western allies, whereas Hitler's main primary concern had been to eliminate the Soviet Union. Ribbentrop in his function as German ambassador to the United Kingdom recommended to Hitler in his report of 28 December 1937 and his final conclusions of 2 January 1938 the creation of a strong anti-British alliance with the ability to threaten the United Kingdom in a way that would either compel it to stay neutral or in the case of war be able to defeat it.<ref name="Macmillan-1985" />{{Rp|268}}

Ribbentrop's political power within the German foreign service grew massively when he was named foreign minister as a replacement for Konstantin von Neurath on 4 February 1938. This was part of the reshuffle of army, air force and foreign service caused by the dismissal of Werner von Blomberg and [[Werner von Fritsch]].<ref name="IMT-1947a">{{Cite book |title=Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal |publisher=International Military Tribunal |year=1947 |volume=1 |location=Nuremberg}}</ref>{{Rp|285}} In this military-political purge, Hitler removed twelve generals (not counting Blomberg and Fritsch) and reassigned 51 other military posts.<ref name="Kershaw-2000" />{{Rp|58}} The removal of Neurath, Fritsch and Blomberg marked the elimination of large parts of the 'moderate' faction in the cabinet Hitler, where as the 'extremists' remained: Goebbels, [[Rudolf Hess|Hess]], [[Alfred Rosenberg|Rosenberg]] and Ribbentrop.<ref name="MacDonald-1981" />{{Rp|5}}

The [[May Crisis 1938|May Crisis of 1938]], when there was a perception of aggressive German troop movements against Czechoslovakia, brought with it strong diplomatic reactions from France and Britain that went contrary to the established [[Appeasement]] policy. As a result, Ribbentrop renewed his pressure on Hitler to formalize the Anti-Comintern Pact into a full military alliance for the case of war against the United Kingdom and France. He eventually also gained the support of [[Bernardo Attolico]], Italian ambassador to Germany, for the idea.<ref name="Macmillan-1985" />{{Rp|270–272}}

In early January 1939, Ribbentrop was certain of his progress in transforming the pact into an alliance.<ref name="Ciano-2001">{{Cite book |last=Ciano |first=Galeazzo |title=The Ciano Diaries |publisher=Simon Publications |year=2001 |isbn=1931313741 |editor-last=Gibson |editor-first=Hugh}}</ref>{{Rp|3}} Mussolini, who had by now given up his attempts at Italian diplomatic ambivalence between the United Kingdom and Germany and fully committed to Italian alliance with Germany,<ref name="Macmillan-1985" />{{Rp|273}} gave his agreement as well.<ref name="Ciano-2001" />{{Rp|3}} Mussolini also advocated to even expand this prospective alliance to include Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania.<ref name="Macmillan-1985" />{{Rp|273}}
[[File:Patto-acciaio.jpg|thumb|Signing of the [[Pact of Steel]] by [[Galeazzo Ciano]] for Italy and [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] for Germany]]

Henceforth, from January 1939 onward, Italy and Germany cooperated on their draft of a military alliance, but Japan was cautious to commit. While the political lobby of the Japanese army was generally in favor of the conclusion of a military alliance with Germany, particularly in order to contain the Soviet Union, the Japanese navy continued to view the prospect of an alliance with Germany as of no particular use for Japan's naval strategic position and as a potential diplomatic and economic blunder, as Japan's navy alone would not be sufficient to hold off British and American naval forces if an alliance with Germany would lead Japan into war with either of the Anglo-American powers, thus cutting off Japan, dependent on vital shipping routes.<ref name="Barnhart-1987" />{{Rp|140–141}}<ref name="Hall-1988">{{Cite book |title=The Twentieth Century |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1988 |isbn=9780521223577 |editor-last=Hall |editor-first=John W. |series=Cambridge History of Japan |volume=6 |editor-last2=Jansen |editor-first2=Marius B. |editor-last3=Kanai |editor-first3=Madoka |editor-last4=Twitchett |editor-first4=Denis |display-editors=1}}</ref>{{Rp|135}}

The overall Japanese attitude, still anti-Soviet rather than anti-British, did not fit with the German and Italian designs to openly antagonize the United Kingdom. The Japanese foreign service did not wish to be drawn into a war between the nations of Western Europe and as a result aimed to differentiate between the Axis Powers' designs against the UK and those against the USSR. Ribbentrop's designs were thus rejected by the Japanese delegates, who insisted on the Anti-Comintern Pact's initial anti-communist designs and were unwilling to see an anti-British component added to it.

Eventually, Japanese caution led Ribbentrop to settle for only a bilateral alliance rather than the trilateral one he had hoped for, and the [[Pact of Steel]] was signed between Germany and Italy on 22 May 1939.<ref name="Macmillan-1985" />{{Rp|274}} The Pact of Steel's capabilities were commented on by Ciano as "real dynamite".<ref name="Ciano-2001" />{{Rp|81–82}} The Pact of Steel enabled Germany to proceed in its aggressive posturing against Poland, as this issue did not necessarily require Japanese consent or support, but Ribbentrop also desired to expand the Pact of Steel and include Japan in it. However, Japanese stalling tactics continued, and Germany wanted to eliminate the Soviet Union as a potential factor in its war against Poland.<ref name="Macmillan-1985" />{{Rp|274}}

As a result, Ribbentrop started seriously pondering a ''quid pro quo'' with the USSR on the question of Eastern Europe's future. This would mark a complete betrayal of the Anti-Comintern Pact's provision to not make bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union without Japanese consent, but Germany proceeded nonetheless. In May 1939, Ribbentrop instructed [[Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg]] to initiate a German-Soviet rapprochement on the basis that the newly forged Pact of Steel marked a turn in Germany's foreign policy, away from anti-Soviet towards anti-British and anti-French diplomacy. Ribbentrop also promised to redirect Japanese anti-Soviet foreign policy into a state where Japan and the USSR would no longer have to stand in rivalry.

At this stage, Ribbentrop also started envisioning a bloc of four, where the Soviet Union would be included with Germany, Italy and Japan to form a quadripartite faction against British influence. This marked a complete deviation from Nazi policy, particularly the Hitlerian goal of ''[[Lebensraum]]'', and was one of the many iterations of Ribbentrop's all-encompassing foreign political goal of containing by all possible means the influence of the United Kingdom. This ''Euro-Asiatic bloc of four'', as historian [[Wolfgang Michalka]] calls it, ultimately failed because of the differences between Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan. Germany and the Soviet Union signed the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]] in August 1939.<ref name="Macmillan-1985" />{{Rp|275–278}}