Editing First day on the Somme (section)

==Aftermath==

===Analysis===
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson wrote that the conventional account of the day has soldiers burdened by {{cvt|66|lb}} of equipment, obeying "doltish" orders to walk shoulder-to-shoulder towards the German lines and being mown down by German machine-gunners, who had time to climb out of shelters and man the parapet. Prior and Wilson ascribed the origin of this narrative to [[John Buchan]] in ''The Battle of the Somme'' (1917) in which the bravery of soldiers is extolled, rather than faulty infantry tactics being criticised. Prior and Wilson traced the [[narrative#Historiography|narrative]] through the writing of [[B. H. Liddell Hart]], [[J. E. Edmonds]] the official historian, [[C. R. M. F. Cruttwell]], [[Martin Middlebrook]], [[Correlli Barnett]] and [[Paul Kennedy]]. In 1970, [[Anthony Farrar-Hockley]] questioned the narrative but reverted to the orthodox view soon after.{{sfn|Prior|Wilson|2005|pp=112–114}}{{efn|J. Buchan ''The Battle of the Somme'',{{sfn|Buchan|1917|p=31}} [[B. H. Liddell Hart]] ''The Real War'',{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1930|p=315}} [[J. E. Edmonds]], ''Military Operations: 1916, volume I'',{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|p=487}} [[C. R. M. F. Cruttwell]], ''A History of the Great War 1914–1918'',{{sfn|Cruttwell|1934|p=266}} [[Martin Middlebrook]] ''The First Day on the Somme'',{{sfn|Middlebrook|1971|p=276}} [[Correlli Barnett]] ''The Great War'',{{sfn|Barnett|1979|p=76}} [[Paul Kennedy]] ''Britain'',{{sfn|Millett|Murray|1988|p=84}} [[Anthony Farrar-Hockley]], ''The Somme''.{{sfn|Farrar-Hockley|1970|pp=113–132}}}} Prior and Wilson did not dispute the facts of {{circa| 20,000 dead}} and {{circa| 40,000 wounded}} but wrote that the Tactical Notes issued by Rawlinson did not dictate the way that advances were to be made but were "ambiguous", referring to "celerity of movement", "a steady pace" and "a rapid advance of some lightly-equipped men" and did not prescribe a formation to be adopted for the advance.{{sfn|Edmonds|Wynne|2010|p=134}}{{efn|The "ambiguity" of the Tactical Notes is open to question, since the three conditions Prior and Wilson describe are exceptions to the "general form of attack", to exploit a temporary disorganisation of the defence, to advance to the final objective and possibly use lightly equipped troops to rush a vital part of the defensive position at a crucial moment.{{sfn|Edmonds|Wynne|2010|p=134}}}}

At the northern end of the British front, the leading brigade of the 31st Division advanced into no man's land before zero hour, to rush the German front trench when the barrage lifted.{{sfn|Prior|Wilson|2005|pp=112–115}} Some units of the 4th Division advanced from the British front line in formations led by snipers and skirmishers. In the 29th Division some battalions "marched" to the German wire and others rushed forward from assembly-trenches dug in no man's land. In the 36th (Ulster), 32nd and 8th division areas, some battalions assembled in front of the German wire, ready to rush forward at zero hour and many of the battalions of XV Corps and XIII Corps walked slowly forward in lines behind a creeping barrage. Of {{nowrap|80 battalions}} in the initial attack, {{nowrap|53 crept}} into no man's land, ten rushed from the British front trench and twelve advanced at a steady pace behind a creeping barrage.{{sfn|Prior|Wilson|2005|pp=112–115}} Prior and Wilson found that the behaviour of the British infantry had less effect than the behaviour of the German infantry, which was determined by the fire of the British guns. Where the German defences and garrisons had been destroyed, the British infantry succeeded. When significant numbers of German machine-gunners survived, especially when supported by artillery, the British attack failed. On the French front, the artillery preparation was almost wholly effective in destroying German defences and killing German infantry in their underground shelters. The prevalence and effectiveness of killing-machines determined the result and in such an environment, a soldier with a bayonet was obsolete and infantry formations irrelevant.{{sfn|Prior|Wilson|2005|p=116}}

In 2009, J. P. Harris described the success of the French, XIII Corps and XV Corps, the extent of British casualties for ground gained and Haig's responsibility for the British casualties. Harris wrote of the inferior German defences on the French front, surprise, superior French artillery and better infantry tactics than those of the British. The French attacked in the south, as did the two most successful British corps, in this area only the first line was an objective. Harris wrote that the German 2nd Army was often ignored in analyses of the First Day and that the main defensive effort was made in the north, the area of greatest German success. Terrain in the south, Anglo-French air superiority and closer objectives, tended to concentrate Allied artillery-fire, which was better-observed and more accurate than on the hillier ground to the north.{{sfn|Harris|2009|pp=234–237}}

In the south, barbed wire was cut, the German fortifications were "exceptionally" damaged and a crude form of creeping barrage preceded the infantry to their objectives. Harris held Haig responsible for the extension of the objectives in the north to the German second position, which diluted the density of British artillery-fire, although no study had been made of the details of the preliminary bombardment and caution must accompany a conclusion that bombardment of the closer objectives was unduly dissipated. Harris concluded that the attack front was too broad and that Rawlinson should be held responsible with Haig for attempting to advance on a {{cvt|16|mi}} front. Despite being under no diplomatic pressure from the French or political pressure from London to obtain swift success, the British tried to do too much too quickly, unlike the French Sixth Army which made short advances with the support of massive amounts of artillery-fire.{{sfn|Harris|2009|pp=234–237}}

In 2009, William Philpott wrote that the post-war French Official History gave five pages to 1 July, with one paragraph on the British attack and that the German official history {{lang|de|Der Weltkrieg}} covered the day in {{nowrap|62 pages.}} The British Official History described the day in {{nowrap|177 pages,}} with one page on the French success. In Joffre's memoirs the French victory was ascribed to "the excellent work of the artillery" and German underestimation of French offensive power due to the Battle of Verdun, leading them to make their principal defensive effort in the north. Many British infantry had been attacked from behind, after failing to mop up captured German positions. This military explanation was insufficient for many British commentators, who blamed "anachronistic" "sword wavers" for leading volunteers to an unnecessary slaughter. The French success, based on the experience of 1915 was overlooked, as was the French expectation of more quick victories being disappointed, as the battle became a counterpart to the long attrition campaign at Verdun. Philpott also described the Germans being written out of the British narrative of useless sacrifice. The Anglo-French armies had gained an advantage on 1 July by forcing the collapse of the German defences for {{cvt|13|mi}}, either side of the Somme.. In the early afternoon a broad breach existed north of the river but the "break in" was in an unexpected place and exploitation had to be improvised.{{sfn|Philpott|2009|pp=204–208}}

===Casualties===
Philpott wrote that the "gory scene" behind the British front showed that something had gone wrong.{{sfn|Philpott|2009|p=202}} In the evening of 1 July, Haig wrote in his diary,

{{quote|North of the Ancre, VIII Division (sic) said they began well but as the day progressed, their troops were forced back into the German front line, except two battalions which occupied Serre village and were, it is said, cut off. I am inclined to believe from further reports that few of VIII Corps left their trenches.{{sfn|Sheffield|Bourne|2005|p=196}}}}

VIII Corps ''had'' left their trenches and over {{nowrap|14,000 men}} became casualties.{{sfn|Philpott|2009|p=202}} Edmonds wrote that for the loss of Britain and Ireland's "finest manhood" there was only a small gain of ground, although an advance of {{cvt|1|mi}} on a {{cvt|3.5|mi}} front and minor advances elsewhere, was the furthest achieved by the British since trench warfare began. Only {{nowrap|1,983 unwounded}} prisoners had been taken and none of the captured ground north of the Albert–Bapaume road, except at the Leipzig Redoubt, had been held.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=483–484}} Before the battle, Rawlinson had requested 18 ambulance trains but only three were provided and these departed part-filled, before many of the wounded had been brought to [[casualty clearing station]]s, which had capacity for only {{nowrap|9,500 cases.}} Casualties were left untended in the open and it was not until 4 July that the Fourth Army medical services had treated all the wounded (some casualties reached hospitals in England still wearing field dressings). As night fell, survivors began to make their way back to the British trenches and stretcher-bearers went into no man's land. Major-General [[Edward Charles Ingouville-Williams|Ingouville-Williams]], commander of the 34th Division, participated in the search and some medical orderlies continued after dawn broke.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|p=483}} At Beaumont-Hamel, two British medical officers arranged a truce and in other places movement in no man's land was fired on. [[Victoria Cross]]es were awarded to [[Robert Quigg]] and [[Geoffrey Cather]] [[Posthumous recognition|(posthumous)]] for rescuing wounded.{{sfn|Middlebrook|1971|p=329}}

Some casualties survived for up to a week in no man's land, scavenging rations from the dead before being rescued. At {{nowrap|7:30 p.m.,}} the Fourth Army headquarters believed that there had been {{nowrap|16,000 casualties,}} by 3 July the staff thought that there had been {{nowrap|40,000}} and by 6 July the count had risen to {{nowrap|60,000 men.}} The Third Army diversion at Gommecourt cost VII Corps 6,758 casualties against 1,212 German.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=474–475}} The final total of {{nowrap|57,470 British}} casualties, {{nowrap|19,240 of}} whom had been killed, was not calculated for some time; the French Sixth Army suffered {{nowrap|1,590 casualties}} and the German 2nd Army suffered {{nowrap|10,000–12,000 casualties.}}{{sfnm|1a1=Edmonds|1y=1993|1p=483|2a1=Sheffield|2y=2003|2p=68}} In 1971 Martin Middlebrook wrote that whereas German units normally submitted a casualty return every ten days, many submitted a special daily return for 1 July. It is possible to estimate that German forces on the British sector (including [[Attack on the Gommecourt Salient|Gommecourt]]) suffered 6,000 killed or wounded and 2,200 taken prisoner.{{sfn|Middlebrook|1971|p=264}} In 2013, Ralph Whitehead wrote that from 1 to 10 July, the 2nd Army commanded 21 divisions, the original divisions present on 1 July and reinforcements, with a ration strength of 469,585 men. In the ten-day reporting period (10 {{lang|de|tägigen Truppenkrankenrapporten}}) from 1 to 10 July 7,539 men reported sick, 22,095 were recorded as wounded and 24,244 men were listed as killed or missing, leaving 5,786 men recorded as killed; during the same period 5,273 men returned to duty.{{sfn|Whitehead|2013|p=474}} For 1 July 1916,

{{quote|The lists represent 20,790 names of the men who most likely fought on the Somme in early July. Of these 6,226 can be identified as having been killed, wounded, injured or captured on 1 July 1916. An additional 1,912 can positively [be] identified as having become a casualty before or after this date. Of the remainder, 12,642 names, only time will tell if the details of their fate can be established.{{sfn|Whitehead|2013|p=476}}}}

===Subsequent operations===
{{main|Battle of Albert (1916)}}

Haig visited the Fourth Army headquarters and discussed the continuation of the attack on 2 July, although in the confused situation the original plan was not changed. Pressure was to be maintained on the Germans to inflict losses and reach ground from which to attack the German second position, with particular emphasis on the capture of Fricourt. Gough, with the Reserve Army ready to exploit a gap was not called on and at {{nowrap|7:00 p.m.}} Rawlinson requested that he take over X Corps and VIII Corps, to reorganise the front astride the Ancre. The [[12th (Eastern) Division]] was sent to relieve the 8th Division and the 25th Division was moved closer to X Corps. Haig ordered the 23rd and 38th (Welsh) divisions to move towards the Somme front and at {{nowrap|10:00 p.m.}} the Fourth Army headquarters ordered all corps to continue the attack. Local conditions south of the Albert–Bapaume road led many officers to urge that the German defeat in the area to be exploited with fresh divisions but XIII Corps was ordered to consolidate and prepare to attack Mametz Wood with XV Corps, which was to capture Fricourt and advance towards Contalmaison, still thought to have been captured. III Corps was ordered to attack La Boisselle and Ovillers again and reach Contalmaison and X Corps and VIII Corps were ordered to capture all of the German first position and reach the intermediate line.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=481–483}}

In the afternoon of 1 July, the German survivors of the 28th Reserve Division and 12th Division and part of the [[10th Bavarian Infantry Division|10th Bavarian Division]] at Montauban Ridge, had been driven back to the {{lang|de|Braune Stellung}} (second position) from Ginchy to Longueval and Bazentin le Grand. The 12th Division arrived in the evening from Bapaume, was sent towards Combles and Ginchy and at {{nowrap|6:45 p.m.,}} a counter-attack was ordered to regain Montauban Ridge, between Favières Wood and Montauban. One regiment was to advance past the north end of Combles to Guillemont and re-capture the north end of Montauban, a regiment in the centre was to retake Favières Wood and the left regiment was to advance along the north bank of the Somme between Curlu and Maurepas, troops joining in from the second position. Dawn broke at {{nowrap|3:00 a.m.}} on 2 July, well before the advance reached Bernafay Wood and a British barrage quickly forced back the Germans into Caterpillar Valley. At La Briqueterie the German infantry were quickly repulsed, as was their attack along the river by French infantry south of Favières Wood. The 12th Division suffered many casualties and was withdrawn to the {{lang|de|Grüne Stellung}} (Green Position) around Maltz Horn Farm, an intermediate position in front of the {{lang|de|Braune Stellung}}.{{sfn|Rogers|2010|pp=78–79}}