Editing First day on the Somme (section)

===Analysis===
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson wrote that the conventional account of the day has soldiers burdened by {{cvt|66|lb}} of equipment, obeying "doltish" orders to walk shoulder-to-shoulder towards the German lines and being mown down by German machine-gunners, who had time to climb out of shelters and man the parapet. Prior and Wilson ascribed the origin of this narrative to [[John Buchan]] in ''The Battle of the Somme'' (1917) in which the bravery of soldiers is extolled, rather than faulty infantry tactics being criticised. Prior and Wilson traced the [[narrative#Historiography|narrative]] through the writing of [[B. H. Liddell Hart]], [[J. E. Edmonds]] the official historian, [[C. R. M. F. Cruttwell]], [[Martin Middlebrook]], [[Correlli Barnett]] and [[Paul Kennedy]]. In 1970, [[Anthony Farrar-Hockley]] questioned the narrative but reverted to the orthodox view soon after.{{sfn|Prior|Wilson|2005|pp=112–114}}{{efn|J. Buchan ''The Battle of the Somme'',{{sfn|Buchan|1917|p=31}} [[B. H. Liddell Hart]] ''The Real War'',{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1930|p=315}} [[J. E. Edmonds]], ''Military Operations: 1916, volume I'',{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|p=487}} [[C. R. M. F. Cruttwell]], ''A History of the Great War 1914–1918'',{{sfn|Cruttwell|1934|p=266}} [[Martin Middlebrook]] ''The First Day on the Somme'',{{sfn|Middlebrook|1971|p=276}} [[Correlli Barnett]] ''The Great War'',{{sfn|Barnett|1979|p=76}} [[Paul Kennedy]] ''Britain'',{{sfn|Millett|Murray|1988|p=84}} [[Anthony Farrar-Hockley]], ''The Somme''.{{sfn|Farrar-Hockley|1970|pp=113–132}}}} Prior and Wilson did not dispute the facts of {{circa| 20,000 dead}} and {{circa| 40,000 wounded}} but wrote that the Tactical Notes issued by Rawlinson did not dictate the way that advances were to be made but were "ambiguous", referring to "celerity of movement", "a steady pace" and "a rapid advance of some lightly-equipped men" and did not prescribe a formation to be adopted for the advance.{{sfn|Edmonds|Wynne|2010|p=134}}{{efn|The "ambiguity" of the Tactical Notes is open to question, since the three conditions Prior and Wilson describe are exceptions to the "general form of attack", to exploit a temporary disorganisation of the defence, to advance to the final objective and possibly use lightly equipped troops to rush a vital part of the defensive position at a crucial moment.{{sfn|Edmonds|Wynne|2010|p=134}}}}

At the northern end of the British front, the leading brigade of the 31st Division advanced into no man's land before zero hour, to rush the German front trench when the barrage lifted.{{sfn|Prior|Wilson|2005|pp=112–115}} Some units of the 4th Division advanced from the British front line in formations led by snipers and skirmishers. In the 29th Division some battalions "marched" to the German wire and others rushed forward from assembly-trenches dug in no man's land. In the 36th (Ulster), 32nd and 8th division areas, some battalions assembled in front of the German wire, ready to rush forward at zero hour and many of the battalions of XV Corps and XIII Corps walked slowly forward in lines behind a creeping barrage. Of {{nowrap|80 battalions}} in the initial attack, {{nowrap|53 crept}} into no man's land, ten rushed from the British front trench and twelve advanced at a steady pace behind a creeping barrage.{{sfn|Prior|Wilson|2005|pp=112–115}} Prior and Wilson found that the behaviour of the British infantry had less effect than the behaviour of the German infantry, which was determined by the fire of the British guns. Where the German defences and garrisons had been destroyed, the British infantry succeeded. When significant numbers of German machine-gunners survived, especially when supported by artillery, the British attack failed. On the French front, the artillery preparation was almost wholly effective in destroying German defences and killing German infantry in their underground shelters. The prevalence and effectiveness of killing-machines determined the result and in such an environment, a soldier with a bayonet was obsolete and infantry formations irrelevant.{{sfn|Prior|Wilson|2005|p=116}}

In 2009, J. P. Harris described the success of the French, XIII Corps and XV Corps, the extent of British casualties for ground gained and Haig's responsibility for the British casualties. Harris wrote of the inferior German defences on the French front, surprise, superior French artillery and better infantry tactics than those of the British. The French attacked in the south, as did the two most successful British corps, in this area only the first line was an objective. Harris wrote that the German 2nd Army was often ignored in analyses of the First Day and that the main defensive effort was made in the north, the area of greatest German success. Terrain in the south, Anglo-French air superiority and closer objectives, tended to concentrate Allied artillery-fire, which was better-observed and more accurate than on the hillier ground to the north.{{sfn|Harris|2009|pp=234–237}}

In the south, barbed wire was cut, the German fortifications were "exceptionally" damaged and a crude form of creeping barrage preceded the infantry to their objectives. Harris held Haig responsible for the extension of the objectives in the north to the German second position, which diluted the density of British artillery-fire, although no study had been made of the details of the preliminary bombardment and caution must accompany a conclusion that bombardment of the closer objectives was unduly dissipated. Harris concluded that the attack front was too broad and that Rawlinson should be held responsible with Haig for attempting to advance on a {{cvt|16|mi}} front. Despite being under no diplomatic pressure from the French or political pressure from London to obtain swift success, the British tried to do too much too quickly, unlike the French Sixth Army which made short advances with the support of massive amounts of artillery-fire.{{sfn|Harris|2009|pp=234–237}}

In 2009, William Philpott wrote that the post-war French Official History gave five pages to 1 July, with one paragraph on the British attack and that the German official history {{lang|de|Der Weltkrieg}} covered the day in {{nowrap|62 pages.}} The British Official History described the day in {{nowrap|177 pages,}} with one page on the French success. In Joffre's memoirs the French victory was ascribed to "the excellent work of the artillery" and German underestimation of French offensive power due to the Battle of Verdun, leading them to make their principal defensive effort in the north. Many British infantry had been attacked from behind, after failing to mop up captured German positions. This military explanation was insufficient for many British commentators, who blamed "anachronistic" "sword wavers" for leading volunteers to an unnecessary slaughter. The French success, based on the experience of 1915 was overlooked, as was the French expectation of more quick victories being disappointed, as the battle became a counterpart to the long attrition campaign at Verdun. Philpott also described the Germans being written out of the British narrative of useless sacrifice. The Anglo-French armies had gained an advantage on 1 July by forcing the collapse of the German defences for {{cvt|13|mi}}, either side of the Somme.. In the early afternoon a broad breach existed north of the river but the "break in" was in an unexpected place and exploitation had to be improvised.{{sfn|Philpott|2009|pp=204–208}}