Editing Democratization (section)

=== Theories based on political agents and choices ===
==== Elite-opposition negotiations and contingency ====
Scholars such as [[Dankwart Rustow|Dankwart A. Rustow]],<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Rustow|first=Dankwart A.|date=1970|title=Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=2|issue=3|pages=337–363|doi=10.2307/421307|issn=0010-4159|jstor=421307|url=http://revistas.usal.es/index.php/1130-2887/article/view/alh201468139168}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/transitionstodem0000unse|title=Transitions to Democracy|date=1999|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-50247-4|editor-last=Anderson|editor-first=Lisa|url-access=registration}}</ref> and [[Guillermo O'Donnell]] and [[Philippe C. Schmitter]] in their classic ''Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies'' (1986),<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/transitions-authoritarian-rule-2|title=Transitions from Authoritarian Rule |date=September 1986 |publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press|doi=10.56021/9780801831904 |isbn=9780801831904 |access-date=2019-12-23 |last1=O'Donnell |first1=Guillermo }}</ref> argued against the notion that there are structural "big" causes of democratization. These scholars instead emphasize how the democratization process occurs in a more contingent  manner that depends on the  characteristics and circumstances of the elites who ultimately oversee the shift from authoritarianism to democracy.

O'Donnell and Schmitter proposed a strategic choice approach to transitions to democracy that highlighted how they were driven by the decisions of different actors in response to a core set of dilemmas. The analysis centered on the interaction among four actors: the hard-liners and soft-liners who belonged to the incumbent authoritarian regime, and the moderate and radical oppositions against the regime. This book not only became the point of reference for a burgeoning academic literature on [[democratic transitions]], it was also read widely by political activists engaged in actual struggles to achieve democracy.<ref>Gerardo L. Munck, "Democratic Theory After ''Transitions From Authoritarian Rule''," ''Perspectives on Politics'' Vol. 9, Nº 2 (2011): 333–43.</ref>

Adam Przeworski, in ''Democracy and the Market'' (1991), offered the first analysis of the interaction between rulers and opposition in transitions to democracy using rudimentary [[game theory]]. and he emphasizes the interdependence of political and economic transformations.<ref>Adam Przeworski, ''Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, Ch. 2.</ref>

==== Elite-driven democratization ====
Scholars have argued that processes of democratization may be elite-driven or driven by the authoritarian incumbents as a way for those elites to retain power amid popular demands for representative government.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/authoritarianism-and-the-elite-origins-of-democracy/29C0246C5474CBC5184B2967AD4206ED|title=Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy|last1=Albertus|first1=Michael|last2=Menaldo|first2=Victor|date=2018|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/9781108185950 |isbn=9781108185950 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Konieczny|first1=Piotr|last2=Markoff|first2=John|date=2015|title=Poland's Contentious Elites Enter the Age of Revolution: Extending Social Movement Concepts|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/socf.12163|journal=Sociological Forum|language=en|volume=30|issue=2|pages=286–304|doi=10.1111/socf.12163|issn=1573-7861}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kavasoglu|first=Berker|date=2021-01-05|title=Autocratic ruling parties during regime transitions: Investigating the democratizing effect of strong ruling parties|journal=Party Politics|volume=28 |issue=2 |language=en|pages=377–388|doi=10.1177/1354068820985280|issn=1354-0688|doi-access=free|hdl=2077/64598|hdl-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{Cite book|last1=Slater|first1=Dan|url=https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691167602/from-development-to-democracy|title=From Development to Democracy|last2=Wong|first2=Joseph|date=2022|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-16760-2|language=en}}</ref> If the costs of repression are higher than the costs of giving away power, authoritarians may opt for democratization and inclusive institutions.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Acemoglu|first1=Daron|title=Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality|date=2015|work=Handbook of Income Distribution|volume=2|pages=1885–1966|publisher=Elsevier|language=en|doi=10.1016/b978-0-444-59429-7.00022-4|isbn=978-0-444-59430-3|last2=Naidu|first2=Suresh|last3=Restrepo|first3=Pascual|last4=Robinson|first4=James A.|url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w19746.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Boix|first1=Carles|last2=Stokes|first2=Susan C.|date=2003|title=Endogenous Democratization|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=55|issue=4|pages=517–549|doi=10.1353/wp.2003.0019|s2cid=18745191|issn=0043-8871}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{Cite book|last=Miller|first=Michael K.|url=https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691217000/shock-to-the-system|title=Shock to the System|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2021|isbn=978-0-691-21700-0|language=en}}</ref> According to a 2020 study, authoritarian-led democratization is more likely to lead to lasting democracy in cases when the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is high.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Riedl|first1=Rachel Beatty|last2=Slater|first2=Dan|last3=Wong|first3=Joseph|last4=Ziblatt|first4=Daniel|date=2020-03-04|title=Authoritarian-Led Democratization|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=23|pages=315–332|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-052318-025732|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref> However,  Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo argue that democratizing rules implemented by outgoing authoritarians may distort democracy in favor of the outgoing authoritarian regime and its supporters, resulting in "bad" institutions that are hard to get rid of.<ref>{{Cite book |chapter=The Stickiness of "Bad" Institutions: Constitutional Continuity and Change under Democracy |chapter-url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/politics-of-institutional-weakness-in-latin-america/stickiness-of-bad-institutions/335EE2ABF4CF956FEF8059B628DB96F0 |last1=Albertus |first1=Michael |last2=Menaldo|first2=Victor |date=2020 |title=The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Latin America |editor=Daniel M. Brinks |editor2=Steven Levitsky |editor3=María Victoria Murillo |language=en|doi=10.1017/9781108776608.003 |publisher=Cambridge University Press|pages=61–97|isbn=9781108776608|s2cid=219476337}}</ref> According to Michael K. Miller, elite-driven democratization is particularly likely in the wake of major violent shocks (either domestic or international) which provide openings to opposition actors to the authoritarian regime.<ref name=":7" /> Dan Slater and Joseph Wong argue that dictators in Asia chose to implement democratic reforms when they were in positions of strength in order to retain and revitalize their power.<ref name=":8" />

According to a study by political scientist Daniel Treisman, influential theories of democratization posit that autocrats "deliberately choose to share or surrender power. They do so to prevent revolution, motivate citizens to fight wars, incentivize governments to provide [[Public good (economics)|public goods]], outbid elite rivals, or limit factional violence." His study shows that in many cases, "democratization occurred not because incumbent elites chose it but because, in trying to prevent it, they made mistakes that weakened their hold on power. Common mistakes include: calling elections or starting military conflicts, only to lose them; ignoring popular unrest and being overthrown; initiating limited reforms that get out of hand; and selecting a covert democrat as leader. These mistakes reflect well-known cognitive biases such as [[Overconfidence effect|overconfidence]] and the [[illusion of control]]."<ref>{{Cite journal|author1-link=Daniel Treisman|last=Treisman|first=Daniel|date=October 2017|title=Democracy by mistake|journal=NBER Working Paper No. 23944|doi=10.3386/w23944|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Sharun Mukand and [[Dani Rodrik]] dispute that elite-driven democratization produce liberal democracy. They argue that low levels of inequality and weak identity cleavages are necessary for liberal democracy to emerge.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Mukand|first1=Sharun W.|last2=Rodrik|first2=Dani|title=The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy|journal=The Economic Journal|year=2020|volume=130|issue=627|pages=765–792|language=en|doi=10.1093/ej/ueaa004|doi-access=free|hdl=10419/161872|hdl-access=free}}</ref> A 2020 study by several political scientists from German universities found that democratization through bottom-up peaceful protests led to higher levels of democracy and democratic stability than democratization prompted by elites.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Lambach|first1=Daniel|url=https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030393700|title=Nonviolent Resistance and Democratic Consolidation|last2=Bayer|first2=Markus|last3=Bethke|first3=Felix S.|last4=Dressler|first4=Matteo|last5=Dudouet|first5=Véronique|date=2020|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=978-3-030-39370-0|language=en}}</ref>

The three dictatorship types, monarchy, civilian and military have different approaches to democratization as a result of their individual goals. Monarchic and civilian dictatorships seek to remain in power indefinitely through hereditary rule in the case of monarchs or through oppression in the case of civilian dictators. A military dictatorship seizes power to act as a caretaker government to replace what they consider a flawed civilian government. Military dictatorships are more likely to transition to democracy because at the onset, they are meant to be stop-gap solutions while a new acceptable government forms.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and out of Dictatorships |journal = International Studies Quarterly|volume = 60|date = 2016-02-18|issn = 0020-8833|pages = 73–84|doi = 10.1093/isq/sqv014|language = en|first = Alexandre|last = Debs|s2cid = 8989565}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Cheibub|first1=Jose Antonio|last2=Gandhi|first2=Jennifer|last3=Vreeland|first3=James|title=Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited|journal=Public Choice|volume=143|issue=1–2|pages=67–101|date=2010|doi=10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2|s2cid=45234838}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Smith|first1=Peter|title=Democracy in Latin America|date=2005|publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref>

Research suggests that the threat of civil conflict encourages regimes to make democratic concessions. A 2016 study found that drought-induced riots in Sub-Saharan Africa lead regimes, fearing conflict, to make democratic concessions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Aidt|first1=Toke S.|last2=Leon|first2=Gabriel|date=2016-06-01|title=The Democratic Window of Opportunity Evidence from Riots in Sub-Saharan Africa|url=https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-democratic-window-of-opportunity(04b0939e-ac4a-46b2-9472-c2274409c003).html|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|language=en|volume=60|issue=4|pages=694–717|doi=10.1177/0022002714564014|issn=0022-0027|s2cid=29658309}}</ref>

==== Scrambled constituencies ====
[[Mancur Olson]] theorizes that the process of democratization occurs when elites are unable to reconstitute an autocracy.  Olson suggests that this occurs when constituencies or identity groups are mixed within a geographic region. He asserts that this mixed geographic constituencies requires elites to for democratic and representative institutions to control the region, and to limit the power of competing elite groups.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Olson|first=Mancur|date=1993|title=Dictatorship, Democracy and Development|url=http://revistas.up.edu.pe/index.php/apuntes/article/view/342|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=87 |issue=3 |pages=567–576 |doi=10.2307/2938736 |jstor=2938736|s2cid=145312307 |url-access=subscription}}</ref>

==== Death or ouster of dictator ====
One analysis found that "Compared with other forms of leadership turnover in autocracies—such as coups, elections, or term limits—which lead to regime collapse about half of the time, the death of a dictator is remarkably inconsequential. ...  of the 79 dictators who have died in office (1946–2014)... in the vast majority (92%) of cases, the regime persists after the autocrat's death."<ref>{{Cite magazine |author=Andrea Kendall-Taylor |author2=Erica Frantz |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/10/when-dictators-die/ |url-access=subscription |title=When Dictators Die |magazine=Foreign Policy |date=September 10, 2015}}</ref>