Editing Animal cognition (section)

=== Consciousness ===
{{main|Animal consciousness}}
[[File:Mirror test with a Baboon.JPG|thumb|Mirror test with a baboon]]

The sense in which animals can be said to have self-[[consciousness]] or a [[self-concept]] has been hotly debated. The best known research technique in this area is the [[mirror test]] devised by [[Gordon G. Gallup]], in which an animal's skin is marked in some way while it is asleep or sedated, and it is then allowed to see its reflection in a mirror; if the animal spontaneously directs grooming behavior towards the mark, that is taken as an indication that it is aware of itself.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Bischof-Köhler D | date = 1991 | chapter = The development of empathy in infants | veditors = Lamb ME, Keller H | title = Infant Development. Perspectives from German speaking countries | pages = 245–273 | publisher = Routledge | isbn = 978-1-317-72827-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Prior H, Schwarz A, Güntürkün O | title = Mirror-induced behavior in the magpie (Pica pica): evidence of self-recognition | journal = PLOS Biology | volume = 6 | issue = 8 | pages = e202 | date = August 2008 | pmid = 18715117 | pmc = 2517622 | doi = 10.1371/journal.pbio.0060202 | doi-access = free}}</ref> Self-awareness, by this criterion, has been reported for chimpanzees<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Gallop GG | title = Chimpanzees: self-recognition | journal = Science | volume = 167 | issue = 3914 | pages = 86–7 | date = January 1970 | pmid = 4982211 | doi = 10.1126/science.167.3914.86 | bibcode = 1970Sci...167...86G | s2cid = 145295899}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Walraven V, van Elsacker L, Verheyen R | year = 1995 | title = Reactions of a group of pygmy chimpanzees (Pan paniscus) to their mirror images: evidence of self-recognition | journal = Primates | volume = 36 | pages = 145–150 | doi=10.1007/bf02381922| s2cid = 38985498}}</ref> and also for other great apes,<ref>{{cite book |vauthors=Patterson FG, Cohn RH |year=1994 |chapter=Self-recognition and self-awareness in lowland gorillas |veditors=Parker ST, Mitchell R, Boccia M |title=Self-awareness in animals and humans: developmental perspectives |location=New York |publisher=Cambridge University Press |pages=273–290}}</ref> the [[European magpie]],<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Prior H, Schwarz A, Güntürkün O | title = Mirror-induced behavior in the magpie (Pica pica): evidence of self-recognition | journal = PLOS Biology | volume = 6 | issue = 8 | pages = e202 | date = August 2008 | pmid = 18715117 | pmc = 2517622 | doi = 10.1371/journal.pbio.0060202 | veditors = De Waal F | doi-access = free}}</ref> some [[cetaceans]]<ref>{{cite book|title=Self-awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives | vauthors = Marten K, Psarakos S |chapter=Evidence of self-awareness in the bottlenose dolphin (''Tursiops truncatus'') | veditors = Parker ST, Mitchell R, Boccia M |pages=361–379 |year=1995 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |chapter-url=http://earthtrust.org/delbook.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081013081149/http://earthtrust.org/delbook.html |archive-date=13 October 2008}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Reiss D, Marino L | title = Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: a case of cognitive convergence | journal = Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | volume = 98 | issue = 10 | pages = 5937–42 | date = May 2001 | pmid = 11331768 | pmc = 33317 | doi = 10.1073/pnas.101086398 | bibcode = 2001PNAS...98.5937R | doi-access = free}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Delfour F, Marten K | title = Mirror image processing in three marine mammal species: killer whales (Orcinus orca), false killer whales (Pseudorca crassidens) and California sea lions (Zalophus californianus) | journal = Behavioural Processes | volume = 53 | issue = 3 | pages = 181–190 | date = April 2001 | pmid = 11334706 | doi = 10.1016/s0376-6357(01)00134-6 | s2cid = 31124804}}</ref> and an [[Asian elephant]],<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Plotnik JM, de Waal FB, Reiss D | title = Self-recognition in an Asian elephant | journal = Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | volume = 103 | issue = 45 | pages = 17053–7 | date = November 2006 | pmid = 17075063 | pmc = 1636577 | doi = 10.1073/pnas.0608062103 | bibcode = 2006PNAS..10317053P | doi-access = free}}</ref> but not for monkeys. The mirror test has been criticized by researchers because it is entirely focused on vision, the primary sense in humans, while other species rely more heavily on other senses such as the [[olfactory|sense of smell]] in dogs.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Lea SE | date = 2010 | chapter-url = https://books.google.com/books?id=GDijCnSs57gC&pg=PA173 | chapter = Concept learning in nonprimate mammals: In search of evidence | veditors = Mareschal D, Quinn PC, Lea SE | title = The Making of Human Concepts | pages = 173–199 | publisher = Oxford University Press | isbn = 978-0-19-954922-1}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | first = Jenia | last = Meng | name-list-style = vanc | url = http://thesuperiorhuman.ultraventus.info/movie/about/transcription/ | title = The Superior Human? | department = Documentary. Transcription on the official website | work = The Superior Human | date = 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last= Gatti |first=Roberto Cazzolla | name-list-style = vanc |date=2015|title=Self-consciousness: beyond the looking-glass and what dogs found there |journal=Ethology Ecology & Evolution |volume=28 |issue=2 |pages=232–240 |doi=10.1080/03949370.2015.1102777 |s2cid=217507938}}</ref> 

It has been suggested that [[metacognition]] in some animals provides some evidence for cognitive self-awareness.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Couchman JJ, Coutinho MV, Beran MJ, Smith JD | title = Beyond stimulus cues and reinforcement signals: a new approach to animal metacognition | journal = Journal of Comparative Psychology | volume = 124 | issue = 4 | pages = 356–68 | date = November 2010 | pmid = 20836592 | pmc = 2991470 | doi = 10.1037/a0020129 | url = http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/features/com-124-4-356.pdf}}</ref> The great apes, dolphins, and [[rhesus monkeys]] have demonstrated the ability to monitor their own mental states and use an "I don't know" response to avoid answering difficult questions. Unlike the mirror test, which reveals awareness of the condition of one's own body, this uncertainty monitoring is thought to reveal awareness of one's internal mental state. A 2007 study has provided some evidence for metacognition in [[rat]]s,<ref>{{cite web | url = https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/03/070308121856.htm | title = Rats Capable Of Reflecting On Mental Processes | work = ScienceDaily | date = 9 March 2007}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Foote AL, Crystal JD | title = Metacognition in the rat | journal = Current Biology | volume = 17 | issue = 6 | pages = 551–5 | date = March 2007 | pmid = 17346969 | pmc = 1861845 | doi = 10.1016/j.cub.2007.01.061 | bibcode = 2007CBio...17..551F}}</ref> although this interpretation has been questioned.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Smith JD, Beran MJ, Couchman JJ, Coutinho MV | title = The comparative study of metacognition: sharper paradigms, safer inferences | journal = Psychonomic Bulletin & Review | volume = 15 | issue = 4 | pages = 679–91 | date = August 2008 | pmid = 18792496 | pmc = 4607312 | doi = 10.3758/PBR.15.4.679}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = Jozefowiez J, Staddon JE, Cerutti DT | title = Metacognition in animals: how do we know that they know? | journal = Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews | volume = 4 | pages = 29–39 | year = 2009 | doi = 10.3819/ccbr.2009.40003| doi-access = free}}</ref>  These species might also be aware of the strength of their memories.

Some researchers propose that animal calls and other vocal behaviors provide evidence of consciousness. This idea arose from research on children's [[crib talk]] by Weir (1962) and in investigations of early speech in children by Greenfield and others (1976). Some such research has been done with a macaw (see [[Talking Birds#Arielle|Arielle]]).

In July, 2012 during the "Consciousness in Human and Nonhuman Animals" conference in Cambridge a group of scientists announced and signed a declaration with the following conclusions:
{{quotation|Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.<ref>{{cite web |title=The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness |url= http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf |access-date=12 August 2012}}</ref>}}