Editing Brusilov offensive (section)

==Aftermath==

[[File:Defenders NGM-v31-p369-A.jpg|thumbnail|Russian infantry]]
Brusilov's operation achieved its original goal of forcing Germany to halt its attack on Verdun and transfer considerable forces to the East. Afterward, the Austro-Hungarian Army increasingly had to rely on the support of the German Army for its military successes. On the other hand, the German Army did not suffer much from the operation and retained most of its offensive power afterward. The early success of the offensive convinced Romania to enter the war on the side of the [[Triple Entente|Entente]], which led to the [[Romania during World War I|failure of the 1916 campaign]]. The Brusilov Offensive was the high point of the Russian effort during World War I, and was a manifestation of good leadership and planning on the part of the [[Military history of the Russian Empire|Imperial Russian Army]] coupled with great skill of the lower ranks. According to [[John Keegan]], "the Brusilov Offensive was, on the scale by which success was measured in the foot-by-foot fighting of the First World War, the greatest victory seen on any front since the trench lines had been dug [[First Battle of the Aisne|on the Aisne two years before]]".{{sfn|Keegan|2000|p=306}}

The Brusilov offensive commanded by Brusilov himself went very well, but the overall campaign, for which Brusilov's part was only supposed to be a distraction, because of Evert's failures, became tremendously costly for the imperial army, and after the offensive, it was no longer able to launch another on the same scale. Many historians contend that the casualties that the Russian army suffered in this campaign contributed significantly to its collapse the following year.<ref>''Defeat and Disarmament'', Joe Dixon</ref>{{Page needed|date=June 2023}} The operation was marked by a considerable improvement in the quality of Russian tactics. Brusilov used smaller, specialized units to attack weak points in the Austro-Hungarian trench lines and blow open holes for the rest of the army to advance into. These were a remarkable departure from the [[human wave attack]]s that had dominated the strategy of all the major armies until that point during World War I. Evert used conventional tactics that were to prove costly and indecisive, thereby costing Russia its chance for a victory in 1916.

The irony was that other Russian commanders did not realize the potential of the tactics that Brusilov had devised. Similar tactics were proposed separately by French, Germans and British on the [[Western Front (World War I)|Western Front]] and employed at the [[Battle of Verdun]] earlier in the year. The tactics would henceforth be used to an even greater degree by the Germans, who used [[Stormtroopers (Imperial Germany)|stormtroopers]] and [[infiltration tactics]] to great effect in the 1918 [[German spring offensive|Spring Offensive]].{{sfn|Edmonds|1995|p=489}}

With the benefit of hindsight, it has been stated that Russia was not able to take advantage of its success nor cement it. In Russian society, pessimism regarding Russia's prospects in the war and distrust in the competence of its military and political leadership would continue to grow in 1916.<ref>Головин H. H. Россия в Первой мировой войне. Глава 10. — Париж, 1939</ref>