Editing CVA-01 (section)

==Cancellation==
In mid-1963 the [[Minister of Defence (UK)|Minister of Defence]] [[Peter Thorneycroft]] announced in [[Parliament of the United Kingdom|Parliament]] that one new aircraft carrier would be built, at an estimated cost of £60 million, although the Treasury thought that the final cost was likely to be nearer £100 million. This was based on the carrier using the same aircraft as the [[Royal Air Force]], the [[Hawker Siddeley P.1154]] supersonic V/STOL aircraft (a larger version of what would become the [[Hawker Siddeley Harrier]]). The single new carrier would be part of a three carrier fleet with a refitted Eagle and Hermes until 1980.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Defence (Carrier Force) |publisher=Hansard |date=30 July 1963 |volume= 682 |at=cc237-42 |work=House of Commons Debates |url=https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1963/jul/30/defence-carrier-force |access-date=2024-08-12 }}</ref> After the [[1964 United Kingdom general election|General Election of October 1964]], however, the new Labour Government wanted to cut back defence spending, and the RAF attacked the Royal Navy's carrier in an attempt to safeguard first its [[BAC TSR-2]] strike/reconnaissance aircraft and then its proposed replacement, the [[General Dynamics F-111K|General Dynamics F-111]], from the cuts.

The new government, and by extension the Treasury, were particularly concerned about the size issues involved, as these were fluctuating quite frequently. They, therefore, demanded that the Admiralty keep to 53,000 tons. With the navy unwilling to alter the size of the carrier and its air group accordingly the difficulties spiraled, and the final tonnage was much more likely to be nearer 55,000 tons. The design issues also increased, including dramatically reduced top speed, deck space, armour, and radar equipment. When the Cabinet met in February 1966, the new Secretary of State for Defence, [[Denis Healey]], strongly supported the RAF and their plan for long-range strike aircraft, by now the F-111, partially due to the cost issues of running fleet carriers, and partially due to opposition to a strong British military.{{citation needed|date=May 2020}} This meeting resulted in the [[1966 Defence White Paper]]. In this paper, the CVA-01 was finally canceled, along with the remainder of the [[Type 82 destroyer]]s that would have been built as escorts, of which only {{HMS|Bristol|D23|6}} was eventually completed. Instead, plans were made for the modernisation of ''Eagle'' and ''Ark Royal''. The final chief designer of CVA-01 said that by the time project was cancelled, so many design compromises had been made because of size and budget restrictions, that the whole project had become risky.<ref name=bbc-20140703>{{cite news |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-28128026 |title=The aircraft carrier that never was |author=Nick Childs |publisher=BBC |date=3 July 2014 |accessdate=3 July 2014}}</ref> The following year, a supplement to the review marked the ending of a global presence with the withdrawal of British presence "[[East of Suez]]". The year after, the purchase of F-111s was cancelled.

One argument about the cancellation of CVA-01 states that the RAF moved Australia by 500 miles in its documents to support the air force's preferred strategy of land-based aircraft.<ref name=bbc-20140703/><ref name="james19991" /> Regardless of the story's veracity, the principal reason for the cancellation was that the Defence Review Board believed adequate cover could be better provided East of Suez by RAF strike aircraft flying from bases in Australia and uninhabited islands in the Indian Ocean,<ref>Defence Review 1966: estimates 14-2-1966. Pt 1</ref> rather than by a small carrier fleet in the 1970s which would have still included ''Hermes''. The Review asserted the carrier's only effective use was to project British power East of Suez, and that the RN carriers were too 'vulnerable' for the RN's other major theatre in the North Atlantic.<ref>Defence Review 1966. Estimates 14-2-1966</ref> When the British government later decided in 1967 that it would withdraw from east of Suez, the case for carriers weakened further. The 1966 Review stated that the ability of the RAF to cover 300 miles offshore was enough for the 1970s, regardless of the RAF's contested claim of being able to provide air cover out to 700 miles. The cancellation of 150 TSR2 aircraft by Labour in mid-1965 was the basis of the RAF's argument for the 'island hopping strategy'.<ref name="james19991">{{cite journal | url=http://www.naval-review.co.uk/issues/1999-1.pdf | title=Carrier 2000: A Consideration of Naval Aviation in the Millennium - I | last=James |first= D. R. | journal=The Naval Review | date=January 1999 | volume=87 | issue=1 | pages=3–8 | access-date=12 December 2011 | archive-date=26 April 2012 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120426045355/http://www.naval-review.co.uk/issues/1999-1.pdf | url-status=dead }}</ref>