Editing Close air support (section)

====''Luftwaffe''====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-646-5188-17, Flugzeuge Junkers Ju 87.jpg|thumb|A flight of Ju 87 D-5s over the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]], winter 1943–44.]]
As a continental power intent on offensive operations, Germany could not ignore the need for aerial support of ground operations. Though the ''[[Luftwaffe]]'', like its counterparts, tended to focus on strategic bombing, it was unique in its willingness to commit forces to CAS. Unlike the Allies, the Germans were not able to develop powerful [[strategic bombing]] capabilities, which implied industrial developments they were forbidden to take according to the [[Treaty of Versailles]].<ref name="ifri">{{cite journal |url=https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/fs35bistenenbaum.pdf |title=The Battle over Fire Support: The CAS Challenge and the Future of Artillery |journal=Focus stratégique |volume=35 bis |date=October 2012 |last=Tenenbaum |first=Elie |publisher=Institut français des relations internationales |isbn=978-2-36567-083-8}}</ref> In joint exercises with [[Sweden]] in 1934, the Germans were first exposed to [[dive bomber|dive-bombing]], which permitted greater accuracy while making attack aircraft more difficult to track by antiaircraft gunners. As a result, [[Ernst Udet]], chief of the Luftwaffe's development, initiated procurement of close support dive bombers on the model of the U.S. Navy's [[SBC Helldiver|Curtiss Helldiver]], resulting in the [[Henschel Hs 123]], which was later replaced by the famous [[Junkers Ju 87]] ''Stuka''. Experience in the [[Spanish Civil War]] lead to the creation of five ground-attack groups in 1938,{{dubious|date=October 2011|German "ground-attack squadron" is normally understood as Schlachtgeschwader (mainly Henschel Hs 123 and Hs 129), while this text seems to describe Sturzkampfgeschwader ("dive-bombing squadron", mainly Ju 87).}} four of which would be equipped with ''Stukas''. The Luftwaffe matched its material acquisitions with advances in the air-ground coordination. General [[Wolfram von Richthofen]] organized a limited number of air liaison detachments that were attached to ground units of the main effort. These detachments existed to pass requests from the ground to the air, and receive reconnaissance reports, but they were not trained to guide aircraft onto targets.{{citation needed|date=September 2020}}

These preparations did not prove fruitful in the [[invasion of Poland]], where the Luftwaffe focused on interdiction and dedicated few assets to close air support. But the value of CAS was demonstrated at the crossing of the [[Meuse River]] during the [[Invasion of France (Nazi Germany)|Invasion of France]] in 1940. General [[Heinz Guderian]], one of the creators of the combined-arms tactical doctrine commonly known as "''[[blitzkrieg]]''", believed the best way to provide cover for the crossing would be a continuous stream of ground attack aircraft on French defenders. Though few guns were hit, the attacks kept the French under cover and prevented them from manning their guns. Aided by the sirens attached to ''Stukas'', the psychological impact was disproportional to the destructive power of close air support (although as often as not, the Stukas were used as [[tactical bomber]]s instead of close air support, leaving much of the actual work to the older Hs 123 units for the first years of the war). In addition, the reliance on air support over artillery reduced the demand for logistical support through the Ardennes. Though there were difficulties in coordinating air support with the rapid advance, the Germans demonstrated consistently superior CAS tactics to those of the British and French defenders. Later, on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern front]], the Germans would devise visual ground signals to mark friendly units and to indicate direction and distance to enemy emplacements.{{citation needed|date=September 2020}}

Despite these accomplishments, German CAS was not perfect and suffered from the same misunderstanding and [[interservice rivalry]] that plagued other nations' air arms, and friendly fire was not uncommon. For example, on the eve of the Meuse offensive, Guderian's superior cancelled his CAS plans and called for high-altitude strikes from medium bombers, which would have required halting the offensive until the air strikes were complete. Fortunately for the Germans, his order was issued too late to be implemented, and the Luftwaffe commander followed the schedule he had previously worked out with Guderian.{{citation needed|date=July 2012}} As late as November 1941, the Luftwaffe refused to provide [[Erwin Rommel]] with an air liaison officer for the ''[[Afrika Korps]]'', because it "would be against the best use of the air force as a whole."<ref name=House2001/>{{page needed|date=July 2012}}

German CAS was also extensively used on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] during the period 1941–1943. Their decline was caused by the growing strength of the Red Air Force and the redeployment of assets to defend against American and British strategic bombardment. Luftwaffe's loss of air superiority, combined with a declining supply of aircraft and fuel, crippled their ability to provide effective CAS on the western front after 1943.{{citation needed|date=July 2012}}