Editing Correspondence theory of truth (section)

== Relation to ontology ==
Historically, most advocates of correspondence theories have been [[metaphysical realism|metaphysical realists]]; that is, they believe that there is a world external to the [[mind]]s of all humans. This is in contrast to [[Metaphysical idealism|metaphysical idealists]] who hold that everything that exists, exists as a substantial metaphysical entity independently of the individual thing of which it is predicated, and also to [[Conceptualism|conceptualists]] who hold that everything that exists is, in the end, just an idea in some mind. However, it is not strictly necessary that a correspondence theory be married to metaphysical realism. It is possible to hold, for example, that the facts of the world determine which statements are true and to also hold that the world (and its facts) is but a collection of ideas in the mind of some supreme [[being]].<ref>See Kirkham, 1992, section 4.6</ref>