Editing Cosmological argument (section)

== General principles ==

=== The infinite regress ===

A ''regress'' is a series of related elements, arranged in some type of sequence of succession, examined in backwards succession (regression) from a fixed point of reference. Depending on the type of regress, this retrograde examination may take the form of [[recursion|recursive]] analysis, in which the elements in a series are studied as products of prior, often simpler, elements. If there is no 'last member' in a regress (i.e. no 'first member' in the series) it becomes an [[infinite regress]], continuing in perpetuity.<ref name="Cameron">{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Cameron |first1=Ross |title=Infinite Regress Arguments |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/infinite-regress/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=2018}}</ref> In the context of the cosmological argument the term 'regress' usually refers to ''causal regress'', in which the series is a chain of [[cause and effect]], with each element in the series arising from causal activity of the prior member.<ref name="Huemer">{{cite book |last1=Huemer |first1=Michael |title=Approaching Infinity |date=2016 |publisher=New York: Palgrave Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HUEAI-2 |chapter=13. Assessing Infinite Regress Arguments}}</ref> Some variants of the argument may also refer to ''temporal regress'', wherein the elements are past events (discrete units of time) arranged in a [[temporality|temporal]] sequence.<ref name="craig-sinclair"/>

An [[infinite regress argument]] attempts to establish the falsity of a proposition by showing that it [[logical consequence|entails]] an infinite regress that is [[Infinite regress#Viciousness|vicious]].<ref name="Cameron"/><ref name="Maurin">{{cite book |last1=Maurin |first1=Anna-Sofia |title=Hommage À Wlodek |date=2007 |publisher=Department of Philosophy, Lund University |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MAUIR |chapter=Infinite Regress – Virtue or Vice?}}</ref> The cosmological argument is a type of ''positive'' infinite regress argument given that it defends a proposition (in this case, the existence of a [[first cause]]) by arguing that its negation would lead to a vicious regress.<ref name="Day">{{cite journal |last1=Day |first1=Timothy Joseph |title=Infinite Regress Arguments |journal=Philosophical Papers |date=1987 |volume=16 |issue=2 |pages=155–164 |doi=10.1080/05568648709506273 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMIRA|url-access=subscription }}</ref> An infinite regress may be vicious due to various reasons:<ref name="Wieland">{{cite journal |last1=Wieland |first1=Jan Willem |title=Infinite Regress Arguments |journal=Acta Analytica |date=2013 |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=95–109 |doi=10.1007/s12136-012-0165-1 |s2cid=170181468 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/WIEIRA}}</ref><ref name="Reichenbach"/>

*Impossibility: [[Thought experiments]] such as [[Hilbert's paradox of the grand hotel|Hilbert's Hotel]] are cited to demonstrate the [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] impossibility of [[actual infinities]] existing in reality. Accordingly, it may be argued that an infinite causal or temporal regress cannot occur in the real world.<ref name="Maurin"/>
*Implausibility: The regress contradicts empirical evidence (e.g. for the [[temporal finitism|finitude of the past]]) or basic principles such as [[Occam's razor]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schaffer |first1=Jonathan |year=2015 |title=What Not to Multiply Without Necessity |url=http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/laser.pdf |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume=93 |issue=4|pages=644–664|doi=10.1080/00048402.2014.992447 |s2cid=16923735 }}</ref>
*Explanatory failure: A failure of explanatory goals resulting in an infinite regress of explanations. This may arise in the case of logical fallacies such as [[begging the question]] or from an attempt to investigate causes concerning origins or fundamental principles.<ref name="Clark">{{cite journal |last1=Clark |first1=Romane |title=Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |date=1988 |volume=2 |pages=369–380 |doi=10.2307/2214081 |jstor=2214081 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CLAVIR|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

=== Accidental and essential ordering of causes ===

Aquinas refers to the distinction found in Aristotle's ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'' (8.5) that a series of causes may either be [[Accident (philosophy)|accidental]] or essential,<ref name="ICR">{{Cite web|url=http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=sor_fac_pubs|title=Infinite Causal Regress and the Secunda Via in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas}}</ref><ref name="IEPAI">{{cite encyclopedia|title=Aquinas: Philosophical Theology 2.b. |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/aq-ph-th/#SH2b |last=Floyd |first=Shawn |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> though the designation of this terminology would follow later under [[Duns Scotus|John Duns Scotus]] at the turn of the 14th century.<ref name=SEPScot/>

In an accidentally ordered series of causes, earlier members need not continue exerting causal activity (having done so to propagate the chain) for the series to continue. For example, in a generational line, ancestors need no longer exist for their offspring to continue the sequence of descent. In an essential series, prior members must maintain causal interrelationship for the series to continue: If a hand grips a stick that moves a rock along the ground, the rock would stop motion once the hand or stick ceases to exist.<ref name=feser1>{{cite book |last=Feser |first=Edward |year=2009 |title=Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide |publisher=Oneworld Publications |isbn=978-1-851-68690-2}}</ref>

Based upon this distinction [[Frederick Copleston]] (1907–1994) characterises two types of causation: Causes ''in fieri'', which cause an effect's ''becoming'', or coming into existence, and causes ''in esse'', which causally sustain an effect, in ''being'', once it exists.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Joyce|first1=George Hayward|year=1922|title=Principles of Natural Theology|location=New York|publisher=Longmans Green}}</ref>

Two specific properties of an essentially ordered series have significance in the context of the cosmological argument:<ref name=feser1/>

*A first cause is essential: Later members exercise no independent causal power in continuing the series. In the example illustrated above, the rock derives its causal power essentially from the stick, which derives its causal power essentially from the hand.
*All members in the causal series must exist simultaneously in time, or timelessly.

[[Thomism|Thomistic]] philosopher, R. P. Phillips comments on the characteristics of essential ordering:<ref name=RPP>{{cite book |last=Phillips |first=Richard Percival  |title=Modern Thomistic Philosophy, Vol. II |publisher=Editiones Scholasticae |date=2014 |isbn=978-3868385403}} pp 284-285.</ref>

:"Each member of the series of causes possesses being solely by virtue of the actual present operation of a superior cause ... Life is dependent ''inter alia'' on a certain atmospheric pressure, this again on the continual operation of physical forces, whose being and operation depends on the position of the earth in the solar system, which itself must endure relatively unchanged, a state of being which can only be continuously produced by a definite—if unknown—constitution of the material universe. This constitution, however, cannot be its own cause ... We are thus irresistibly led to posit a first efficient cause which, while itself uncaused, shall impart causality to a whole series."