Editing Critique of Practical Reason (section)

==Analytic: Chapter One==
[[Practical reason]] is the faculty for determining the will, which operates by applying a general principle of action to one's particular situation. For Kant, a ''practical principle'' can be either a mere ''maxim'' if it is based on the agent's desires or a ''law'' if it applies universally. Any principle that presupposes a previous desire for some object in the agent always presupposes that the agent is the sort of person who would be interested in that particular object. Anything that an agent is interested in can only be contingent, however, and never necessary since it is only valid for that agent alone. Therefore, it cannot be a law, but only a maxim.<ref>Kant, KpV 5:19-21</ref>

To say that the law is to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number or the greatest good, always presupposes some interest in the greatest happiness, the greatest number, the greatest good, and so on. This cannot be the basis for any universal moral law. Kant concludes that the source of the [[nomological]] character of the moral law derives not from its ''content'' but from its ''form'' alone. The content of the universal moral law, the [[categorical imperative]], must be nothing over and above the law's form, otherwise it will be dependent and based on the desires that the law's possessor has. The only law whose content consists in its form (viz., the form of universality), according to Kant, is the statement: {{blockquote|1=Act in such a way that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle of a universal legislation.<ref>Kant, KpV 5:30</ref>}}

Kant then argues that a will which acts on the practical law is a will which is acting on the idea of the form of law, an idea of reason which has nothing to do with the senses. Hence the moral will is independent of the world of the senses, the world where it might be constrained by one's contingent desires. The will is therefore fundamentally free. The converse also applies: if the will is free, then it must be governed by a rule, but a rule whose content does not restrict the freedom of the will. The only appropriate rule is the rule whose content is equivalent to its form, the ''categorical imperative''. To follow the practical law is to be [[Wiktionary:autonomy|autonomous]], whereas to follow any of the other types of contingent laws (or ''[[hypothetical imperative]]s'') is to be [[Wiktionary:heteronomy|heteronomous]] and therefore unfree. The moral law expresses the positive content of freedom, while being free from influence expresses its negative content.

Kant then lists and examines six classical moral principles as practical "material" determinants of morality:
{| class="wikitable"
|
: I. Subjective<ref>Kant, KpV 5:40</ref><ref>The principles listed in the table below and the names are taken from: {{cite book |last1=Beck |first1=Lewis White |author1-link=Lewis White Beck |title=A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason |date=May 1, 1996 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=9780226040752 |pages=104 |edition=2nd |language=English}}</ref>
::: A. External
::::: 1. Education ([[Michel de Montaigne|Montaigne]])
::::: 2. Civil government ([[Bernard Mandeville|Mandeville]])
::: B. Internal
::::: 3. Physical feeling ([[Epicurus]])
::::: 4. Moral feeling ([[Francis Hutcheson (philosopher)|Hutcheson]])
: II. Objective
::: A. Internal
::::: 5. Perfection ([[Christian Wolff (philosopher)|Wolff]] and the [[Stoicism|Stoics]])
::: B. External
::::: 6. Will of God ([[Christian August Crusius|Crusius]] and other theological moralists)
|}

He concludes that all of these doctrines fail precisely because deducing or basing morality from various ultimate objects, such as happiness or perfection, is impossible. This makes these principles heteronomous and therefore fundamentally inadequate to reason.

Kant next argues that we are conscious of the operation of the moral law on us and it is through this consciousness that we are conscious of our freedom and not through any kind of special faculty. Though our actions are normally determined by the calculations of "self-love", we realize that we can ignore such contingencies when moral duty is at stake. Consciousness of the moral law as such is ''a priori'' and unanalysable.

He ends this chapter by discussing [[David Hume|Hume]]'s denial of the claim that the concept of causation possesses any objective validity. Hume argues that we can never see one event cause another, only the constant conjunction of events. It is subjective necessity (habit), according to Hume, that makes us view events that occur repeatedly alongside or after one another as being causally connected. Kant suggests that if Hume's view were universally accepted, then Kant could not have distinguished causality as being both conditioned and objectively valid. Thus he would lack the necessary empty conception of unconditioned causation necessary to prevent the conflating of the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. Since we are autonomous, Kant subsequently claims that we can know something about the noumenal world as unconditioned, namely that we are in it and play a causal role as unconditioned moral agents. This standpoint, however, remains ''exclusively practical''. Consequently, his views advanced do not challenge our limited theoretical knowledge of the things in themselves; theoretical speculation on the noumenal world is avoided.