Editing Croatian Spring (section)

==National revival==
===Grievances===
By the end of the 1960s, the economic reforms had not resulted in discernible improvement within Croatia. [[Belgrade]]-based federal banks still dominated the Yugoslav loan market and foreign trade. Croatia-based banks were pushed out from [[Dalmatia]], a popular tourist region, and hotels there were gradually taken over by large companies based in Belgrade. Croatian media reported that favourable purchase agreements for Serbian companies were the result of political pressure and bribery, and the situation was framed as an ethnic rather than economic conflict.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=228–229}}

Furthermore, the situation was worsened by a perception among Croatian nationalists of cultural and demographic threats to Croatia from the following policies: use of school textbooks to suppress Croatian national sentiment, a campaign to standardise the [[Serbo-Croatian language]] in a way favouring [[Serbian language|Serbian dialects]], demographic displacement by Serbs, and encouragement of [[Dalmatianism|Dalmatian regionalism]].{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=229–230}} Calls for the establishment of autonomous Serbian provinces in Dalmatia and elsewhere in Croatia, seen as a threat to Croatia's territorial integrity, added to these concerns.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=234}} Many people in Croatia believed these to be substantive threats intended to weaken the republic, and rejected alternate explanations of them attributing the changes to economic phenomena or results of modernisation.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=229–230}} Early in 1969, a number of grievances were listed in an article by the [[Croatian Writers' Association]] president, [[Petar Šegedin (writer)|Petar Šegedin]], in {{lang|hr|[[Kolo (magazine)|Kolo]]}}, a magazine published by {{lang|hr|[[Matica hrvatska]]}}. In the article, Šegedin accused the Yugoslav government of attempting [[cultural assimilation]] of Croatia.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=235}}

===Language question===
{{main|Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language}}
[[File:Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika - cropped.png|thumb|The [[Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language]] was announced in the ''Telegram'', a contemporary literary newspaper on 17 March 1967.|alt=Photograph of the front page of the Telegram newspaper]]
In 1967, the first two volumes of the [[Dictionary of Serbo-Croatian Literary and Vernacular Language]] based on the 1954 [[Novi Sad Agreement]] were published, sparking controversy about whether Croatian was a separate language. Both volumes excluded common Croatian expressions or treated them as local dialect while Serbian variants were often presented as the standard. The unrelated 1966 Serbo-Croatian dictionary published by {{ill|Miloš Moskovljević|el|Μίλος Μοσκοβλίεβιτς|sr|Милош Московљевић}} further inflamed the situation by omitting the term "Croat" from the vocabulary.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=230–231}}

The [[Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language]] was issued by 130 Croatian linguists, including 80 communists,{{sfn|Rusinow|2007|p=140}} on 17 March 1967. The declaration criticised the 1967 dictionary and called for official recognition of Croatian as a separate language and for a requirement for the government of Croatia to use the [[Croatian language]] in official business. This step would have disadvantaged the many Serb bureaucrats in Croatia.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=230–231}} The declaration drew "A Proposal for Reflection" in response, drafted by 54 Serbian writers calling for [[TV Belgrade]] to use [[Cyrillic script]] and to provide education for the [[Serbs of Croatia]] in the Serbian language.{{sfn|Rusinow|2007|p=140}} There were also several denunciations of the declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language from the SKJ within days. The declaration was not universally supported in Croatia. The deputy speaker of the [[Sabor]], {{ill|Miloš Žanko|hr}}, denounced [[Franjo Tuđman]], the head of the [[Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement of Croatia]], and [[Većeslav Holjevac]], the head of the [[Croatian Heritage Foundation]], for hiring known Croatian nationalists. The declaration marked the beginning of the four-year long period of increased Croatian nationalism commonly referred to as the Croatian Spring.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=230–231}}

{{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}} withdrew from the Novi Sad Agreement on 22 November 1970 because {{lang|hr|[[Matica srpska]]}} insisted that Croatian was only a dialect of Serbian. {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}} went on to publish a new Croatian dictionary and orthography manual by [[Stjepan Babić]], [[Božidar Finka]], and [[Milan Moguš]], which was condemned by Serbia.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=232}}{{sfn|Mićanović|2012|p=283}} The Croatian nationalists reacted by promoting [[linguistic purism]] and by revising school textbooks to increase coverage of [[History of Croatia|Croatian history]] and [[culture of Croatia|culture]]. {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}} became the rallying point of the nationalist revival, and its economic secretary [[Šime Đodan]] was particularly popular.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=235}} In 1970, {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}}'s membership grew from about 2,000 to 40,000, increasing its political influence.{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=161}} It also enabled complaints to [[Yugoslav Railways]], backed by the SKH, that Serbian [[Ekavian]] spelling ought to be supplemented with Croatian [[Ijekavian]] spelling in all official notices and schedules.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=234}}

While multiple newspapers and magazines supported {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}}, the organisation also introduced its own organ, {{ill|Hrvatski tjednik|hr|Hrvatski tjednik (Zagreb)|italic=y}} (Croatian Weekly), which enthusiastically promoted Croatian nationalism.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=235}} Edited by [[Vlado Gotovac]],{{sfn|Jakovina|2012|p=410}} it quickly surpassed the number of subscribers of all other newspapers including {{lang|hr|[[Vjesnik]]}}, the [[newspaper of record]] in Croatia.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=235}}

===SKH factions===
[[File:Mika Tripalo.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Miko Tripalo]] was one of the leaders of the reformist faction of the [[League of Communists of Croatia]].|alt=Photograph of Miko Tripalo facing the camera]]
Initially, the SKH was internally divided over support for {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}}, and its leadership remained mostly silent on the matter.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=236}} The party was led by a reformist faction consisting of SKH Secretary of the Central Committee [[Savka Dabčević-Kučar]] and [[Miko Tripalo]], supported by [[Pero Pirker]], [[Dragutin Haramija]], [[Ivan Šibl]], and others.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=249}} Dabčević-Kučar, Tripalo and Pirker assumed the top positions in the SKH in 1969 with Bakarić's support.{{sfn|Rusinow|2007|p=141}} The reformists were opposed by a conservative or anti-reformist faction including Žanko and [[Stipe Šuvar]], [[Dušan Dragosavac]], [[Jure Bilić]], and {{ill|Milutin Baltić|hr}}. In search of support, the conservative faction allied with the Praxis School. Dabčević-Kučar and Tripalo, on the other hand, found support in SKH ranks closer to or associated with {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}} such as Đodan and [[Marko Veselica]].{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=249}} In late 1969, Žanko also criticised the SKH leadership as well as Bakarić, accusing them of nationalism and anti-socialist attitudes in an article for {{lang|hr|[[Borba (newspaper)|Borba]]}}. He also wrote a series of articles denouncing {{lang|hr|Vjesnik}}, [[Radio Television Zagreb]], and literary magazine {{ill|Hrvatski književni list|lt=''Hrvatski književni list''|hr}} and [[Bruno Bušić]] as a writer contributing to the magazine. Others accused by Žanko of stirring up nationalist views were writers Šegedin, Gotovac, and [[Tomislav Ladan]]; literary critics [[Vlatko Pavletić]], [[Igor Mandić]] and {{ill|Branimir Donat|hr}}; {{lang|hr|[[Vjesnik u srijedu]]}} [[Weekly newspaper|weekly]] editor [[Krešimir Džeba]] and {{lang|hr|Vjesnik}} political [[columnist]] [[Neda Krmpotić]]; editor of [[Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Zagreb]]-published weekly {{lang|hr|[[Glas Koncila]]}} [[Živko Kustić]], historian [[Trpimir Macan]], art historian [[Grgo Gamulin]], as well as economists Đodan, {{ill|Hrvoje Šošić|hr}}, Marko and [[Vladimir Veselica]]. On 19 December, Tito criticised Žanko's actions.{{sfn|Batović|2017|pp=132–134}} In January 1970, Dabčević-Kučar accused Žanko of [[Political unitarism|unitarism]] and of trying to topple the SKH leadership. Žanko was removed from all political functions and the SKH moved closer to {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}}'s positions.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=236}} Some sources, including Perović, mark Žanko's dismissal as the beginning of the Croatian Spring.{{sfn|Perović|2012|p=181}}

Throughout, the SKH's central economic demand was that Croatia be permitted to retain more of its foreign currency earnings.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=254}} To this end, the SKH maintained good relations with counterparts from Slovenia and Macedonia, and also attempted to secure the support of the [[League of Communists of Kosovo]]. Due to its rejection of the SKH's economic agenda, the SKS was dismissed as "unionist" by the SKH despite Nikezić's support for other reforms.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=253–254}} The SKH also opposed the under-representation of Croats in the police, security forces, and the military, as well as in political and economic institutions in Croatia as well as across Yugoslavia. The predominance of Serbs in these positions led to widespread calls for their replacement by Croats.{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=159}} At the federal level, Serbs represented about 39 percent of the Yugoslav population, while Croats accounted for about 19 percent. Serbs were over-represented and Croats under-represented in the [[civil service]] by a factor of two, accounting for 67 percent and nine percent of civil servants, respectively.{{sfn|Batović|2017|p=95}} Similarly, Serbs made up between 60–70 percent of the officer corps of the [[Yugoslav People's Army]] (JNA).{{sfn|Dean|1976|p=37}} In Croatia alone, Serbs represented about 15 percent of the population,{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=238}} but accounted for nearly one-quarter of the SKH's members and more than one-half of the police force.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=309}}

===SKH involvement until mid-1971===
[[File:Savka Dabcevic Kucar.jpg|thumb|left|upright|[[Savka Dabčević-Kučar]], one of the most prominent Croatian Spring participants and the head of the [[League of Communists of Croatia]] in 1969–1971.|alt=Photograph of Savka Dabčević-Kučar facing the camera]]
In December 1970, the SKH candidate lost the election of student [[Rector (academia)|pro-rector]] of the [[Zagreb University]] to an independent, [[Ivan Zvonimir Čičak]]. Non-communist candidates took over the remaining student organisations headquartered in Zagreb in April 1971. [[Dražen Budiša]] was elected the head of the Zagreb Student Federation, and [[Ante Paradžik]] became the head of the [[Savez studenata Hrvatske|Croatian Student Federation]].{{sfn|Haug|2012|p=244}}

Within days of the student-body elections, Tito requested that Dabčević-Kučar order the arrests of Šegedin, Marko Veselica, Budiša, Čičak and Đodan, but she declined.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=261}} This decision made Dabčević-Kučar very popular in Croatia. At a rally of 200,000 people to mark the 26th anniversary of the [[Zagreb in World War II|1945 liberation of Zagreb]] on 7 May, observers from the United States reported that her speech was interrupted about 40 times by cheering and applause directed at her rather than the SKH.{{sfn|Batović|2017|pp=188–189}} According to the [[British ambassador to Yugoslavia]] Dugald Stewart, Dabčević-Kučar and Tripalo were very skilled at use of public political rallies and their speeches drew crowds typically expected only at football matches.{{sfn|Batović|2017|pp=230–231}}

Another set of amendments to the Yugoslav constitution was adopted further restricting federal powers in June 1971. The only powers retained by the federal government were [[foreign affairs]], foreign trade, defence, [[common currency]], and common [[tariff]]s. Inter-republic committees were set up to make decisions by the federal government before [[ratification]].{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=247–248}} The SKH wanted further decentralisation in 1971 to include banking and foreign trade, and changes that would allow Croatia to retain more foreign currency earnings. Other demands were coming from outside the SKH Central Committee, ranging from establishing a Croatian military to complete independence.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=253–255}} Ultimately the Croatian Spring involved a wide variety of elements including anti-centralists, moderate and extreme nationalists, pro-[[Ustaše]], [[anti-communists]], reformists, democrats and [[democratic socialists]], liberals, and [[libertarians]].{{sfn|Rusinow|2007|p=141}}

The SKS leadership did not criticise the SKH; on the contrary, Nikezić and Perović defended Croatia's reformist leadership to Tito in 1971.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=244}} Serbian and Croatian newspapers traded accusations of mutual hostility, nationalism, and unitarism, leading Tito to admit that the SKJ had lost control of the media.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=249–250}} In a meeting with the SKH leaders in July 1971, Tito expressed concern with the political situation and offered Tripalo the post of [[Prime Minister of Yugoslavia]] to move him away from the SKH, but Tripalo declined.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=250–251}} Later that month, the conservative faction managed to gain sufficient support to expel Đodan and Marko Veselica from the SKH as "nationalist ringleaders".{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=249}}

On 2 August, the SKH announced an Action Programme, criticising nationalism which was referred to in the programme as "national movement", and denouncing unnamed individuals associated with {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}} for conspiring against the SKH and the SKJ. The SKH leaders determined that the Action Programme would be formally adopted or rejected by its next [[plenary session]] in November.{{sfn|Swain|2011|p=172}} The SKH arranged another meeting with Tito on 14 September, insisting he had been misinformed about the situation. After the meeting, Tito said he was convinced that the stories about [[chauvinism]] reigning in Croatia were absurd.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=250–251}} He also implied that he favoured the SKH's proposal to reform Yugoslavia's foreign currency policy. After the meeting, Tripalo suggested that the Action Programme would no longer be considered.{{sfn|Swain|2011|p=173}}

===Looking for role models from the past===
[[File:Third session of ZAVNOH.JPG|thumb|The federal model adopted by the [[ZAVNOH]] ([[Andrija Hebrang (father)|Andrija Hebrang]] shown speaking at its third session) was the declared aim of the Croatian leadership during the Croatian Spring.|alt=Andrija Hebrang speaking at a podium]]
The Croatian Spring spurred increased interest in Croatian historical figures. A [[commemorative plaque]] to [[Stjepan Radić]], the founder of the [[Croatian Peasant Party]] (HSS) and a champion of the Croatian cause in [[Kingdom of Yugoslavia|pre-war Yugoslavia]], was put up in Zagreb, followed by a monument to him in the town of [[Metković]]. The city of [[Šibenik]] cancelled a plan to erect a monument to the victims of [[fascism]], instead erecting a statue of the medieval Croatian king [[Peter Krešimir IV of Croatia|Peter Krešimir IV]].{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=237–238}} A marching band and a [[living history]] troop named after the 18th-century [[Trenck's Pandurs]] were re-established in [[Požega, Croatia|Požega]] in 1969.{{sfn|Jakovina|2012|p=393}} There were also unsuccessful calls to restore a monument to the 19th-century [[Ban of Croatia]] [[Josip Jelačić]], which had been removed from [[Ban Jelačić Square|Zagreb's central square]] by the SKH in 1947.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=237–238}}

Traditional Croatian patriotic songs—some of them banned—experienced a resurgence in popularity. The most popular and controversial singer of such songs at the time was [[Vice Vukov]].{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=237–238}} {{lang|hr|[[Lijepa naša domovino]]}} returned to formal use as a patriotic song when a plaque was placed in the [[Zagreb Cathedral]] commemorating the noblemen involved in the 17th-century [[Magnate conspiracy]]. The opera {{lang|hr|[[Nikola Šubić Zrinski (opera)|Nikola Šubić Zrinski]]}}, retelling the 16th-century [[Siege of Szigetvár]], was regularly sold out whenever it played at the [[Croatian National Theatre, Zagreb|Croatian National Theatre]] in Zagreb. Paintings by [[Oton Iveković]] (1869–1939) depicting events from Croatian history became very popular.{{sfn|Batović|2017|p=162}}{{sfn|Jakovina|2012|pp=392–393}} Croatia's historical [[Coat of arms of Croatia|chequy coat of arms]] became a famous symbol sewn by youths on jackets and berets or applied on stickers to car windshields. In 1969, it was incorporated into the football club crest [[GNK Dinamo Zagreb|Dinamo Zagreb]]. While the [[Flag of Yugoslavia|Yugoslav flag]] was still flown, it was always paired with the [[Flag of Croatia|Croatian one]]. The latter was also used on its own, and in overall use in Croatia, it outnumbered the Yugoslav flag by ten to one.{{sfn|Jakovina|2012|pp=392–393}}

The SKH pointed out the significance of the [[Catholic Church]] in Croatian culture and political identity. Dabčević-Kučar later said that the move was motivated by her wish to counterbalance the [[Serbian Orthodox Church]] as a "source of Serbian chauvinism".{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=158}} While the Catholic Church did not play an important role in the Croatian Spring, it contributed to the strengthening of national identity by introducing the [[Cult of Mary]] as a Croatian national symbol around the same time. This contribution was reinforced by the [[canonisation]] of the 14th-century Croatian [[Franciscan]] friar and missionary [[Nicholas Tavelic]] in 1970.{{sfn|Irvine|2007|pp=170–171}}

The SKH maintained that its current policy was rooted in the [[Yugoslav Partisans|Partisan]] legacy, arguing that the Yugoslav federation was not set up as envisaged by the World War II-era [[State Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia]] (ZAVNOH); in particular, ZAVNOH's solution to the [[Croatian question]] was not implemented. The SKH said that national sentiments were a legitimate expression of interests which communists must defend and that Yugoslavia must be organised as a community of national sovereign republics.{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=155}} {{lang|hr|Hrvatski tjednik}} published an article by Tuđman praising ZAVNOH. Its cover page carried a photo of the wartime secretary of the [[Communist Party of Croatia]], [[Andrija Hebrang (father)|Andrija Hebrang]],{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=162}} whom the SKJ had considered a [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] spy and a traitor since the 1948 [[Tito–Stalin split]]. The article also coincided with a request, ignored by the SKH, to posthumously rehabilitate Hebrang.{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=155}} The initiative was launched as a form of "moral rehabilitation" by anti-communist émigrés including former high-ranking KPJ official [[Ante Ciliga]].{{sfn|Strčić|1988|p=30}}
{{clear}}

===Demands for autonomy and a new constitution===
At the time of the Croatian Spring, civic relations between Croats and Serbs in Croatia were increasingly framed by diverging narratives of [[World War I]] and especially World War II. While Croats focused on the role of the [[Royal Serbian Army]] in the creation of the Serb-dominated Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and killings of [[collaborationism|collaborationist]] Ustaše troops and their sympathisers in the [[1945 Yugoslav pursuit of Nazi collaborators]], Serbs negatively evaluated the Croatian participation in Austria-Hungary's [[Serbian campaign]] during World War I, and especially the [[Genocide of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia|genocide of Serbs]] committed by the Ustaše in the [[Axis powers|Axis]] [[puppet state]] known as the [[Independent State of Croatia]] (NDH).{{sfn|Pavlowitch|2007|pp=86–87}} In a series of articles in {{lang|hr|Hrvatski tjednik}}, Tuđman expressed the view of the majority of the SKH as well as {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}}: that Croats had made a significant contribution to the Partisan struggle and were not collectively to blame for Ustaše atrocities.{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=163}}

Among Croatian Serbs, Serbian nationalism flared in response to the Croatian national resurgence. By 1969, the cultural society {{lang|sh|[[Prosvjeta]]}} came to the forefront of Croatian Serb nationalist discourse.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=242–243}} A plan put forward by SKH reformists to revise elementary and middle school literature and history [[Curriculum|curricula]] so 75 per cent of the coverage would be on Croatian topics{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=157}} drew complaints from {{lang|sh|Prosvjeta}}, which argued that the plan was a threat to Serb cultural rights. {{lang|sh|Prosvjeta}} also objected to the SKH's attempts to reinterpret the wartime Partisan struggle as a liberation of Croatian nationality within the Yugoslav framework.{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=166}} By 1971, {{lang|sh|Prosvjeta}} demanded that the Serbian language and Cyrillic script be officially used in Croatia alongside the Croatian language and [[Latin script]], as well as legislative safeguards guaranteeing the national equality of Serbs.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=242–243}} {{lang|sh|Prosvjeta}} rejected the federal model advocated by the ZAVNOH and the SKH, arguing that nationalism was no longer needed in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, {{lang|sh|Prosvjeta}} denounced the work of {{lang|sh|Matica hrvatska}} and asserted that the Serbs of Croatia would preserve their national identity by relying on Serbia's help regardless of the borders of the republics.{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=167}}

Finally, {{lang|sh|Prosvjeta}}'s [[Rade Bulat]] demanded the establishment of an autonomous province for the Croatian Serbs, and there were calls to grant autonomy for Dalmatia as well.{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=167}} The SKH Central Committee declared that no region of Croatia could make any legitimate claim to autonomy of any kind and labelled calls for regional Dalmatian autonomy as treason to the Croatian nation.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=234}} Such responses aligned with the SKH's objective of national homogenisation. To that end, the SKH blocked the option of declaring one's ethnic identity as regional in the 1971 census.{{sfn|Irvine|2007|p=157}} The campaign led by {{lang|sh|Matica hrvatska}} to emphasise the distinction between Croatian and Serbian was reflected in the prevailing speech of Croatian Serbs, which changed from predominantly Ijekavian, or an Ekavian-Ijekavian blend, to predominantly Ekavian.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=238}}

The Serbian philosopher [[Mihailo Đurić]] argued that Croatia's constitution should be amended to describe the republic as the national state of Croats and Serbs. This remark sparked another series of public debates in March 1971 in the context of the constitutional reform of Yugoslavia. The SKJ responded by bringing charges against Đurić and imprisoning him. {{lang|sh|Matica hrvatska}} proposed an amendment to the constitution, further emphasising the national character of Croatia. The SKH dismissed the proposal and drafted its own wording, arguing it was a compromise. Ultimately passed, the SKH's amendment mentioned the Croatian Serbs specifically but defined Croatia as a "national state" of the Croats, avoiding use of the exact same phrase for the Croatian Serbs.{{efn|The amendment defined the Socialist Republic of Croatia as "the national state of the Croatian nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia, and state of the nationalities inhabiting it."{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=239–240}}}} The meaning of this difference in formulations was not explained in the text of the constitution.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=239–240}} By mid-September 1971, ethnic tensions had worsened to the point that in northern Dalmatia, some Serb and Croat villagers took up arms in fear of each other.{{sfn|Swain|2011|p=172}}

===Outside Croatia===
[[File:Ban Jelačić statue which used to be on the north facing the south and was changed with the breakup of Yugoslavia (13023759645).jpg|thumb|An unsuccessful attempt was made during the Croatian Spring to restore the monument to [[Josip Jelačić]] to [[Ban Jelačić Square|Zagreb's central square]].|alt=Photograph of an equestrian monument to Josip Jelačić]]
In February 1971, the Croatian nationalist émigré magazine {{lang|hr|Hrvatska država}}, printed by [[Branimir Jelić]] in [[West Berlin]], published a story attributed to its [[Moscow]] correspondent claiming that the [[Warsaw Pact]] would help Croatia achieve its independence, granting it a status comparable to that [[Finlandization|enjoyed by Finland at the time]]. The article also stated that the SKH was collaborating with Ustaše émigrés. The Yugoslav Military Mission in Berlin reported the story to the [[KOS (Yugoslavia)|military intelligence service]] along with the names of alleged Ustaše émigré operatives in Croatia. The report was initially believed,{{sfn|Swain|2011|pp=169–170}} leading the Yugoslav authorities to become concerned that the Soviet Union might be instigating and aiding the SKH and the Ustaše émigrés.{{sfn|Kullaa|2012|p=105}} A federal investigation concluded on 7 April that the story was false, and the authorities decided to bury the affair. Immediately, the SKH announced that foreign and domestic enemies of the SKH stood behind the allegations. The same day, [[Vladimir Rolović]], the Yugoslav ambassador to [[Sweden]], was mortally wounded in [[1971 Yugoslav Embassy shooting|an unrelated attack by Ustaše émigrés]], further escalating tensions.{{sfn|Swain|2011|pp=169–170}} According to Dabčević-Kučar, the SKH leadership treated the enthusiasm of the émigrés with suspicion, believing it to be linked with the Yugoslav State Security Administration, and also because their activity weakened the SKH's position.{{sfn|Bing|2012|p=369}}

Even though the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina was cautious in its response to the SKH's January 1970 shift towards {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}}'s positions,{{sfn|Kamberović|2012|p=141}} relations became much tenser, primarily reflected through texts published by {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}} journals and {{lang|bs|[[Oslobođenje]]}}, the newspaper of record in Bosnia and Herzegovina.{{sfn|Kamberović|2012|p=143}} The leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina initially distinguished between the positions of the SKH and those held by {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}}, but this distinction eroded over time.{{sfn|Kamberović|2012|pp=144–145}} In September, {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}} expanded its work to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the [[Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina|Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina]], claiming Croats were underrepresented in government institutions there due to policies implemented during Ranković's tenure. By November 1971, Croatian nationalists advocated annexing a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia to rectify the situation. In response, Serbian nationalists claimed other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Serbia.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=251–253}} Officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina responded by prohibiting the establishment of {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}} branches within the republic.{{sfn|Kamberović|2012|p=143}}

===Foreign policy considerations===
[[File:Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev - Flickr - The Central Intelligence Agency.jpg|left|thumb|[[Leonid Brezhnev]] offered [[Josip Broz Tito]] Soviet assistance in 1970.|alt=Photograph of Leonid Brezhnev seated at a desk, facing the camera]]
During a meeting of the SKJ leadership at the [[Brijuni Islands]] on 28–30 April 1971, Tito received a telephone call from [[List of leaders of the Soviet Union|Soviet leader]] [[Leonid Brezhnev]]. According to Tito, Brezhnev offered help to resolve the political crisis in Yugoslavia, and Tito declined. The offer was likened by the SKH and by Tito to Brezhnev's call to the First Secretary of the [[Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]] [[Alexander Dubček]] in 1968 ahead of the [[Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia]]—as being a threat of imminent Warsaw Pact invasion. Some members of the SKH Central Committee suggested that Tito invented it to strengthen his position, but the [[First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union]] [[Dmitry Polyansky]] confirmed the conversation took place.{{sfn|Batović|2017|pp=182–185}}

Aiming to improve the United States' position in the [[Mediterranean]] area following the [[Black September]] crisis in [[Jordan]], the [[President of the United States|United States President]] [[Richard Nixon]] toured several countries in the region.{{sfn|Batović|2017|pp=142–152}} Nixon's [[state visit]] to Yugoslavia lasted from 30 September until 2 October 1970 and included a trip to Zagreb, where Nixon sparked controversy in a toast at the [[Banski dvori]], the seat of the Croatian government.{{sfn|Jakovina|1999|pp=347–348}} His toast ended with the words "Long live Croatia! Long live Yugoslavia!", which were interpreted variously as a show of support for the [[independence of Croatia]], or alternatively as just a [[common courtesy]]. The Yugoslav ambassador to the United States interpreted the episode as strategic positioning for a breakup of Yugoslavia.{{sfn|Batović|2017|pp=151–152}}

Brezhnev visited Yugoslavia from 22 to 25 September 1971 amid continuing tension between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union following the 1968 invasion of [[Czechoslovakia]]. Brezhnev offered a friendship agreement, but Tito declined to sign it to avoid appearing to move closer to the [[Eastern Bloc]].{{sfn|Batović|2017|pp=195–198}} Yugoslav officials notified Nixon through [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[William P. Rogers]] that the meeting with Brezhnev did not go well. An official visit of Tito to the United States was arranged to reassure Tito of the United States' political, economic, and military support for Yugoslavia. Nixon and Tito met on 30 October in [[Washington, D.C.]]{{sfn|Batović|2017|pp=198–202}}