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Dual-coding theory
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==Alternative theory== Dual-coding theory is not accepted by everyone. [[John Robert Anderson (psychologist)|John Anderson]] and [[Gordon H. Bower|Gordon Bower]] proposed an alternative method β the propositional theory β of how knowledge is mentally represented. The propositional theory claims that mental representations are stored as propositions rather than as images. Here, proposition is defined as the meaning that underlies the relationship between concepts. The propositional theory is able to explain the basic concept of an idea without needing images or verbal information. It is able to take the complex and break it down more into the differing components of the idea or concept.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Friedenberg, Jay.|title=Cognitive science : an introduction to the study of mind|date=2016|publisher=Sage|isbn=978-1-4833-4741-7|oclc=989659597}}</ref> This theory states that images occur as a result of other cognitive processes because knowledge is not represented in the form of images, words, or symbols. This theory is also related to A Natural Deduction Systems model. This type of model allows for both feed forward and its reverse. The [[common coding theory]] has also been proposed as an alternative to dual coding theory. The common coding theory looks at how things we see and hear are connected to our motor actions. It claims that there is a common code that is shared between perceiving something and the respective motor action.
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