Editing Economic sanctions (section)

===Effectiveness of economic sanctions===
According to a study by Neuenkirch and Neumeier, UN economic sanctions had a [[Statistical significance|statistically significant]] impact on targeted states by reducing their GDP growth by an average of 2.3–3.5% per year—and more than 5% per year in the case of comprehensive UN embargoes—with the negative effects typically persisting for a period of ten years. By contrast, unilateral US sanctions had a considerably smaller impact on GDP growth, restricting it by 0.5–0.9% per year, with an average duration of seven years.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last1=Neuenkirch |first1=Matthias |last2=Neumeier |first2=Florian |date=2015-12-01 |title=The impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth |journal=European Journal of Political Economy |volume=40 |pages=110–125 |doi=10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.09.001 |issn=0176-2680 |url=http://www.fiw.ac.at/fileadmin/Documents/Publikationen/Working_Paper/N_138_NeuenkirchNeumeier.pdf}}</ref>

Oryoie, A. R. demonstrates that economic sanctions result in welfare losses across all income groups in Iran, with wealthier groups suffering greater losses compared to poorer groups.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Oryoie |first=Ali Reza |date=2024-06-06 |title=The impact of international sanctions on income mobility: Evidence from Iran |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.13123 |journal=Review of Development Economics |language=en |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=1695–1717 |doi=10.1111/rode.13123 |issn=1363-6669|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Imposing sanctions on an opponent also affects the economy of the imposing country to a degree. If import restrictions are promulgated, consumers in the imposing country may have restricted choices of goods. If export restrictions are imposed or if sanctions prohibit companies in the imposing country from trading with the target country, the imposing country may lose markets and investment opportunities to competing countries.<ref>{{cite web |last= Griswold |first= Daniel |url= http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |title= Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. More than Foes |publisher= Cato.org |date= 2000-11-27 |access-date= 2015-03-30 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20110923164257/http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-date= 2011-09-23 |url-status= dead }}</ref>

Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (2008) argue that [[regime change]] is the most frequent foreign-policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for just over 39 percent of cases of their imposition.<ref>
{{cite book |last1 = Hufbauer |first1 = Gary Clyde |last2 = Schott |first2 = Jeffrey J. |last3 = Elliott |first3 = Kimberly Ann |last4 = Oegg |first4 = Barbara |title = Economic Sanctions Reconsidered |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=crSxDQAAQBAJ |edition = 3 |location = Washington, DC |publisher = Columbia University Press |date = 2008 |page = 67 |isbn = 9780881324822 |access-date = 2018-05-10 |quote = By far, regime change is the most frequent foreign policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for 80 out of the 204 observations.}}</ref> Hufbauer et al. found that 34 percent of the cases studied were successful.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hufbauer |first1=Gary Clyde |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g-uzlJDD7DwC |title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered |last2=Schott |first2=Jeffrey J. |last3=Elliott |first3=Kimberly Ann |last4=Oegg |first4=Barbara |publisher=Peterson Institute |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-88132-536-2 |pages=158 |language=en}}</ref> However, when [[Robert A.&nbsp;Pape]] examined their study, he found that only 5 of their reported 40 successes were actually effective,<ref>
{{cite journal |last1 = Pape |first1 = Robert A. |title = Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work |jstor = 2539263 |journal = International Security |date = Summer 1998 |volume = 23 |issue = 1 |pages = 66–77 |doi = 10.1162/isec.23.1.66 |s2cid = 57565095 |quote = I examined the 40 claimed successes and found that only 5 stand up. Eighteen were actually settled by either direct or indirect use of force; in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target state made the demanded concessions; 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions, and 3 are indeterminate. If I am right, then sanctions have succeeded in only 5 of 115 attempts, and thus there is no sound basis for even qualified optimism about the effects of sanctions.}}</ref> reducing the success rate to 4%. In either case, the difficulty and unexpected nuances of measuring the actual success of sanctions in relation to their goals are both increasingly apparent and still under debate. In other words, it is difficult to determine ''why'' a regime or country changes (i.e., whether it was the sanction or inherent instability) and doubly so to measure the full political effect of a given action.<ref>''A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions: International Relations, Law, and Development'', Golnoosh Hakimdavar, p.&nbsp;105.</ref>

Offering an explanation as to why sanctions are still imposed even when they may be marginally effective, British diplomat [[Jeremy Greenstock]] suggests sanctions are popular not because they are known to be effective, but because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government".<ref name="greenstock">{{cite news |last=Marcus |first=Jonathan |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10742109 |title=Analysis: Do economic sanctions work? |work=BBC News |date=26 July 2010 |access-date=2015-03-30}}</ref> Critics of sanctions like Belgian jurist [[Marc Bossuyt]] argue that in nondemocratic regimes, the extent to which this affects political outcomes is contested, because by definition such regimes do not respond as strongly to the popular will.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Capdevila |first1=Gustavo |title=United Nations: US Riled by Economic Sanctions Report |url=https://www.iatp.org/news/united-nations-us-riled-by-economic-sanctions-report |publisher=Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy |access-date=20 June 2020 |date=18 August 2000}}</ref>

A strong connection has been found between the effectiveness of sanctions and the size of veto players in a government. Veto players represent individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo, for example, parties in a coalition, or the legislature's check on presidential powers. When sanctions are imposed on a country, it can try to mitigate them by adjusting its economic policy. The size of the veto players determines how many constraints the government will face when trying to change status quo policies, and the larger the size of the veto players, the more difficult it is to find support for new policies, thus making the sanctions more effective.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Peksen |first1=Dursun |last2=Jeong |first2=Jin Mun |date=30 August 2017 |title=Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=63 |pages=194–217 |doi=10.1177/0022002717728105 |s2cid=158050636 |via=Sage Journals}}</ref>

Francesco Giumelli writes that the "set of sanctions&nbsp;... that many observers would be likely to consider the most persuasive (and effective)", namely, UN sanctions against "[[central bank]] assets and [[sovereign wealth fund]]s", are "of all the types of measures applied&nbsp;... the one least frequently used".<ref name="Giumelli 2015"/> Giumelli also distinguishes between sanctions against international terrorists, in which "the nature of the request is not as important as the constraining aspect", and sanctions imposed in connection with "post-conflict scenarios", which should "include flexible demands and the potential for adaptation if the situation changes".<ref name="Giumelli 2015"/>

Economic sanctions can be used for achieving domestic and international purposes.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Whang |first1=Taehee |date=2011-09-01 |title=Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States |url=https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/55/3/787/1834344  |journal=International Studies Quarterly |publisher=Ingentaconnect.com |volume=55 |issue=3 |pages=787–801 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00668.x |access-date=2015-03-30|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Foreign [[aid]] suspensions are typically considered as a type of economic sanctions. Previously mentioned work by Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot, and Oegg is a prominent example.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hufbauer |last2=Schott |last3=Elliott |last4=Oegg |title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered  |date=2007 |publisher=Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) |isbn=978-0-88132-408-2 |edition=3rd |location=Washington, DC}}</ref> [[Claas Mertens]] finds that "suspending aid is more effective than adopting economic sanctions because (1) aid suspensions are economically beneficial for the adopting state, while sanctions are costly, (2) aid suspensions directly affect the targeted government's budget, (3) market forces undermine sanctions but not aid suspensions, and (4) aid suspensions are less likely to spark adverse behavioral reactions. [...] The findings suggest that economic sanctions are less effective than previously thought and that large donor states have a higher chance of achieving political goals through economic coercion."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mertens |first=Claas |date=28 March 2024 |title=Carrots as Sticks: How Effective Are Foreign Aid Suspensions and Economic Sanctions? |journal=International Studies Quarterly |volume=68 |issue=2|doi=10.1093/isq/sqae016 |doi-access=free }}</ref>