Editing Epicurus (section)

==Philosophy==
{{main|Epicureanism}}

===Physics===
{{further|Ancient atomism}}
Epicurus believed in an eternal universe, where anything that comes into being must come from something that exists, all that is destroyed does not cease to exist, but all that exists always will.{{sfn|Long|Sedley|1987|p=26}} He held that this universe consists of two things; matter and void.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=11–13}} Matter is made up of atoms, tiny bodies that are unable to be broken down into smaller parts, that only have the unchanging qualities of shape, size, and weight.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=18–21}} There are an infinite number of these atoms, though only a finite number of types, and an infinite amount of void. Because of the infinite supply of atoms, there are an infinite number of worlds, each separated from each other by vast areas of void, some of which could be vastly different from our own.{{sfn|Wilson|2015|p=9}}

The atoms are in constant motion through the void, moving in one of four different ways. They can collide with each other, either bouncing back, or joining together and vibrating to maintain the overall shape of the larger object.{{sfn|Wilson|2015|p=11}} When not prevented by other atoms, all atoms naturally move at the same speed downwards in relation to the rest of the world, though they must also occasionally "[[clinamen|swerve]]" randomly out of their usual path; without the swerving motion, atoms would never collide with each other from their parallel trajectory downwards.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=25–28}} Epicurus argued that the swerve, which was absent in [[Democritus]]' earlier [[Democritean theory of atoms|atomic theory]], was also what accounted for humanity's free will; if it were not for the swerve, humans would be subject to a never-ending chain of cause and effect.{{sfn|Sharples|1996|pp=64-66}}

Epicurus also believed that senses also relied on atoms; which were constantly being emitted from every object. Atoms themselves, which only had size, shape, and weight, did not possess the qualities, such as redness, that are perceived by the senses, but instead caused the observer to experience them in their mind. Because the atoms move sufficient quickly, this is experienced as a continuous sensation of vision.{{sfn|Wilson|2015|pp=54–55}}

===Epistemology===
Epicurus considered [[sense perception]] to be the foundation of knowledge. Although he had explained perception in terms of his atomic theory, he also designed his theory of knowledge to be independent of his atomism, as he intended it to serve as justification for his philosophy of nature. Since Epicurus believed that sense perceptions were the basis of our knowledge, errors can only arise in how we judge those perceptions; although the senses sometimes receive contradictory information, they are the only means by which we receive information from the external world, and, recognizing the limits of our senses, it is necessary to use reason (''[[dianoia]]'') in order to organize the information we receive and determine whether our sense-organs are functioning correctly. However, reason still ultimately depends on the senses; Epicurus did not believe in the existence of [[abstract objects]] such as [[Plato]]'s [[Theory of Forms]] that are derived entirely from thought.{{sfn|Striker|2020|pp=48-49}}

==== Criteria of truth ====
In order to make judgements about the information we receive from our senses, Epicurus proposed three [[Problem of the criterion|criteria of truth]] which constituted the method through which  we gain knowledge:{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|page=85}} sensations (''aisthêsis''), preconceptions (''prolepsis''), and feelings (''pathê'').{{sfn|Asmis|2009|pp=93=94}} 

Sensations are the first and main criterion of truth for Epicureans; when judgments about things are formed, they can be verified or corrected through further closer examination,{{sfn|O'Keefe| 2010 | pp=97–98}} which eventually allows the observer to obtain "clear vision" (''enargeia''), a sensation of an object that is unchanged by further judgments or opinions and is a clear and direct perception of that object.{{sfn|Asmis|2009|p=85}}{{sfn|Sharples|1996|p=12-16}} 

Preconceptions, Epicurus' second criterion of truth, are the concepts of what different things are that are formed in a person's mind through prior sense data, the background knowledge required for learning which allows an observer to make judgments about the things that are perceived.When a word that relates to the preconception is used, these preconceptions are summoned up by the mind into the person's thoughts.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=101–104}} 

Epicurus' third criterion of truth are "choices and avoidances" which are the feelings of pleasure and pain which determine our actions. If something is pleasurable, we pursue that thing, and if something is painful, we avoid that thing. They are analogous to sensations in that they are a means of perception, but they perceive our internal state as opposed to external things.{{sfn|Asmis|2009|pp=93=94}}

==== Principle of Multiple Explanations ====
{{anchor|Principle of Multiple Explanations}}
Epicurus applied his theory of knowledge to his understanding of nature; for understanding natural phenomena, we cannot rely on direct sense impressions alone, but must rely on inferences based on preconceptions. Hypotheses about phenomena that cannot be directly observed must be tested via relation to known observable facts, from which they are considered either contested or non-contested; a hypothesis that is not observable can be accepted as true if it is not contested by any explanations or observable phenomena.{{sfn|Striker|2020|pp=52-56}}

However, a hypothesis can still be contested by other explanations without being directly ''contradicted'' by observable phenomena, so long as it is inconsistent with other potential explanations for how similar phenomena that can be closely observed are produced. For example, with the existence of atoms and void, Epicurus argues that there are no other possible explanations for the world we observe, so we must accept them as true. On the other hand, for various meteorological and cosmological phenomena, such as thunder and lightning or the waxing and waning of the moon and the motions of the stars, Epicurus produces several different possible explanations for the causes underlying the observed phenomena. Since none of the multiple explanations proposed can be verified or falsified, we must list them all and consider each of them to be possible, and cannot accept any of them as true.{{sfn|Striker|2020|pp=52-56}}

Although Epicurus conceded that it may not be feasible to exhaustively list all possible causes, he believed it is still preferable to list several, rather than one, as becoming fixated on one possible explanation for all phenomena allows for the possibility of [[mythology]] and [[divine intervention]] as explanations, despite the fact that these have never been directly observed.{{sfn|Striker|2020|pp=52-56}}

==== Epilogism ====
{{main|Epilogism}}
In addition to deductions based on the criteria of truth and inference of explanations based on observation, Epicurus also used a proof-free method of philosophical argumentation which he called ''[[Epilogism]]'' ({{lang|grc|ἐπίλογισμός}}), often translated as "appraisal" or "assessment," which was intended to provide insight via reflection when neither observation nor preconceptions about a given phenomena could provide a consistent answer. For example, Epicurus claimed that although we do not have a preconception of time as an independent object, we nonetheless speak of having "a lot of time" or "little time" and we can arrive at a better understanding of how we conceive of time falling into discrete periods by reflecting on what we mean when we say "a lot of time." Epicurus also argued that we can arrive at insight on the relations between pleasure and pain, desire, and happiness through an assessment of our own sense experience, preconceptions and feelings beyond what we already know from them alone.{{sfn|Striker|2020|pp=56-58}}

===Ethics===
{{Hedonism}}
Epicurus was a [[Hedonism|hedonist]], meaning he taught that what is pleasurable is morally good and what is painful is morally evil. For his ethical system he redefined "pleasure" as the absence of suffering and taught that all humans should seek to attain the state of ''[[ataraxia]]'', meaning "untroubledness", a state in which the person is completely free from all pain or suffering.{{sfn|Barnes|1986}}

Epicureans had a very specific understanding of what the greatest pleasure was, and the focus of their ethics was on the avoidance of pain rather than seeking out pleasure.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=117–121}} As evidence for this, Epicureans say that nature seems to command us to avoid pain, and they point out that all animals try to avoid pain as much as possible.{{sfn|Wilson|2015|p=93}}

Epicureanism divided pleasure into two broad categories: ''pleasures of the body'' and ''pleasures of the mind''. ''Pleasures of the body'' involve sensations of the body, such as the act of eating delicious food or of being in a state of comfort free from pain, and exist only in the present. One can only experience pleasures of the body in the moment, meaning they only exist as a person is experiencing them. ''Pleasures of the mind'' involve mental processes and states; feelings of joy, the lack of fear, and pleasant memories are all examples of pleasures of the mind. These pleasures of the mind exist not only in the present, but also in the past and future, since memory of a past pleasant experience or the expectation of some potentially pleasing future can both be pleasurable experiences. Because of this, the pleasures of the mind are considered to be greater than those of the body.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=117–121}} Emphasis was placed on pleasures of the mind rather than on physical pleasures.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=107–115}}

The Epicureans further divided each of these types of pleasures into two categories: ''kinetic pleasure'' and ''katastematic pleasure''. ''Kinetic pleasure'' is the physical or mental pleasures that involve action or change. Eating delicious food, as well as fulfilling desires and removing pain, which is itself considered a pleasurable act, are all examples of kinetic pleasure in the physical sense. According to Epicurus, feelings of joy would be an example of mental kinetic pleasure. ''Katastematic pleasure'' is the pleasure one feels while in a state without pain. Like kinetic pleasures, katastematic pleasures can also be physical, such as the state of not being thirsty, or mental, such as freedom from a state of fear. While the pursuit of pleasure formed the focal point of the philosophy, this was largely directed to the "katastematic pleasures" of minimizing pain, anxiety and suffering. From this understanding, Epicureans concluded that the greatest pleasure a person could reach was the absence of pain, [[aponia]], and lack of disturbance of mind, [[ataraxia]], and, therefore, the ultimate goal then of Epicurean ethics was to reach a state of ''aponia'' and ''ataraxia''.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=117–121}}

In order to do this an Epicurean had to control their desires, because desire itself was seen as painful. Not only will controlling one's desires bring about ''aponia'', as one will rarely suffer from not being physically satisfied, but controlling one's desires will also help to bring about ''ataraxia'' because one will not be anxious about becoming discomforted since one would have so few desires anyway. The Epicureans divide desires into three classes: natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, and vain and empty:{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=124–127}}
*''Natural and necessary'': These desires are limited desires that are innately present in all humans; it is part of human nature to have them. They are necessary for one of three reasons: necessary for happiness, necessary for freedom from bodily discomfort, and necessary for life. Clothing and shelter would belong to the first two categories, while something like food would belong to the third.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=124–127}}
*''Natural but not necessary'': These desires are innate to humans, but they do not need to be fulfilled for their happiness or their survival. Wanting to eat delicious food when one is hungry is an example of a natural but not necessary desire. The main problem with these desires is that they fail to substantially increase a person's happiness, and at the same time require effort to obtain and are desired by people due to false beliefs that they are actually necessary. It is for this reason that they should be avoided.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=124–127}}
*''Vain and empty'': These desires are neither innate to humans nor required for happiness or health; indeed, they are also limitless and can never be fulfilled. Desires of wealth or fame would fall in this class, and such desires are to be avoided because they will ultimately only bring about discomfort.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=124–127}}

If one follows only natural and necessary desires, then, according to Epicurus, one would be able to reach ''aponia'' and ''ataraxia'' and thereby the highest form of happiness. Unnecessary and, especially, artificially produced desires were to be suppressed.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=124–127}}

===Politics===
Epicurus laid great emphasis on developing friendships as the basis of a satisfying life. The avoidance or freedom from hardship and fear is ideal to the Epicureans. While this avoidance or freedom could conceivably be achieved through political means, Epicurus insisted that involvement in politics would not release one from fear and he advised against a life of politics. Epicurus also discouraged contributing to political society by starting a family, as the benefits of a wife and children are outweighed by the trouble brought about by having a family. Instead Epicurus encouraged a formation of a community of friends outside the traditional political state. This community of virtuous friends would focus on internal affairs and justice. However, Epicureanism is adaptable to circumstance as is the Epicurean approach to politics. The same approaches will not always work in protection from pain and fear. In some situations it will be more beneficial to have a family and in other situations it will be more beneficial to participate in politics. It is ultimately up to the Epicurean to analyse their circumstance and take whatever action befits the situation.{{sfn|Brown|2009|pp=182-184}}

Epicurus was also an early thinker to develop the notion of justice as a [[social contract]], and in part attempts to address issues with the society described in [[Plato]]'s ''[[Republic (Plato)|Republic]]''. The social contract theory established by Epicureanism is based on mutual agreement, not divine decree. He defined justice as an agreement made by people not to harm each other. The point of living in a society with laws and punishments is to be protected from harm so that one is free to pursue happiness. Because of this, laws that do not contribute to promoting human happiness are not just. He gave his own unique version of the [[ethic of reciprocity]], which differs from other formulations by emphasizing minimizing harm and maximizing happiness for oneself and others.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=139–142}}

The Epicurean understanding of [[justice]] was inherently self-interested. Justice was deemed good because it was seen as mutually beneficial. Individuals would not act unjustly even if the act was initially unnoticed because of possibly being caught and punished. Both punishment and fear of punishment would cause a person disturbance and prevent them from being happy.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=142–145}} 

Epicurean ideas on politics disagree with other philosophical traditions, namely the Stoic, Platonist and [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian]] traditions.{{sfn|Brown|2009|p=179}} To Epicureans all our social relations are a matter of how we perceive each other, of customs and traditions. No one is inherently of higher value or meant to dominate another.{{sfn|Wilson|2015}} That is because there is no metaphysical basis for the superiority of one kind of person, all people are made of the same atomic material and are thus naturally equal.{{sfn|Wilson|2015}}  Epicureans also discourage political participation and other involvement in politics.{{sfn|Wilson|2015}} However Epicureans are not [[apolitical]]; it is possible that some political association could be seen as beneficial by some Epicureans. Some political associations could lead to certain benefits to the individual that would help to maximize pleasure and avoid physical or mental distress.{{sfn|Brown|2009|p=179}}

===Theology===
Epicurus does not deny the existence of the gods; rather he denies their involvement in the world. According to Epicureanism, the gods do not interfere with human lives or the rest of the universe in any way{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=155–156}} – thus, it shuns the idea that frightening weather events are divine retribution.{{sfn|Taub|2009|p=124}} One of the fears the Epicurean ought to be freed from is fear relating to the actions of the gods.{{sfn|Taub|2009|p=105}}

The manner in which the Epicurean gods exist is still disputed. Some scholars say that Epicureanism believes that the gods exist outside the mind as material objects (the [[Philosophical realism|realist]] position), while others assert that the gods only exist in our minds as ideals (the [[Idealism|idealist]] position). The realist position holds that Epicureans understand the gods as existing as physical and immortal beings made of atoms that reside somewhere in reality. However, the gods are completely separate from the rest of reality; they are uninterested in it, play no role in it, and remain completely undisturbed by it. Instead, the gods live in what is called the ''metakosmia'', or the space between worlds. Contrarily, the idealist (sometimes called the "non-realist position" to avoid confusion) position holds that the gods are just idealized forms of the best human life, and it is thought that the gods were emblematic of the life one should aspire towards. While a scholarly consensus has yet to be reached, the realist position remains the prevailing viewpoint at this time.{{sfn|Sedley|2011|pp=29-30}}{{sfn|Konstan|2011|pp=53-54}}

====Epicurean paradox<!--'Epicurean paradox', 'Riddle of Epicurus', and 'Epicurus' trilemma' redirect here-->====
{{main|Epicurean paradox}}
{{Theodicy}}
The Epicurean paradox is a version of the [[problem of evil]]. [[Lactantius]] attributes this [[trilemma]] to Epicurus in ''De Ira Dei'', 13, 20-21:

<blockquote>
God, he says, either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is [[wikt:envious|envious]], which is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils? Or why does He not remove them?
</blockquote>

Although no extant writings of Epicurus contain this argument, it is possible that some form of this argument may have been found in his lost treatise ''On the Gods''. However, since Epicurus did believe in the existence of gods, if he really did make some form of this argument, it would have been an argument against divine providence, the idea that the gods interfere in the world.{{sfn|Hickson|2014}}

=== Death ===
Epicurus rejected [[immortality]]. Epicureans believe in the soul, but Epicureanism suggests that the soul is mortal and material, just like the body.{{sfn|Wilson|2015|p=52}} Epicurus rejected any possibility of an afterlife, while still contending that one need not fear death: "Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved, is without sensation, and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us."<ref>Russell, Bertrand.  [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ey94E3sOMA0C ''A History of Western Philosophy''], [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ey94E3sOMA0C&q=A+History+of+Western+Philosophy pp. 239–40]</ref> From this doctrine arose the Epicurean Epitaph: ''Non fui, fui, non sum, non curo'' ("I was not; I have been; I am not; I do not mind."), which is inscribed on the gravestones of his followers and seen on many ancient gravestones of the [[Roman Empire]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2015-06-26 |title=Death is Not the End |url=https://catholicexchange.com/death-is-not-the-end/ |access-date=2023-09-14 |website=Catholic Exchange |language=en-US}}</ref>