Editing Experience (section)

=== Intentionality ===
Most experiences, especially the ones of the perceptual kind, aim at representing reality. This is usually expressed by stating that they have [[intentionality]] or are about their intentional object.<ref name="Representation in Mind">{{cite book |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |title=Representation in Mind |date=1 January 2004 |publisher=Elsevier |pages=107–124 |chapter-url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780080443942500099 |language=en |chapter=Chapter 6 - Representation and Experience|doi=10.1016/B978-008044394-2/50009-9 |isbn=9780080443942 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Pitt |first1=David |title=Mental Representation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=24 September 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> If they are successful or veridical, they represent the world as it actually is. But they may also fail, in which case they give a false representation. It is traditionally held that all experience is intentional.<ref name="Smith"/> This thesis is known as "intentionalism".<ref name="Crane">{{cite book |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |title=The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind |publisher=Oxford: Oxford University Press |pages=474–93 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CRAI-17 |chapter=Intentionalism|year=2009 }}</ref><ref name="Siewert">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Siewert |first1=Charles |title=Consciousness and Intentionality |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2017}}</ref> In this context, it is often claimed that all mental states, not just experiences, are intentional. But special prominence is usually given to experiences in these debates since they seem to constitute the most fundamental form of intentionality.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Strawson |first1=Galen |title=Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-927245-7 |url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.001.0001/acprof-9780199272457-chapter-3 |chapter=Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Kriegel |first1=Uriah |title=Phenomenal intentionality |date=2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |isbn=9780199764297 |chapter=Chapter 1: The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program}}</ref> It is commonly accepted that all experiences have phenomenal features, i.e. that there is something it is like to live through them. Opponents of intentionalism claim that not all experiences have intentional features, i.e. that phenomenal features and intentional features can come apart.<ref name="Siewert"/><ref name="Chalmers">{{cite book |last1=Chalmers |first1=David J. |title=The Future for Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=153–181 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CHATRC |chapter=The Representational Character of Experience|year=2004 }}</ref> Some alleged counterexamples to intentionalism involve pure sensory experiences, like pain, of which it is claimed that they lack representational components.<ref name="Siewert"/> Defenders of intentionalism have often responded by claiming that these states have intentional aspects after all, for example, that pain represents bodily damage.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Park |first1=Thomas |title=Pain, Perception, and the Appearance-Reality Distinction |journal=Philosophical Analysis |date=2017 |volume=2017 |issue=38 |pages=205–237 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PARPPA-6}}</ref> [[Mystical experience|Mystical states of experience]] constitute another putative counterexample. In this context, it is claimed that it is possible to have experiences of ''pure consciousness'' in which awareness still exists but lacks any object. But evaluating this claim is difficult since such experiences are seen as extremely rare and therefore difficult to investigate.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Forman |first1=Robert Kc |title=The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=8 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FORIMC-2 |chapter=Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting|year=1990 }}</ref>