Editing False consensus effect (section)

== Major theoretical approaches ==
The false-consensus effect can be traced back to two parallel theories of [[social perception]], "the study of how we form impressions of and make inferences about other people".{{sfn|Aronson|Wilson|Akert|Sommers|2015|p=86}} The first is the idea of social comparison. The principal claim of [[Leon Festinger]]'s (1954) [[social comparison theory]] was that individuals evaluate their thoughts and attitudes based on other people.{{sfn|Bauman|Geher|2002|p=294}} This may be motivated by a desire for confirmation and the need to feel good about oneself. Informational social influence can be viewed as an extension of this theory, where people may use others as sources of information to define social reality and guide behavior. This is called [[informational social influence]].{{sfn|Aronson|Wilson|Akert|Sommers|2015|p=231}}{{sfn|Bauman|Geher|2002|p=293}} The problem, though, is that people are often unable to accurately perceive the social norm and the actual attitudes of others. In other words, research has shown that people are surprisingly poor "intuitive psychologists" and that our social judgments are often inaccurate.{{sfn|Bauman|Geher|2002|p=294}} This finding helped to lay the groundwork for an understanding of biased processing and inaccurate social perception. The false-consensus effect is just one example of such an inaccuracy.{{sfn|Bauman|Geher|2002|p=293}}

The second influential theory is [[Social projection|projection]], the idea that people project their own attitudes and beliefs onto others.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Robbins|first1=Jordan M.|last2=Krueger|first2=Joachim I.|date=2005|title=Social Projection to Ingroups and Outgroups: A Review and Meta-Analysis|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0901_3|journal=Personality and Social Psychology Review|volume=9|issue=1|pages=32–47|doi=10.1207/s15327957pspr0901_3|pmid=15745863 |s2cid=10229838 |issn=1088-8683|url-access=subscription}}</ref> This idea of projection is not a new concept. In fact, it can be found in [[Sigmund Freud]]'s work on the [[defense mechanism]] of projection, D.S. Holmes' work on "attributive projection" (1968), and Gustav Ichheiser's work on social perception (1970).{{sfn|Gilovich|1990}} D.S. Holmes, for example, described social projection as the process by which people "attempt to validate their beliefs by projecting their own characteristics onto other individuals".{{sfn|Bauman|Geher|2002|p=294}} In religious psychology, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) posited the Projection or Reflection theory of religion,<ref>{{Cite web |title=University of Toronto Libraries |url=https://login.library.utoronto.ca/index.php?url=https://doi.org/10.1163/1569206X-12341620 |access-date=2025-04-05 |website=library.utoronto.ca |language=en |doi=10.1163/1569206x-12341620}}</ref> in that human perceptions of the divine are projections of our own ideal qualities in order to conceptualize our aspirations.

Here, a connection can be made between the two stated theories of social comparison and projection. First, as social comparison theory explains, individuals constantly look to peers as a reference group and are motivated to do so in order to seek confirmation for their own attitudes and beliefs.{{sfn|Bauman|Geher|2002|p=294}}

The false-consensus effect, as defined by [[Lee Ross|Ross]], Greene, and House in 1977, came to be the culmination of the many related theories that preceded it. In their well-known series of four studies, Ross and associates hypothesized and then demonstrated that people tend to overestimate the popularity of their own beliefs and preferences.{{sfn|Ross|Greene|House|1977}} Studies were both conducted in hypothetical situations by questionnaire surveys and in authentic conflict situations. For questionnaire studies, participants were presented with hypothetical events and then were not only asked to indicate their own behavioral choices and characteristics under the provided circumstances, but also asked to rate the responses and traits of their peers who referred as "actors". As for real occasion studies, participants were actually confronted with the conflict situations in which they were asked to choose behavioral alternatives and to judge the traits as well as decisions of two supposedly true individuals who had attended in the study.{{sfn|Ross|Greene|House|1977}}  In general, the raters made more "extreme predictions" about the personalities of the actors that did not share the raters' own preference. In fact, the raters may have even thought that there was something wrong with the people expressing the alternative response.<ref name="psyblog" />

In the ten years after the influential Ross et al. study, close to 50 papers were published with data on the false-consensus effect.{{sfn|Marks|Miller|1987|p=72}} Theoretical approaches were also expanded. The theoretical perspectives of this era can be divided into four categories: (a) selective exposure and cognitive availability, (b) salience and focus of attention, (c) logical information processing, and (d) motivational processes.{{sfn|Marks|Miller|1987|p=72}} In general, the researchers and designers of these theories believe that there is not a single right answer. Instead, they admit that there is overlap among the theories and that the false-consensus effect is most likely due to a combination of these factors.{{sfn|Marks|Miller|1987}}

===Selective exposure and cognitive availability===
This theory is closely tied to the availability heuristic, which suggests that perceptions of similarity (or difference) are affected by how easily those characteristics can be recalled from memory.{{sfn|Marks|Miller|1987|p=72}} And as one might expect, similarities between oneself and others are more easily recalled than differences. This is in part because people usually associate with those who are similar to themselves. This selected exposure to similar people may bias or restrict the "sample of information about the true diversity of opinion in the larger social environment".{{sfn|Marks|Miller|1987|p=73}} As a result of the selective exposure and availability heuristic, it is natural for the similarities to prevail in one's thoughts.{{sfn|Marks|Miller|1987}}

{{harvtxt|Botvin et al.|1992}} did a popular study on the effects of the false-consensus effect among a specific adolescent community in an effort to determine whether students show a higher level of false-consensus effect among their direct peers as opposed to society at large.{{sfn|Bauman|Geher|2002}} The participants of this experiment were 203 college students ranging in age from 18 to 25 (with an average age of 18.5). The participants were given a questionnaire and asked to answer questions regarding a variety of social topics. For each social topic, they were asked to answer how they felt about the topic and to estimate the percentage of their peers who would agree with them. The results determined that the false-consensus effect was extremely prevalent when participants were describing the rest of their college community; out of twenty topics considered, sixteen of them prominently demonstrated the false-consensus effect. The high levels of false-consensus effect seen in this study can be attributed to the group studied; because the participants were asked to compare themselves to a group of peers that they are constantly around (and view as very similar to themselves), the levels of false-consensus effect increased.{{sfn|Bauman|Geher|2002}}

===Salience and focus of attention===
This theory suggests that when an individual focuses solely on their own preferred position, they are more likely to overestimate its popularity, thus falling victim to the false-consensus effect.{{sfn|Marks|Miller|1987|p=73}} This is because that position is the only one in their immediate consciousness. Performing an action that promotes the position will make it more salient and may increase the false-consensus effect. If, however, more positions are presented to the individual, the degree of the false-consensus effect might decrease significantly.{{sfn|Marks|Miller|1987|p=73}}

===Logical information processing===
This theory assumes that active and seemingly rational thinking underlies an individual's estimates of similarity among others.{{sfn|Marks|Miller|1987|p=73}} 
In a study done by Fox, Yinon, and Mayraz, researchers were attempting to determine whether or not the levels of the false-consensus effect changed in different age groups. In order to come to a conclusion, it was necessary for the researchers to split their participants into four different age groups. Two hundred participants were used, and gender was not considered to be a factor. Just as in the previous study mentioned, this study used a questionnaire as its main source of information. The results showed that the false-consensus effect was extremely prevalent in all groups, but was the most prevalent in the oldest age group (the participants who were labeled as "old-age home residents"). They showed the false-consensus effect in all 12 areas that they were questioned about. The increase in false-consensus effect seen in the oldest age group can be accredited to their high level of "logical" reasoning behind their decisions; the oldest age group has obviously lived the longest, and therefore feels that they can project their beliefs onto all age groups due to their (seemingly objective) past experiences and wisdom. The younger age groups cannot logically relate to those older to them because they have not had that experience and do not pretend to know these objective truths. These results demonstrate a tendency for older people to rely more heavily on situational attributions (life experience) as opposed to internal attributions.{{sfn|Yinon|Mayraz|Fox|1994}}

===Motivational processes===
This theory stresses the benefits of the false-consensus effect: namely, the perception of increased social validation, social support, and self-esteem. It may also be useful to exaggerate similarities in social situations in order to increase liking.{{sfn|Marks|Miller|1987|p=74}}