Editing First day on the Somme (section)

====French====
The offensives of 1915 showed that attacks would inevitably be slow and costly; on 8 January 1916, GQG issued "{{lang|fr|Instruction sur le combat offensif des petits unités}}" ("Instructions on Small Unit Offensive Operations") and "{{lang|fr|Instruction sur le combat offensif des grandes unités}}" on 26 January ("Instructions on large Unit Offensive Operations"). On 20 April, General [[Ferdinand Foch]], commander of {{lang|fr|Groupe d'armées du Nord}} (GAN, [[Army Group North (France)|Northern Army Group]]) issued "{{lang|fr|L'Instruction du Général Commandant du GAN sur le battaille offensif}}" ("The GAN Commander's Instruction on Offensive Battle") an {{nowrap|82-page}} pamphlet on the stages and processes of an attack on enemy positions prepared in depth.{{sfn|Gale|2018|p=293}} The pamphlet was a substantial revision of {{lang|fr|Note 5779}}, derived from "{{lang|fr|But et conditions d'une action offensive d'ensemble"}} (''Purpose and Conditions of Comprehensive Offensive Action'' 16 April 1915), a manual compiled from analysis of the fighting in 1914 and the basis of French offensive planning in 1915. Battle would now be methodical until the power of resistance of the defender was broken by "moral, material and physical degradation", while the attacker retained the ability to continue the offensive; a breakthrough was unlikely but not ruled out.{{sfn|Krause|2013|pp=4–5, 20}} Co-ordination of artillery and infantry was fundamental to the process, in which artillery would destroy defences and then infantry would occupy them, infantry objectives being determined by the capacity of artillery to prepare the way and limit casualties.{{sfn|Philpott|2009|pp=145–146}}

Artillery bombardments were to be co-ordinated with infantry attacks, various types of artillery being given targets suitable for their characteristics, for the cumulative destruction of field defences and the killing of German infantry. Heavy artillery and mortars were to be used for the destruction of field fortifications, howitzers and light mortars for the destruction of trenches, machine-gun and observation posts; heavy guns and mortars to destroy fortified villages and concrete strong points. Longer-range guns were to engage German artillery with counter-battery fire, to deprive German infantry of artillery support during the attack, when French infantry were at their most vulnerable. Wire cutting was to be performed by field artillery, firing [[high-explosive]] (HE) shells and supported by specialist wire-cutting sections of infantry, which would go out the night before an attack. During the attack, the field artillery would fire a linear barrage on trenches and the edges of woods and villages. Infantry tactics were to be based on reconnaissance, clear objectives, liaison with flanking units and the avoidance of disorganisation within attacking units. General attacks would need to be followed by the systematic capture of remaining defences to obtain jumping-off positions for the next general attack.{{sfn|Philpott|2009|pp=146–148}}