Editing Franz Halder (section)

=== Invasion of the Soviet Union ===
{{Main|Operation Barbarossa}}

On 30 March 1941 Halder attended the conference where Hitler described the planned invasion to about 200 senior ''Wehrmacht'' officers. He later wrote in his diary, summarising Hitler's remarks:
{{blockquote|We must forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A Communist is no comrade before or after the battle. This is a war of extermination. (...) Commanders must make the sacrifice of overcoming their personal scruples.{{sfn|Bellamy|2007|p=27}} }}

Halder was instrumental in the subsequent preparation and implementation of [[war crimes]] during the invasion of the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=101}} He had his staff draft both the [[Commissar Order]] and the [[Barbarossa Decree]] without Hitler's instruction or interference.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|pp=60–61}} The author of the orders was [[Eugen Müller]], who reported on his work directly to Halder.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=60}} The Commissar Order required political [[commissars]] to be executed immediately when captured.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=25}} Halder also insisted that a clause be added to the Barbarossa Decree giving officers the right to raze whole villages and execute the inhabitants.{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=101}} The decree freed soldiers from any form of prosecution for war crimes committed in the East.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=25}} The decree had no specific target: Soviet citizens could be killed at any time and for any reason.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=28}} Until this time only the SS could kill citizens without fear of later prosecution. These orders allowed officers throughout the army to execute citizens with no repercussions.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|pp=25–26}} [[Ulrich von Hassell]], discussing the orders given by Halder, said the conquered population were being controlled by [[despotism]]. He added that Germans were being turned into a type of being that previously existed only in enemy propaganda.{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=102}} [[Omer Bartov]] described the orders as "the barbarisation of warfare".{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=102}}

The offensive began on 22 June 1941 where the German forces initially met muted resistance. Halder brashly wrote in his diary on 3 July that the war was already won.{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=196}} [[Nicolaus von Below]] reported that this confidence was shared at Fuhrer Headquarters in the month of July.{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=197}} Halder's confidence was dashed with dramatic effect in early August with the arrival of new intelligence information from his [[Foreign Armies East]].{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=387}} He wrote in his diary on 11 August that he had underestimated the "Russian colossus".{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=388}} At the start of the campaign, he had reckoned the enemy had 200 divisions, but now 360 had been counted. He added: "We destroy a dozen of them, then the Russians put another dozen in their place."{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=388}} In mid-August, the German advance had stalled, and at the same time, effective long-term defence was impossible so far from friendly territory. Halder wrote of the situation: "Everything that has so far been achieved is for nothing."{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=396}} During that summer, Hitler and the Army General Staff led by Halder had been engaged in a long and divisive dispute over strategy.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=17}} By mid-September, it was clear  Operation Barbarossa had failed in its central objective to quickly overcome the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=17}}

==== Operation Typhoon ====
{{Main|Battle of Moscow}}
Operation Typhoon, the German offensive at the [[Battle of Moscow]], began on 2 October 1941.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=25}} In early October, the German forces encircled the bulk of the Soviet armies defending the capital city in the [[Battle of Moscow#Battles of Vyazma and Bryansk|Vyazma and Bryansk pocket]].{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=21}} Halder determined the strategy for Typhoon, and it was subsequently endorsed by Hitler.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=117}} Typhoon had the same basic flaw as Barbarossa; officers on the front line were unable to change Halder's objectives even when those objectives were impossible.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=117}}

The Barbarossa Decree and Commissar Order became a fundamental aspect of the battle for Moscow.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=24}} By this time, thousands of Soviet civilians and defenceless prisoners in already occupied Russia were being murdered every day.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=24}} The killings were unprecedented in the modern era and radicalised the defence of Moscow.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=24}} On 5 December Operation Typhoon was over. Halder wrote in his diary there was no more strength and a withdrawal may be necessary.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=308}} The withdrawal, when it came, was dictated by the Soviet army.{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=309}} The crisis on the battlefield prompted Hitler to remove von Brauchitsch and assume command of OKH himself.{{sfn|Wheeler-Bennett|1967|p=525}}

Halder vehemently pushed for a [[blitzkrieg]] assault on Moscow and believed if the capital could be taken the war would be won. However, he did not understand the fundamental underpinnings of blitzkrieg and the impossibility of carrying out a lightning war in the vast expanse of the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=446}} Even if Moscow had fallen, Stalin would have moved his base of operations farther east and the war would have continued.{{sfn|Fugate|1984|p=315}}

[[David Stahel]] writes: "The Soviet Union was nothing less than a militarised juggernaut and, while deeply wounded in Germany's 1941 campaign, there is no evidence to suggest it was about to collapse either politically or militarily."{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=448}} The responsibility for the failure fell on Halder, Hitler and [[Fedor von Bock]].{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=20}} The war in the Soviet Union and the winter that followed was one of the worst chapters in the history of the German army—there were over one million casualties.{{sfn|Citino|2007|p=9}}

==== Case Blue ====
{{Main|Case Blue}}
In the spring of 1942, Halder, along with the German high command, began planning a new ambitious offensive in the Soviet Union. This was despite the heavy losses the ''Wehrmacht'' had suffered in 1941. Under the code name "Case Blue", the plan envisaged an offensive against the southern sector of the front. The aim was to capture the Soviet oil fields in the [[Caucasus]].{{sfn|Citino|2007|pp=9–11, 86}} The directive for the offensive was issued by Hitler on 5 April 1942, envisaging a complex sequence of staggered operations.{{sfn|Citino|2007|pp=156–157}} The offensive began on 28 June 1942 and at the outset appeared successful; [[Friedrich Paulus]] cut through a defensive position with ease and Bock wrote: "There was nothing left: The enemy has not succeeded in organizing a new defense anywhere."{{sfn|Citino|2007|p=172}}

The Soviet army had adopted a new strategy known as the "[[elastic defence]]" that was highly uncharacteristic of prior engagements and left the German army closing in on an enemy that had already left.{{sfn|Citino|2007|p=173}} Confusion ensued leading to the failure of the campaign. Bock was removed as Commander of [[Army Group B]], replaced by [[Maximillian von Weichs]] and Halder was marginalised.{{sfn|Citino|2007|pp=176,180}} The relationship between Hitler and Halder became strained. Halder's diary entries became increasingly sarcastic, and Hitler mocked him. On one occasion Hitler said Halder had spent [[World War I]] in an office "sitting on that same swivel stool".{{sfn|Citino|2007|p=238}} On 24 September Hitler replaced Halder as Chief of Staff of the [[OKH]] with [[Kurt Zeitzler]] and retired him to the [[Führer Reserve]].{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=306}}