Editing German General Staff (section)

===Moltke the Elder===
[[File:Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke.jpg|right|thumb|General Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Chief of the General Staff from 1857 to 1888]]
In 1857, [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder]], a widely travelled officer who was a confidante of [[William I, German Emperor|King William I]], was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Under his control, the existing staff system was expanded and consolidated.

Each year, Moltke selected the best twelve graduates from the ''Kriegsakademie'' for his personal training as General Staff officers. They attended theoretical studies, annual manoeuvres, "[[Staff ride|war rides]]" (a system of tactical exercises without troops in the field) under Moltke himself, and war games and map exercises known as [[Kriegspiel (wargame)|''Kriegsspiele'']].<ref>McElwee, p.67</ref><ref>Howard, p.25</ref> Although these officers subsequently alternated between regimental and staff duties, they could be relied upon to think and act exactly as Moltke had taught them when they became the Chiefs of Staff of major formations. Moltke himself referred to them as the "nervous system" of the Prussian Army. In the victories which the Prussian Army was to gain against [[Austrian Empire]] and [[France]], Moltke needed only to issue brief directives expressing his intentions to the main formations, leaving the staffs at the subordinate headquarters to implement the details according to the doctrines and methods he had laid down, while the Supreme Commands of his opponents became bogged down in mountains of paperwork and trivia as they tried to control the entire army from a single overworked headquarters.<ref>McElwee, p.50</ref>

Moltke's wide experience also prompted the General Staff to consider fields of study outside the purely military, and rapidly adapt them to military use. Immediately upon his appointment, he established the ''Abteilung'' (section or department) which studied and promoted the development of railway networks within Prussia and incorporated them into its deployment plans. He also formed telegraphic, and other scientific and technical departments within the General Staff<ref>McElwee, p. 107</ref> and a Historical division, which analysed past and current conflicts and published accounts of them and lessons learned.

The General Staff reformed by Moltke was the most effective in Europe, an autonomous institution dedicated solely to the efficient execution of war, unlike in other countries, whose staffs were often fettered by meddling courtiers, parliaments and government officials. On the contrary, the General Staff itself had a powerful effect on Prussian, and later German, politics.<ref>Wawro, pp. 283–284</ref>

====War with Denmark====
The [[Second Schleswig War]] (1864), the political origins of which lay in [[Denmark]]'s conflict with Prussia and Austria over the [[Schleswig–Holstein question]], vindicated Moltke's concepts of operations and led to an overhaul of the command arrangements of the Prussian Army. Moltke envisaged a rapid attack to prevent the Danes falling back behind water obstacles which the Prussian Navy could not overcome. A rigid system of seniority placed [[Friedrich Graf von Wrangel]], widely regarded as being in his dotage, in command. He ignored all of Moltke's directives and his own staff's advice, and by allowing the Danish Army to withdraw at its leisure he prolonged the war for several months. The resulting ''post mortem'' was to ensure a better (though not infallible) system for appointing commanders.

====Seven Weeks' War====
The [[Austro-Prussian War]] (1866) became almost inevitable after the end of hostilities with Denmark. Many Prussians regarded the war as a sad necessity. Moltke, describing his reasons for confidence to War Minister [[Albrecht von Roon]], stated "We have the inestimable advantage of being able to carry our Field Army of 285,000 men over five railway lines and of virtually concentrating them in twenty-five days ... Austria has only one railway line and it will take her forty-five days to assemble 200,000 men." Although there were inevitable mistakes and confusion on the battlefield, Moltke's pre-war calculations were proved correct, and the Austrian army was brought to battle at [[Battle of Königgrätz|Königgrätz]] and destroyed.

In contrast to the Prussian staff, Austrian staff officers gained their posts either by membership of the [[Austrian nobility]] and a desire to avoid tedious regimental duties, or after uninspiring training which made them into plodding, rule-bound clerks.<ref>McElwee, pp.54, 299–300</ref> In all aspects of preparation, planning and execution, their muddled efforts compared badly with that of their Prussian counterparts.

====Prussian staff analysis and army improvements====
In reviewing Prussian deficiencies against the Austrians, the General Staff made several improvements to increase the strategic and tactical proficiency of the King's army. [[Cavalry]] would no longer be held in reserve, but would actively screen the army's movements at all levels, make first contact with the enemy, and constantly observe hostile activities. Newly developed [[Rifling|rifled]] [[artillery]] would no longer be placed in the rear of the order of march for employment behind the infantry; instead, a significant detachment would travel with the advanced guard of the leading corps or other major element, and the remainder would march with the front of the main body, providing immediate artillery coverage of the advanced guard on contact and of the main body during subsequent deployment on the field. A renewed emphasis was placed on maintaining contact with subordinate and superior commands, so that commanders always were informed of units' locations on the battlefield, reducing the "[[fog of war]]" effect. Finally, the introduction of the breech-loading infantry rifle marked a revolution in weapons effect, so that Moltke made the following analysis in 1865:

<blockquote>The attack of a position is becoming notably more difficult than its defense. The defensive during the first phase of battle offers a decisive superiority. The task of a skillful offensive will consist of forcing our foe to attack a position chosen by us, and only when casualties, demoralization, and exhaustion have drained his strength will we ourselves take up the tactical offensive.... Our strategy must be offensive, our tactics defensive.<ref>Dupuy, pp. 88–92</ref></blockquote>

====Franco-Prussian War====
The government of [[Napoleon III]] was undoubtedly startled by the Prussian victory over Austria, and urgently sought to reform their army to face the conflict with Prussia which seemed inevitable and imminent. Their senior officers entirely failed to grasp the methods of the Prussian General Staff. The [[Chief of Staff of the French Army]], [[List of Marshals of France|''Maréchal de France'']] [[Edmond Le Bœuf]], fatuously stated in 1870 that the French Army was ready for war, "down to the last gaiter button." In the event, at the outset of the [[Franco-Prussian War]], 462,000 German soldiers concentrated flawlessly on the French frontier while only 270,000 French soldiers could be moved to face them, the French army having lost 100,000 stragglers before a shot was fired through poor planning and administration. (Most of these were reservists who had not been able to join their units before the units were hastily dispatched to join the armies forming up near the frontier.)<ref>McElwee, p. 46</ref>

During the war, there were again the inevitable mistakes due to the "fog of war", but German formations moved with a speed and precision which French staff officers, accustomed only to moving battalion-sized punitive columns, could not match. In the French army of the time, there was an anti-intellectual prejudice in favour of brave and unimaginative regimental officers over intelligent and well-trained staff officers. The French Army paid dearly for this bias in 1870 and 1871.<ref name="Morgan2009">{{cite book |translator=J. H. Morgan |title=The War Book of the German General Staff: Being "The Usages of War on Land" Issued by the Great General Staff of German Army |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9K5UDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT2 |year=1915 |publisher=McBRIDE, NAST & COMPANY |pages=2– |id=GGKEY:E9XBKUES5B3}}</ref>{{page needed |date=January 2021}}

The result of the strategic preparation by Moltke (and diplomatic maneuvers by Chancellor [[Otto von Bismarck]]) was complete Prussian victory. After the victory, [[Unification of Germany|Germany was unified]] as the Prussia-dominated [[German Empire]]; King [[William I, German Emperor|Wilhelm I of Prussia]] was proclaimed "German Emperor" on 18 January 1871. The German victory surprised many military professionals around the world. France had been considered a great military power while Prussia was widely considered a lesser power, despite its military successes in 1813–15 against Napoleon and more recently over Austria during the Seven Weeks' War of 1866.<ref>Dupuy, pp. 77–88</ref> Many nations adopted Prussian staff methods and structures, with mixed success.<ref>Dupuy, pp. 113–114</ref>

Throughout his tenure, Moltke pushed for the Prussian army to engage in reassessment and self-improvement at every command level to maintain tactical superiority relative to other nations. Moltke formalised the concept of [[mission-type tactics]], which emphasized the importance of initiative at all levels of command, even the lowest. Every Prussian tactical manual published after the Franco-Prussian War included this passage:

<blockquote>A favorable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must always be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient.<ref>Dupuy, p. 116</ref></blockquote>